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and their impact on state

financing of public

higher education during the period 1981-1992.
This

study makes

clear that Reaganomics was

and implemented based on the
could be cut,

faulty assumption that

the needy protected,

increased and the budget balanced.
economic policies
significant

developed

military spending
The

on state government

in two major ways:

taxes

impact of

these

finances was

the substantial

reduction

in

federal aid to state governments during the initial phase of
the implementation of Reaganomics;

and the transferring of

responsibility for certain social services
government to state governments,
Medicaid program.

from the federal

particularly in the

These changes in state finances had a

significant impact on state funding of public higher
education and access to these institutions.
The findings of this study have significant
implications

for the understanding of future state financing

and accessibility of public higher education because they
clearly establish the relationship between federal economic
policies,
education,

state finances,

state financing of public higher

and access to public higher education.

Because

of these relationships it becomes clear that the future
levels of state financing of public higher education and
access

to these institutions will depend greatly on the

economic policies of the federal government.

The

dissertation concludes with a an examination of the
potential

impact of the choices

facing the Clinton

administration on state financing of public higher
education.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO PROBLEM/STATEMENT OF RESEARCH

Field Of Study
The field of study in which this dissertation is
conducted is The Political Economy of Public Higher
Education.

This

is defined as

the external political

and economic relationship of public higher education to
state government,

the

federal government and the
I

private sector.

In the case of state government this

relationship takes

the

resource allocations,

form of governance structures,
financial aid policies and the

defining of public service
community.

for the higher education

In the case of the federal government this

relationship takes

the

economic policies,

federal research priorities,

financial aid policies.

form of the impact of

contracts,

and

In the case of the private

sector this relationship takes
grants,

federal

the form of gifts,

and the participation in governance.

Purpose Of Study
This dissertation addresses
of

the specific relationship

federal economic policies of the Reagan

administration,
education.

known as Reaganomics,

Its purpose is

primary question:

to public higher

to answer the following

2
How has state government financing of public
higher education been affected by Reaganomics?
Upon answering this question the

following question is

addressed:
What has been the impact on the accessibility of
public higher education of these policies?
In conducting this

study three questions are asked:

What were the economic policies of the Reagan
administration?
What was the impact on state finances of these
policies?
What was the effect on access to public higher
education of this impact on state finances?
For the purposes of
defined as

this

study

"state financing"

the funding appropriated to public higher

education from state funds.

This usually refers

lump sum or line item state appropriation.
state-financing can also
appropriations
aid,

library,

appropriations

individual

include

for such specific

to one

However,

"special"
items as

financial

special building projects or other

particular purposes.

included as

is

When using data on state

it will be stated clearly what is

state financing.

In the cases where

states utilize different appropriation

systems data will be used in terms of percentage
changes during a stated period of time.

So,

although

two different states might use different methods

to

3
appropriate money to public higher education,
comparative trends will be apparent
percentage changes.

the

through the use of

"Accessibility"

to higher

education is usually understood in terms of how the
financial aspects of attending the institution i.e.
cost of attendance and financial aid affect the ability
of

the population to attend the institution but it can

also refer to admission standards,

diversity of program

offerings and academic support services
tutoring or child care.

However,

such as

for the purposes of

this dissertation accessibility will be used in
relation to the cost of attendance.
economic policies"

The term "Federal

is used primarily to describe the

tax and spending policies of

the federal government.

Context
During the late 1980s and early 1990s

institutions

of public higher education in the United States have
been in severe financial crisis.

This crisis has been

precipitated by a national recession which has

led to

state budget difficulties across

In 1990

33

the country.

states reported fiscal problems^ with the number

^Michael deCourcy Hinds, "To Victors Go the Trials After
Races Against Taxes," New York Times. 19 November 1990, page B9.

4
rising to at least 37

states

in 1992.^

The problem

has become so severe that state appropriations

for

higher education in 1992-93 will be lower than two
years previously,
States history.

likely the first such drop in United
After adjusting

for inflation,

36

states will provide less money for public higher
education in academic year 1992-93
ago.^

This

than two years

funding crisis has brought about

significant changes

in public universities across

the

country including the reduction of academic programs
and layoffs of

faculty and staff and are threatening

the quality of the education being offered.
importantly,
reductions

as a means

Most

for dealing with these

in state appropriations,

tuition and fees at

public higher education institutions rose 22% between
1990

and 1992

severely threatening the accessibility of

public higher education.

Hypothesis
This dissertation expects

to

find that state

financing of public higher education has been

^Chronicle of Hicrher Education.

9 January 1991,

page A20.

^Scott Jaschik, “1% Decline in State Support for Colleges
Thought to be First 2-Year Drop Ever," Chronicle of Higher
Education. 21 October 1991, page A21.
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profoundly affected by the federal economic policies of
the Reagan administration.

This federal impact on

state financing occurs in the following way.

Since

approximately 18% of all state revenue in 1990 came
directly from federal aid/ any significant shift in
the level of federal aid creates a direct impact on
state finances.

When state revenues increase there is

more money available for higher education.

When state

revenues decrease there is less money available for
higher education.

The impact of these shifts is

magnified because a large proportion of state
expenditures are either mandated by law
state)

or viewed as essential services.

(federal or
This leaves

public higher education as a "discretionary"
expenditure and therefore much more susceptible to the
shifts in state financing.

When more money is

available it is often given disproportionately more
money.

When less money is available public higher

education often receives disproportionately less money.
The primary impact on public higher education of
any shifts in state financing is on the degree of
accessibility of the institutions.

Accessibility is

^U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States; 1992 (112th edition)
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992)
page

288.

6

measured in terms of cost of attendance taking into
account available financial aid.

Cost of attendance is

used to refer to the tuition and mandatory fees of
attending an institution of public higher education.
When state appropriations to public higher education
increase there are relatively low increases in the cost
of attendance and when state appropriations decrease
there are correspondingly high increases in the cost of
attendance.^

Significance of Study
This dissertation is significant in two ways: by
contributing new scholarly research to the field of the
political economy of public higher education;

and by

proposing new means for policy professionals,

higher

education administrators,

government officials and

union and student advocates to understand the impact of
federal economic policies on the financing of public
higher education in the 1990s.
In the literature on the political economy of
public higher education there has been no work

^Arthur M. Hauptman, "Trends in the Federal and State
Financial Commitment to Higher Education," The Uneasy Public
Policy Triangle in Higher Education: Quality, Diversity, and
Budgetary Efficiency (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1991): page 124.

7
published on the primary question of the impact of
federal economic policies on state financing of public
higher education.

There has been work conducted that

addresses pieces of the question and these form
important components of this study.
In the literature on intergovernmental fiscal
relations the question of the impact of changes in
federal spending on state spending is explored in a
number of works.

Benton,

Bahl and Sanders,

and Hanson

and Cooper all found that increases in federal aid tend
to lead to increases in state spending.^

Benton,

Stonecash and Stotsky in very recent studies found that
decreases in federal aid tended to lead to decreases in
state spending.^

Hedge indicates that in the short¬

term states may increase spending to compensate for
federal cutbacks but then decrease spending as the

®J, Edwin Benton, "Federal Aid Cutbacks and State and Local
Government Spending Policies," Intergovernmental Relations and
Public Policy, eds. J. Edwin Benton and David R. Morgan (New York:
Greenwood, 1986), pages 15-34; Roy W. Bahl and Robert J. Saunders,
"Determinants of Change in State and Local Government
Expenditures," National Tax Journal 18 (March 1965): page 50-57;
and Susan B. Hanson and Patrick Cooper, "State Expenditure Growth
and Revenue Elasticity," Policy Studies Journal 9 (Autiimn 1980) :
pages 26-33.
’'j. Edwin Benton, "The Effects of Changes in Federal Aid on
State and Local government Spending," Publius: The Journal of
Federalism 22 (Winter 1992): page 73; Jeffrey M. Stonecash, "State
Responses to Declining Federal Support: Behavior in the Post-1978
Era," Policy Studies Journal 18 (Spring 1990): page 5; and Janet
G. Stotsky, "State Fiscal Responses to Federal Government Grants,"
Growth and Change 22 (Summer 1991): page 28.

8

permanency of the cutbacks becomes more apparent.®
Nathan and Doolittle come the closest to addressing the
primary question of this dissertation in their
extensive study of state responses to federal cutbacks
in the 1980s.

They set out to determine the extent to

which states used their own funds to replace federal
aid cuts and how states responded differently to cuts
in different policy areas.

Using a fourteen state case

study they found that states responded in a manner that
two conclusions could be drawn:

that the likelihood of

replacing federal funds with state funds was determined
by the political and economic conditions in a
particular state and that those programs that were most
redistributive by nature were not only cut the most by
the federal government but were also the least likely
to receive state funds to compensate.®

However,

they

did not address the impact on state funded programs
such as public higher education that the state did not
receive direct aid from the federal government for.
All of these works contribute to this dissertation
by providing insight into the behavior of state

®David M. Hedge, "Fiscal Dependency and the State Budget
Process," Journal of Politics 45 (February 1983); pages 198-208.
^Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle and Associates, Reagan
and the States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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governments in reaction to changes in federal
expenditures but none directly address the question of
the impact of federal spending policies on state
financing of public higher education.
In the literature on public higher education
financing there are also works that substantially
contribute to this dissertation.

Arthur Hauptman in

The College Tuition Spiral does briefly address the
primary question posed in this dissertation.

He points

out:
...a state's ability to fund higher education
may be constrained by increased competition
between higher education and other state
priorities brought about by changing federal
priorities... that lead to more state
responsibility for functions previously
performed at the local level.
In his article

"Trends in the Federal and State

Financial Commitment to Higher Education" Hauptman also
finds that the way in which states provide funding for
higher education has a "large and inverse"

impact on

the rate of increase in the cost of attendance that
public institutions charge their students.
argues,

This,

he

is because the revenue from tuition and

mandatory fees at public higher education institutions
are generally used to fill the gap between state

^°Arthur M. Hauptman, The College Tuition Spiral
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), pages 14-15.

(New York:

10

appropriations
So when state

and the size of
funds

attendance tends
smaller gap to

institutional budgets.

increase rapidly,

to increase less

funds

increase

since there is a

fill between state funding and

institutional spending levels.
state

the cost of

slows,

When the growth of

then the cost of attendance tends

to

faster to make up for the larger difference

between institutional budgets and state funds.
Hauptman writes

that since the extent of state funds

available to public higher education is tied in a
direct way to the state economy there is a
relationship between changes
increases

"disturbing”

in economic conditions and

in cost of attendance.

When economic

conditions are bad a state cannot afford to increase or
even maintain institutional budgets so the cost of
attendance rises
state

faster.

funding increases

slow down.

As

so cost of attendance increases

Hauptman finds

in the 1980s.
the early 1980s

the economy improves,

that this

When the economy went into recession in
and state resources were scarce the

cost of attendance skyrocketed.
recovered in the mid-1980s
increases at public
argues

is what happened

When the economy

the cost of attendance

institutions eased.

Hauptman

that this runs counter to what the policy should

be where students are asked to pay the highest cost of

11
attendance increases when

times are good and the

least increase when students

can least afford them,

when economic conditions are bad.^^
confirmed by Mcpherson et al
found in their article

in an empirical analysis

"Recent Trends

Education Costs and Prices:
Fundinghave significant
dissertation.

These findings,

in U.S.

Higher

The Role of Government
implications

for this

By pointing out the probable

relationships between federal policies and state
finances and between state financing of public higher
education and the cost of attendance they lay a
foundation on which to build with the aim of
establishing the link between federal economic policies
and the accessibility of public higher education.
The establishment of the role of
policies on specific

federal economic

state policy areas

such as higher

education and the impact on the accessibility of public
higher education would constitute new findings
fields of

intergovernmental

in the

fiscal relations and the

^^Arthur M, Hauptman, "Trends in the Federal and State
Financial Commitment to Higher Education," in The Uneasy Public
Policy Triangle in Higher Education; Quality, Efficiency and
Budgetairy Efficiency, David H. Finifter, Roger G. Baldwin, and
John R. Thelin eds. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1991): pages 124-125.
^^Michael S. McPherson, Morton Owen Schapiro, and Gordon C.
Winston, "Recent Trends in U.S. Higher Education Costs and Prices:
The Role of Government Funding, " AEA Papers and Proceedings 79
(May 1989): pages 253-257.
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financing of public higher education and would provide
new insights

into

higher education.

the political

economy of public

The establishment of these

relationships would also suggest new lines of inquiry
in the fields

i.e.

how the economic,

educational,

or

governing philosophies of different federal
administrations

impacted on public higher education

through this relationship and what does
relationship suggest

this

for the advocacy activities

in

support of public higher education.
This dissertation also has
education administrators,
and student advocates,

significance for higher

policy professionals,

union

and government officials who

develop policy and advocate for public higher
education.

In the present

financial crisis

higher education most of the

in public

focus of administrators,

policy professionals and other advocates of public
higher education has been on the actions of state
government.
level

i.e

The discussion has centered on the micro
state tax and expenditure policies,

an understanding of the macro level
government end up in this

i.e.

how did state

financial crisis?

discussion concerning decreases

without

The

in state revenues has

been primarily about whether there should be more
taxes,

who are the players

involved in this decision.

13
and what are their motivations.

The discussion about

expenditures has been about how to pay for various
services,

what are the choices

should make,

who has

the most

that state government
influence,

suffer most in the population.
important questions
and answering,

and who will

Though these are very

that are certainly worth studying

without at least an understanding of the

role of the Reagan economic policies

in causing the

difficult situation state governments are presently in
then the discussion about

the state financial crisis

and policy decisions and advocacy activities concerning
public higher education are based on an incomplete and
inadequate understanding of the situation.
The findings of this dissertation will contribute
significantly in providing this macro level
understanding.

In the dissertation the connection

between the economic policies of the Reagan
administration and the present crisis
government

in state

finances will be established thus providing

a context in which to understand the present situation.
This macro level understanding will
of state political dynamics

inform the analysis

involving decisions made to

deal with the financial crisis.

If the role of the

federal government in causing the crisis
then the focus of

finding solutions

is understood

should change from

14
blaming
state

state

legislatures,

employees,

tax-limitation groups,

or social

federal

service recipients,

lobbying

the

government

policies

that would counter

administration and bring
financial

good health.

important

for

which often

in competition

those

enact
of

the Reagan

This

becomes particularly
education community

itself pitted against

for

funds,

or against

groups made up of members
higher education needs

economic

state government back to

the public higher

finds

to

to

of

social

services

tax-limitation

the private

sector whom

to be working with

instead of

against.
The
and its

timing of
findings

this

study

even more

is

especially significant

important

the new economic plan being put

in

in

the context

front

of

the

American public by the Clinton administration.
plan

is

analyzed and acted upon

the

higher education administrators,
and advocates must be
state government
the plan's

impact

the

finances.

impact
As

terms

service repayment

of

of

the plan on

education

the proposal

loans.

But

a whole

continues

the public
is
for

this

service policy proposal becomes meaningless
economic plan as

the

of public

introduced to

of

As

policy professionals

on public higher

presented primarily in
national

on

focus

of

if

the policies

national
the
of

the
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Reagan administration towards state governments where
mandates and responsibilities are increased while
financial resources are decreased.
If the public higher education community focuses
on the national service proposal as the primary impact
on public higher education they do a serious disservice
to the future of public higher education.

If the

Reagan administration's policies are continued in
relation to state government then public higher
education will continue the pattern of the 1980s:
decreases in state-financing and increases in the cost
of attendance.

And even if the grandiose national

service plan is enacted,

the amount of money available

for loans will likely not cover ever increasing costs
of attendance.

Therefore,

accessibility will be

further curtailed and the crisis facing public higher
education will intensify.

This dissertation provides

the framework from which to initiate this broad based
discussion about the Clinton plan and any other plan
that follows it.

It enables the public higher

education community to see the forest through the trees
and hopefully describe that forest to the public.

16
Audience
This dissertation is targeted to higher education
scholars,

administrators,

and policy professionals.

It

will also be very useful for any scholars or policy
professionals in intergovernmental relations or
political economy as well as for state and federal
government officials

.

Parameters
During the discussion of the results of the Reagan
economic program this dissertation focuses primarily on
the tax and spending policies.

However,

there are many

other variables that play an important role in the
economy that are not discussed.

For example,

during

the 1980s there were significant changes in the private
sector that influenced the results of the Reagan
economic program.

During the 1970s and 1980s there was

a dramatic change in the type of jobs being created in
the United States.

Between 1973 and 1980 over 11

million new jobs were created in the private sector and
more than 7 0% of them were in retail and service.
This trend continued into the 1980s and served to
change the level of income of Americans,

thus the tax

^^John W. Cole and Gerald F. Reid, "The New Vulnerability of
Higher Education", Thought & Action v.II, no.l, page 33.
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base,

and provided evidence of a transformation of the

American economic landscape.

This change was further

magnified by the tremendous influx of foreign
investment during the 1970s and 1980s and the
internationalization of capital.
industry,

The computer

very much a player in the growth of the mid

1980s saw a huge drop in sales and its place in the
world market.

The manufacturing base of the United

States economy also declined significantly during the
198Os.The policies of the Federal Reserve Bank
also play a significant role in the outcome of federal
economic policies in terms of their control over the
money supply.

These are all important economic factors

that influenced the outcome of the Reagan economic
program and are not fully discussed in this
dissertation.
There were also many other forces in society
advocating significant changes in the role of the
federal government and its relations with state
government than just those in the Reagan
administration.

These different forces,

especially

^^Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves
for 21st Century Capitalism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991),
page 136.
^^Reich,

The Work of Nations,

pages 159-162.
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right-wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation
and the Hoover Institute,

and Christian fundamentalist

organizations grouped under the heading of the Moral
Majority played a significant role in affecting public
opinion and policy.

These forces are not discussed in

the dissertation.
There are also many other significant factors that
affect state finances besides federal economic policies
such as the national and international competitiveness
of state-based industries.

More importantly during

the time period discussed there was a powerful tax and
expenditure limitation movement that played an
important role in state finances.

This movement to

limit the ability of state government to tax and spend
forced states to consider spending reductions in the
face of federal aid reductions and other state tax
revenue decreases.
dissertation,

Although touched upon in this

especially when examining specific state

finances in Massachusetts,

California and New York,

the

impact of these tax and expenditure limitation efforts
on state finances and therefore funding of public
higher education are not fully discussed.
The impact of the Reagan administration's economic
policies had other effects on public higher education
besides through the impact on state-financing.

Direct

19
federal funding of research activities at public
universities had a significant impact on the priorities
of universities particularly in terms of program
support and graduate education.Federal economic
policies also impacted on public higher education
through federal financial aid policies.

During the

Reagan administration after adjusting for inflation
federal financial aid declined 1.3% between 1980-81 and
1989-90 while institutional financial aid grew 90%
after adjusting for inflation during the same period.
The federal share of available financial aid decreased
from 83% to 75% while institutional aid grew from 12%
to 19% of the total with state aid increasing from 5%
to 6%.

This despite an increased cost of attendance for

public higher education of approximately 25% after
adjusting for inflation.Although touched on in the
discussion of the effect on access to public higher
education of changes in state financing,

the impact of

federal financial aid policies is not fully discussed.
The federal government also affects public higher

^®Vera Kistiakowsky, "Military Funding of University
Research," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 502 (March, 1989): page 141.
^^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1980 to 1989
(Washington, D.C.: College Entrance Examination Board, August,
1989) pages 6-13.
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education through a process known as

"ear-marking"

of

funds which represents direct appropriations from the
federal government to individual institutions for
designated purposes.

In FY 1992 over $600 million was

appropriated to higher education
through this method.^®

(public and private)

The impact of federal ear¬

marking on public higher education finance is not
discussed in this study.
This dissertation also does not explore the impact
on state financing of public higher education of the
significant changes in college-age population
demographics.

The change in demographics during the

time period discussed affected state financing
particularly in states that have funding formulas that
include variables for eligible students or students
applying for admission.

The change in demographics

also affects states without formula funding when state
governments take into account the rise and fall of the
population that most extensively uses the public higher
education system.

^®Colleen Cordes and Jack Goodman, "Congress Earmarked a
Record $684 Million for Non-Competitive Projects on Campuses,"
Chronicle of Higher Education 15 April 1992, page 1.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
The literature reviewed for this study represents
the seminal works in the field of the political economy
of public higher education as defined in terms of the
external relationships of public higher education.

The

literature chosen provides the historical perspective,
theoretical background,

and present and future context

in which the study is conducted.

The review focuses on

the relationship between the private sector and public
higher education during the industrial revolution,

the

evolving interaction between public higher education
and the military,
"multiversity"

and the role of the modern

in a global economy.

First literature is reviewed that provides the
historical context in which the study is conducted.
This historical perspective entails a brief examination
of the land grant movement and then a more in-depth
review of the role of public higher education during
the industrial revolution and the two world wars.

Then

literature is reviewed which focuses upon the
characteristics of today's external relationships of
public higher education.
9

The literature analyzes the
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term
of

"multiversity"

the

seminal work The Uses

the University by Clark Kerr as

which

to present

public
of

and uses

education

It

in

on

on the demands

global

from

the role

in defining and meeting

focuses

the

springboard

different perspectives

universities'

society.

a

of

the needs

on public higher

economy and what

is

and will

be

expected

from public higher education today and in

the

future.

This

and

contextual

examination provides

the

framework upon which the

theoretical

study is based.

The Land-Grant Movement
Public higher
in earnest with
colleges

education

the

schools.

enabling

in

the Morrill

in Congress before

both houses
on
was

the

the

seventy one

legislation of

that

federal

unconstitutional.

considered quite

the

1862 when the original

This

came after an earlier

the Civil War

that passed

but was vetoed by President James

grounds

the

Land-Grant College Act was

signed by Abraham Lincoln.
attempt

of

that were defined as

The

land-grant movement was
legislation,

the United States began

establishment

and universities

"Land-grant

in

involvement

Therefore

Buchanan

in education

the Morrill Act was

a breakthrough.

The motivation behind the movement was the
development of two major political forces in the United
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States:

the rapid industrial and agricultural

development of the United States that had developed
tremendous momentum in the middle of the 1800's and the
growing democratic,

egalitarian,

developing in the country.

and populist forces

Both of these forces put

tremendous pressure on the federal government to become
involved in education.

As the Land-Grant movement

developed it became supported by many different sectors
of society who saw its development as potentially
benefiting their interests:

farmers,

emerging industrial capitalist class.

laborers,

and the

As a result of

this interesting coalescence of political forces the
Land-Grant movement developed into a powerful crusade
to involve the federal government in the business of
higher education.

It was thought that only with the

massive resources of the federal government involved
could the far-reaching and ambitious goals of the
movement be obtained.

These goals were the following:

democratize higher education by making it accessible to
all members of society with a focus on a more
vocational philosophy of higher education;

and to

emphasize the emerging fields of applied science in
agriculture and engineering that were seen to be
crucial to the development of the United States during
this period.
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There have been many books written about the LandGrant movement that are considered authoritative
histories including those by Edward D.
Edmond,

Allan Nevin,

is Earle D.

Eddy,

and Roger Williams.^®

Ross's Democracy College:

College in the Formative State

(1942)

Joseph B.

However it

The Land-Grant
that is

considered the seminal work on the Land Grant movement.
Ross argues that the movement to increase access
was done in the spirit of moving towards a more
classless society with the doors to all aspects of the
political,

social,

and economic system open to all

through access to education.

By working towards the

democratization of higher education through increased
accessibility the architects of the land-grant movement
were also making a statement about the undemocratic and
inaccessible nature of existing private colleges and
universities.

In Ross'

view the accessibility and

democratization of higher education was intimately tied
to implementing a vocational philosophy of higher

^®see Edward D. Eddy, Jr., Colleges for Our Land and Time:
The Land-Grant Idea in American Education (New York: Harper,
1957); J.B. Edmond, The Magnificent Charter: The Origin and Role
of the Morill Land-Grant Colleges and Universities (Hicksville.
N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1978); Allan Nevins, The State
Universities and Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1962); and Roger L. Williams, The Origins of Federal Support for
Higher Education: George W. Atherton and the Land-Grant College
Movement (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1991.)
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education.

This training would appeal to what he

describes as the "industrial classes" which included
nearly 75% of the members of society:
laborers.

farmers and

Ross points out that the focus on a

vocational orientation was partly a result of the
growing agitation and class consciousness of labor and
farm groups.

He writes that organized labor groups no

longer sought education merely for general training but
now were agitating for training in special competence
in craftsmanship as well.

Special training was seen as

both a protection against losing a job one already had
and as a means to getting a better one.

Specialized

educational training was also thought to be a way to
gain competency in management aspects of agriculture
and the ability to influence the political system,

thus

aiding the struggle against discrimination and
disparity within the agriculture economy.^®
Ross writes that the goal of emphasizing science,
both as a field of study and as an essential aspect of
the development of the nation,

would have tremendous

consequences for the future of higher education and the
nation.

Agriculture in particular was beginning to be

^°Earle D. Ross, Democracy's Collecre; The Land-Grant Movement
in the Formative State (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press,
1942), page 18.
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seen as a science and,

combined with the emerging

industrialization of the country,

applied science was

seen as an essential part of economic development by
the emerging industrial capitalist class.
point,

he writes,

At that

most Americans who wished to study

scientific fields were forced to go to Europe and many
of these people,
minds,

some of America's most brilliant

decided to stay there,

thus depriving the United

States of much needed brain power and scientific
discoveries.
The relationship between the American military and
universities and colleges also began with the Morrill
Act of 1862 which stated that institutions financed
under the terms of the act through income from the sale
of federal lands must offer military training as part
of the curriculum.

Ross writes that since the act was

being considered by Congress eight months into the
Civil War the sponsor of the Act,
Morrill of Vermont,
the brief clause

Congressman Justin

was able to insert into the measure

"and including military tactics".

There were two underlying motivations behind the
military provision of the Act.

The first was the

already strong commitment to the concept of a citizen

^^Ross,

Democracy's College,

page 15-18.
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militia and avoiding the need for a standing army.
There was

strong sentiment expressed in the union at

that point,

including that by Congressman Morrill,

avoid the possibility that
military needs might

to

the nation's growing

lead to a large professional

military establishment.

By providing military training

in civilian-run colleges,

he argued,

it was hoped that

the establishment of such a professional military could
be avoided.

The second was

the tendency of the union

to judge every public institution by its utility in
achieving some social purpose thus,
making it almost inevitable that

according to Ross,

the public university

would be called on to serve the military.
For the

first 30 years,

training provision appears
since the Act left
to be imposed.

the Morrill Act's military

to have had little impact

the states to determine how it was

Most land-grant states made military

training compulsory for able-bodied men in their first
two college years,
on tactics.
period,

and curriculum included course work

Most of the training during this

however,

seems

to have amounted to a few hours

of drill each week.^^

^^Ross,

time

Democracy's College,

page 122.
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Industrialization
Research
David Noble,
Design:

Science,

Capitalism,

in his

seminal work America by

Technology,

outlines

and the Rise of Corporate

the historical

evolution of

science as a basis of american economic development and
the role of the educational
argues

that the process of

system in this process.

He

integrating applied

scientific research and training with the higher
education system played a fundamental role in the
development of american capitalism during the
industrial revolution of the early 20th century.
Noble writes

that in the early 1800s colleges were

still very traditionally oriented and there was
considerable disdain among the academics
of experimental science.

Therefore,

for the study

he writes,

technical education in the United States developed in
conflict with what he calls

the classical colleges.

This happened through the development of technological
studies within these colleges and the rise of technical
colleges and institutes outside these traditional
schools.

Noble points

though often feeble,

out

that

attempts at

there were numerous,
integrating technical

education into the traditional American higher
education institutions as

early as

1749 when Benjamin
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Franklin argued for instruction in mathematics,
surveying,

navigation,

architecture,

agriculture and commerce.

and the science of

In 1756 Franklin helped

establish the Public Academy in the City of
Philadelphia which attempted to integrate technical
education into a traditional

education program,

but the

advocates of the traditional perspective were very
strong and by 1811 the program had been watered down
such that science was confined to the senior year and
consisted only of astronomy,
chemistry,

natural philosophy,

and electricity.^^

success of these attempts

Because of

the limited

to integrate technical

education into the traditional

educational

institutions

the rise of technical education took place more
prominently outside these traditional
a major step towards
Massachusetts

this end,

institutions.

in 1861

Institute of Technology

established by scientific and civic

As

the
(MIT)

leaders

was
in Boston.

The biggest leap forward however for technical
education came about as a result of
legislation.

According to Noble,

that had previously been reluctant

the Land-Grant

state
to

legislatures

fund technical

^^David F. Noble, America By Design; Science, Technology &
the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979), page 20.
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instruction now were eager to accept federal grants
made available by Morrill for the purpose of
establishing new types of schools for the purpose of
studying agriculture and the mechanical arts.

In the

first decade after the Act was passed the number of
engineering schools increased from six to 70.
there were 85 and by 1917 there ^ere 126.^^

By 1880

Still

when these engineering and agriculture schools opened
there was considerable resistance to focusing on
"practical" problems.

The mind set of the classical

college where abstract and theoretical problems were
the main focus, was still prevalent,

but it soon became

obvious that most of the graduates from these programs
were ill-equipped for jobs in industry and agriculture,
and there developed strong support for the curricula to
be adapted to meet the demands of the "real world".
For many years this struggle continued with conflicting
forces pressuring these institutions to be all things:
academically respectable,

based in esoteric knowledge

and meeting the need of employers for practically
trained graduates.

^^Noble,

America By Design,

page 24.

^^Noble,

America By Design,

page 28.
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Noble writes that during this period in the late
19th century industrial engineers were focusing their
attention upon translating the basic research of the
new university-based scientists into products,

but

rarely concerned themselves with the actual production
of scientific discovery itself.
20th century this had changed.

However,

in the early

The introduction of

organized research laboratories in industry,

and the

effort to integrate universities within this industrial
structure brought about an attempt by industrial
engineers to become intimately involved in basic
research.^®

As early as 183 0 some industrial firms

had employed university scientists to do research.

But

it wasn't until the industrial revolution of the late
1800s and early 1900s that industry became convinced
that research was an essential part of its work.

And

with this realization came the understanding that they
needed to look outside industry for this research.
This led to the idea of a coordinated system of
industry,

universities and government.

This meant that

the historical distinctions between basic and applied
research and industry and the university were melting
away and,

^®Noble,

as Noble points out,

America By Design,

the distinction between

page 110.
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scientific research and industrial research became one
only of motive.

The motive for scientific research was

the search for truth while the motive behind industrial
research was to maximize prof its.
It was during the first 25 years of the 20th
century that industry began establishing in-house
research facilities and started attracting university
based scientists to work in these facilities.

Noble

views this period as the beginning of the link between
university and industry research efforts.^®

It was

also during the early 1900s that the first faculty
exchanges between industry and universities occurred.
The purpose was to enable universities to keep abreast
of the changes in the industries and to enable
manufacturers to obtain needed expertise.

This was

modeled after a system in Germany where universities
and manufacturers worked closely together.At the
University of Kansas the Industrial Fellowship system
was established where members of the faculty were
appointed for a two-year period to work exclusively on
projects defined by the sponsoring company,

^’^Noble,

America By Design,

page 112.

^®Noble,

America By Design,

page 118.

^^Noble,

America By Design,

page 122.

which would
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also undeinvrite the cost.

Any discoveries made during

this work would become the property of the company.
During this time industry began to recognize that
universities were the ideal places for research.

One

reason was that universities could provide a continuous
stream of personnel both new faculty and the constant
influx of new graduate students.
resources within the university,

Because of meager
industry was in a

perfect position to provide the funding necessary for
these universities to expand their research
capabilities.

Many leaders in industry argued

fervently for increased support for both basic and
applied research.

Noble points out that these

industrial leaders saw clearly that not only would this
support meet their needs in the short-term but,
more importantly,

perhaps

would "retool" american higher

education to be more in tune with the demands of
industry.

This,

according to Noble,

is one of the most

important aspects of this period.
Noble points out that the first official
recognition of the university's responsibility to
industry was in 1903 when the University of Illinois
established the first university "engineering

^°Noble, America By Design,

page 131.
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experiment station"
1887,

in the country.

The Hatch Act of

the second land grant legislation,

had provided

the federal funds for the establishment of agricultural
experiment stations at land-grant institutions
throughout the country and,

while this succeeded in

greatly stimulating research for agriculture,

it did

not encourage the development of the second aspect of
the Morrill Act:

the promotion of the mechanic arts.

In 1896 Congress passed additional legislation
appropriating funds for the establishment of
engineering experiment stations.

Noble writes that as

the 2 0th century arrived many politicians and
industrial leaders argued that industry was the
economic future of America

(and therefore the needs of

industry were equal or greater than those of
agriculture) ,

and that the role of land-grant

institutions in meeting these demands of industry was
essential,

hence the establishment of the engineering

experiment stations.

Recognition of the preeminence of

industry was also reflected in the federal government's
creation of the Bureau of Standards and the transfer of
industry oriented bureaus from the Department of the
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Interior to that of Commerce where they didn't have to
compete with agriculture for government support.
The most advanced cooperation between industrial
and university research developed at MIT,

which had

originally received 30% of the land-grant college
appropriation in Massachusetts as a school of mechanic
arts.

MIT established the "Technology Plan"

in which a

standard contract was made available by the institute
whereby industry could benefit from the Institute's
resources in exchange for a standard fee.
the contract,

According to

MIT agreed to make available to the

companies the library,

as well as faculty for meetings

to discuss the company's problems.

MIT went further

and maintained a record of the qualifications and
special expertise of its alumni so as to assist the
companies in obtaining qualified personnel for
permanent employment.

Those in charge at MIT perceived

this plan to be mutually beneficial' to industry and the
educational processes at the institute.According
to Noble,

the plan was an immediate success.

MIT's

cooperation provided industry with an essential source
of basic and applied research and trained personnel.

^^Noble,

America By Design,

pages 135-36.

^^Noble,

America By Design,

pages 142-43.
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As the industrial revolution grew,

and other industries

developed a need for resources such as these,

the

dependence of industry on places such as MIT grew
accordingly.
Noble points out that this increased cooperation
between industry and university research not only
shifted much of the cost of scientific research and
training from industry to the public sector
universities)

(land-grant

but also transformed the form and content

of scientific research itself.

This meant more than

the shift in emphasis from basic to applied research.
There occurred a fundamental transformation in the
agenda of the research efforts: what kinds of questions
would be asked; what specific questions would be asked;
which problems would be investigated; what sorts of
solutions would be sought; what conclusions would be
drawn.

Noble argues that it is this point in history

that science had been fully enlisted in the service of
capital and was now fully integrated in the capitalist
economy.

^^Noble,

America By Design,

page 145.

^^Noble,

America By Design,

page 147.
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Training
The connection between industry and university
took the shape of more than just research.

The need of

industry for a trained work force was as essential as
that of research because without the trained personnel
there could be no research conducted nor their industry
managed.

Noble writes that during this period there

were two general categories of workers needed by
industry:

the skilled and unskilled labor that did the

actual work and the managers who designed and
supervised the production process.

Accordingly,

Noble

divides the educational process into two categories:
industrial education as the means for producing the
labor;

and higher education,

education,

especially engineering

as the means of producing the managers.

At the beginning of the 20th century industry was
working closely with higher education on issues of
curriculum and recruitment,
education of workers.
working population,
system,

and promoted the industrial

They sought to educate the

mostly through the public K-12

on how to carry out the directives of

management most efficiently.
however,

Engineering education,

was viewed in a different light as it was the

^^Noble, America By Design,

page 168.
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source of their managerial work force.
Noble writes,

Therefore,

industry sought to bring both the form

and content of the engineering education into line with
what they saw to be both the short-term and long-term
needs of industry.

Procedures for rating and

evaluating students had to be standardized and a stateof-mind had to be instilled that included a sense of
"corporate responsibility,

teamwork,

service and

loyalty and had to provide fundamental training in
social sciences and humanities which were then
perceived as essential for an effective manager".^®
As in the development of research,

the

transformation of higher education evolved at three
levels:

corporate in-house training programs,

educational institutions that formed cooperative
programs with industry and new federal agencies created
during World War I that would coordinate these
activities on a nationwide level.

During the

beginnings of the industrial revolution corporations
educated prospective managers through their own schools
set up precisely for this purpose.

But in 1913 the

National Association of Corporation Schools

(NACS)

was

created for the purpose of coordinating the efforts of

^®Noble,

America By Design,

page 170.
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industry to

obtain

trained managers

importantly,

to

institutions

to gear

industry.

In

fact,

ideal would be
business

influence
their
it was

to put

by gearing

the

the

that

so

and training

for which the

Up

Thus NACS became

to

schools
of
not
of

that point

efforts

toward the needs

openly acknowledged that
corporation

the

schools

industries,

science

for

corporation
the

the

in

had been
but

emphasis

scientific

As

independent

of

of

services
had been

industry-

the

of

engineering
the majority

created as

the

stated earlier,

a result

extensions

established schools

approach to

this

included an

theory rather

the

schools

than

industrial

remained relatively

industry and produced graduates who were

ill-suited

for

the discipline

industrial work or poorly trained

^’'Noble,

the

state and private universities which

As

practice.

of

these matters.

the gap between

engineering.
upon

out

schools

agency for

demanded an academically respectable

either

schools

and industry had resulted because

engineering
of

established educational

they could provide

education cooperation

more

established educational

institutions

created.

the

and,

America By Design,

of

applied

in the practical

pages 182-83.
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applications necessary to do the work.^®

Ironically

it was the alumni from many of these engineering
schools within universities that led the fight to
change this. As these alumni became leaders in industry
they put pressure upon their alma matas to change the
focus of the curriculum so as to bring it into line
with the requirements of practical work in industry.
A major aspect of this effort was the
establishment of cooperative education where students
combined on the job training with classroom work.

This

began as early as 1910 at the University of Pittsburgh,
the University of Cincinnati and MIT.

The Cooperative

system was seen as a bridge between the pure science
approach and the practical needs of industry.

The next

step was the development of the university as a keeper
of records and files on students and alumni so as to
help fit them with the needs of industry.

This

information focused on character evaluations as well as
the scholastic record.Soon the cooperative
education movement spread to other areas of the economy
besides engineering.

Banks established business-

fellowship plans with various schools that involved one

^®Noble, America By Design,

page 184.

^^Noble, America By Design,

pages 197-99,
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year of employment at the bank during the four year
college career.

However,

it wasn't until the

involvement of the military in the years preceding
World War I that industry was able to dramatically
alter the way in which higher education worked to serve
industrial needs.

Militarization
Training
Early in May,

1917 leading educators gathered in

Washington to formulate a comprehensive policy for the
cooperation between higher education and the government
which would make the most effective use of the higher
education institutions in the World War I effort.^°
Representatives of 187 institutions gathered and
decided to modify curricula to fulfill the need for
technical and vocational training,

to coordinate their

efforts so as to provide the "efficient use of
institutional plant,

force and equipment",

students below draft age,

(especially those in

engineering and other technical fields)
school and complete their training.

^°Noble,

America By Design,

and to urge

page 209.

to stay in

Most importantly
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the educators decided to provide military training for
all able-bodied college men/^
The military expressed a priority need for
vocationally trained men,

which coincided with an

expressed need of industry.

The U.S. War Department

established a Committee on Education and Special
Training

(CEST)

whose membership consisted of national

leaders in industry and higher education.

CEST

formally took charge of American vocational and higher
education during the war.

Secretary of War Baker

explained that CEST was established for the "purpose of
organizing and coordinating all the educational
resources of the country with relation to the needs of
the Army,

and to represent the War Department in its

relations with the educational institutions of the
country and to develop and standardize policies as
between the schools and colleges and the War
Department" .
During the summer of 1918 the Vocational Division
of CEST trained 38,000 draftees in twenty basic trades
at educational institutions selected by CEST.

They

developed unprecedented short courses for intensive

^^Noble,

America By Design,

page 210.

^^Noble,

America By Design,

page 215.
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training in technical,
subjects.

vocational and military

While this was happening,

the United States

Bureau of Education called a conference "to consider
the permanent effect on industrial education of the
plans and methods which were developed under the stress
of the war emergency and to formulate plans for
utilizing the best of the experience thus gained".
CEST also focused upon the problem of supplying
officers

for the war effort through the training and

recruitment of college students.

It was assigned the

task of developing a large body of men in the colleges
that would serve as a military asset.
age was 21,

Since the draft

students between 18 and 21 were encouraged

to enroll in the Student Army Training Corps
which would grant them military status,
under military authority,

(SATC)

bring them

and allow them to continue

their education until called upon by the military.
In August,

1918 the draft age was lowered to 18,

thus jeopardizing the efforts of CEST.
developed a plan,

however,

But CEST

to make the SATC mandatory

which led to the Government taking charge of nearly all
colleges and universities in the United States.
American education thus was placed under military

^^Noble,

America By Design,

page 216.
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authority as exercised through CEST.

This opportunity

provided industry and their supporters in higher
education the chance to break down the academic
barriers that had made difficult their efforts to
transform higher education institutions from
theoretical-based institutions to ones serving the
practical needs of industry.

Old courses of study were

abolished and were substituted with short intensive
courses for men with specific duties in the Army.
Changes that previously seemed nearly impossible were
now easily envisioned.

On October 1,

1918 the new SATC

was formally implemented at 500 colleges throughout the
country and American higher education came officially
under military command.

CEST insisted on such

uniformity that it ordered that the ceremonies on all
campuses be identical and take place simultaneously.
However this unprecedented situation was short-lived as
the Armistice of November 11 caught CEST by surprise.
The CEST final report expressed regret that there was
not more time to perfect the organization.

Therefore

the guise of the military authority was now gone and in
order to implement their plans they were forced to do
so under different auspices.

^^Noble,

America By Design, pages 221-223.
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These events demonstrate that the first World War
had a tremendous effect on the relationship between
industry,

the federal government and higher education.

For the first time there was a national effort to
coordinate research and training activities in
accordance with a national plan.

It was clear that

this plan was mainly being devised by industrial
leaders and their sympathizers in the federal
government and institutions of higher education.

Noble

points out that after the war many industrialists who
were part of the efforts to reform higher education
wrote about the changes of the student body under
military authority.

Particularly noteworthy to them

was the greater efficiency of the student body in terms
of

"physical fitness,

the development of courtesy and

the spirit of service and self-sacrifice".
to Noble,

According

their goal became the implementation of these

changes in the peace-time era.

Since the legislation

establishing CEST allowed its members to retain their
military status and authority in peacetime,

their first

act was the revitalization of the Reserve Officers
Training Corps

(ROTC)

which had been suspended during

the war when SATC was established.

^^Noble,

America By Design,

pages 224-25.
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Soon after the end of the war the CEST was
officially dissolved but a new Education and Recreation
Branch of the War Plans Division was created

(E & R) .

Enrollment in the ROTC grew from 35,000 in 1916 to
120,000 in 1925 and the program served to maintain a
military presence on college campuses thereby extending
the benefits of
Army".

"military discipline beyond the active

This was very important from the industrial

standpoint as the ROTC units on the campuses provided
technical education for potential officers at the
government's expense,

in addition to the purely

military instruction.

The E & R pushed for the

extension of military discipline into all areas of
national life and established the new military
philosophy which identified training for industry with
military training.'*®
signal the end of

The end of the war did not

"universal military training";

it

only meant that this training would now be carried on
outside of the military proper in the country's
educational institutions.

Efforts were made to promote

physical fitness as well as loyalty to and support of
"American ideals".

^®Noble,

America By Design,

page 226.
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The most important activity of the E & R,
was how to select,

however,

train and assign men to the right

jobs as defined by the demands of the military and
industry.

They were anxious to adopt the practices

that had proved effective for military mobilization in
a manner that would improve the organization of
personnel for industrial work.^"^

The E & R was not

the only agency that kept the CEST activities alive
during peacetime.
Federation

(PRF)

In 1919 the Personnel Research
was established and became the

country's central agency for personnel research.

The

PRF was responsible for conducting personnel research
for industry which measured human usefulness,
standardization of vocational terminology,
preparation of job specifications.'*®

the

and the

During the next

few years the focus turned to the question of who would
take responsibility for achieving the standardization
of terminology and specifications.
government,

Representatives of

industry and educational institutions that

were members of PRF agreed that educational
institutions were the appropriate place for such work.

^’^Noble, America By Design,

page 228.

^®Noble,

page 231.

America By Design,
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This brought the issue of industry-university
cooperation back to the forefront.

It was proposed

that industry as a whole would develop the job
specifications and requirements that the schools
demanded and the schools would provide the
complementary testing,

training,

selection and

distribution of manpower for industry.

This was to

deal with one of the pressing problems facing industry:
the shortage of technically trained personnel as a
result of casualties during the war,

the decline in

attendance at universities and the drop in
immigration.
These efforts were centered on three ideas:

"to

perpetuate the centralized authority achieved during
the war which entailed the extension of governmental
and industrial authority over education;

the

standardization of american education procedures and
institutional classification;

and the extension within

the educational institutions themselves of the testing,
rating and guidance procedures developed by the
science-based industries before the war".^°

However,

the war had generated deep divisions within the

^®Noble,

America By Desicrn,

page 237.

®°Noble,

America By Design,

pages 247-48.
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American population and many educators outside the
industry-university-government circles were now arguing
strenuously that it was specifically the role of the
university to stand apart from government and industry
so that it might encourage the unrestricted pursuit of
knowledge.

The governmental repression during and
/

after the war also gave birth to a powerful social
movement to establish academic freedom as a foundation
of american university life.

People in this movement

viewed military training as coercive which was a
dramatic change from the ideology of the 19th century,
when military training was viewed as an integral part
of character building and responsible citizenship.
Research
Noble points out WWI was also the turning point
for federal involvement in university research.

This

increased involvement of the federal government began
after the sinking of the Lusitania in July,

1915 when

the Secretary of the Navy wrote to Thomas Edison to ask
about the possibility of creating "machinery and
facilities for utilizing the natural inventive genius
of America to meet the new conditions of warfare..."
This inquiry led to the establishment of the Naval
Consulting Board.

One of the first actions of the NCB

was to recommend the creation of a special naval
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laboratory under the command of civilian scientists.
The Navy agreed and a substantial appropriation was
made for that purpose.
April,

When the war broke out in

1917 the project was dropped,

leaving as the

major activity of the NCB during the war the screening
of public suggestions and inventions for possible
military use.

This proved to be quite fruitless as

110,000 suggestions led to 100 detailed examinations
and only one project that actually went into
production.
In 1916 President Wilson approved the creation of
the National Research Council.

Its stated objectives

included the "preparation of an inventory of scientific
personnel,

equipment,

and current research work;

cooperation with educational institutions and research
foundations;

the promotion of research relating to

national defense;

the creation of a clearinghouse;

and

for the coordination of research projects and
scientific information".®^

With the outbreak of war

in 1917 the National Research Council

(NRC)

was charged

with the organization of military research and the
coordination of scientific resources for the war.

^^Noble, America By Design,

pages 149-50.

^^Noble,

pages 152-153.

America By Design,

The
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NRC was the first federal agency created for the
purpose of coordinating and influencing research
activities.

Though the war ended before much of these

efforts could get off the ground they served as a warm¬
up for American scientists who became accustomed to
working together for the quick solution of an immediate
problem.
From the outset the NRC was an industrial as well
as a military research agency.
was

Its original purpose

"to bring into cooperation existing governmental,

industrial and other research organizations.

Though

the early part of the war served as an opportunity for
the consolidation of scientific efforts Noble points
out that as early as eight months before the Armistice
leaders of the council began to shift the emphasis
explicitly from a military to an industrial focus.
In the years just prior to World War II,

the

relationship between the military and university
research intensified.

According to Richard DeLauer in

his article "The Good of It and Its Problems",

the

military began specific programs to underwrite certain
scientific and technological research projects at a

^^Noble,

America By Design,

^^Noble, America By Design,

pages 153-54.
page 155.
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number of the leading colleges and universities
country.As the war approached,

in the

a group of

scientists brought to President Roosevelt's attention
the important role that science was
the war.

They pointed out

american scientists

to meet

result of their effort was
Roosevelt established,

likely to play in

the urgency of mobilizing
the military need.
that

in June 1941,

by executive order,

of Scientific Research and Development
the

first time,

The
President

the Office

(OSRD)

and,

for

endorsed the view that the proper

functions of government included support of basic
research by university scientists.
Richard Abrams

in his article

Higher Education:

According to

"The U.S.

A Brief History",

although that

office's mandate focused on national
priorities,

its acknowledgement of

Military and

security

the importance of

pure science lent assurance to academic researchers
that their work need not be confined specifically to
military objectives.^®

The OSRD realized at the

outset that government

laboratories were too few in

^^Richard D. DeLauer, "The Good of It and Its Problems", The
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 502
(March 1989): page 132.
®®Richard M. Abrams, "The U.S. Military and Higher Education:
A Brief History", The ANNALS of The American Academy of Political
and Social Science 502 (March 1989): page 20.
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number to meet even a fraction of

the research needs

of

the war effort and rather than create a vast new
federal bureaucracy,

it adopted the policy of working

through organizations with established research
facilities.

This policy gave rise to the no-profit-no-

loss research and development contract,

a device

through which hundreds of universities and industrial
companies contributed to the wartime research and
development effort.
Abrams

explains

that the military identified the

need to apply new technologies
radar,

for communications,

sonar and long range aircraft to military

purposes and they looked to universities
scientists

to perform these tasks.

of the war,
facilities

From the beginning

university science and engineering
took on much of the research that produced

missile technology,
the atom bomb.
contracts

for the

gun sights,

bomb sights,

More than 25 universities

radar,

and

secretly took

to develop chemical and biological weapons.

This new relationship between university research
facilities and military departments of research and
development set the U.S.

apart from other industrial
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nations,

where most of such work was done in government

or private installations^”^.
It was also during this period that social
scientists began to establish relationships with the
military for the first time.
article
that

"DoD,

Richard D.

Science and International

in preparation for World War II,

Lambert in his
Studies"

writes

key social

scientists moved from positions of external advisers
those of

internal policy makers,

conducting research

intended to influence policy directly.
sociologists,

anthropologists,

to

During the war

and political

scientists

worked in the Research Branch of the Information and
Education Division of the War Department and in the
Foreign Morale Analysis Division.
a new field:

area studies.

This helped lead to

Two well known examples are

the study of the morale of the Japanese population near
the end of

the war and a major survey in Germany

immediately after the War to study the effects of
saturation bombing on population morale during the last
phase of

the European war effort.^®

^’Abrams,

"The U.S. Military and Higher Education," page 20.

®®Richard D. Lampert, "DoD., Science and International
Studies," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 502 (March 1989) page 96.
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World War II was a popular war in the academic
community,

where strong sentiment for fighting the

fascist powers

existed.

Support for the U.S.

the war led to a widely held belief that

entering

the proper

function of the university included making positive
contributions

to the military effort.

The success

of

the academic/military relationship during the war
helped solidify the support

for continuing this

function of the university during the post-war period.
In order to institutionalize the wartime
relationship between the military and university
research,

three important structures were put in place:

the establishment of university run research facilities
separate
in the

from the university proper;

individual military services;

research offices
and academic-

industry-military scientific advisory boards.
University Run Research Facilities
Delauer argues that the practice of contracting
military research

(and development)

research centers was vital

to university-run

to the military effort in

World War II and the Defense Department's plans
post-war period.

During the war the Los Alamos

Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico was
headquarters
atomic bomb.

for the

the

for the research and development of
At the time,

Los Alamos was under

the
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contract with the University of California on behalf of
the Atomic Energy Commission.

During the late 1940s

two other university-military research laboratories
were

institutionalized:

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory

at California Technology and the Lincoln Laboratories
at Massachusetts

Institute of Technology

Research Offices

(MIT).^®

in the Military Services

Carl Kaysen explains

in his article

"Can the

Universities Cooperate with the Defense Establishment?"
that after the war's end,

the Navy continued to support

research in the universities
Naval Research
Its

(ONR)

through the Office of

which was established in 1946.

support shifted from the design of specific weapons

for specific military situations
scientific research in areas,

to general support of

very broadly defined,

that were of potential Naval concern.

Soon the other

armed services

the Air Force

followed the same path;

Office of Scientific Research
1952

(AFOSR)

was created in

followed by that of the Army in 1958.

two organizations
Science Foundation

“DeLauer,

These last

followed the creation of the National
(NSF)

in 1950,

which was given a

"The Good of It and Its Problems," page 132.
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broad charter to support the advancement of
/

knowledge.In the late 1950s,
Research Projects Agency
by ONR and

(AFOSR,

(DARPA)

the Defense Advanced
was formed and,

joined

helped direct DoD funding for

specific military research projects.®^
Advisory Boards
The role of scientists in convincing President
Roosevelt to mobilize scientific resources in
preparation for World War II,

and the decision to

contract for military research and weapon development
through universities,

led to the development of

committees through which distinguished members of
academia met with military personnel to advise the
military and develop research priorities.

These

contacts soon became widespread and have served as one
of the most fundamental means for institutionalizing
the relationship between academia and the military.
According to Michael Klare in his seminal work War
Without End,

panels were formed "to provide a means of

obtaining advice,

views and recommendations of benefit

to the operation of the Government from industrialists.

®°Carl Kaysen, "Can the Universities Cooperate With the
Defense Establishment," The ANNALS of The American Academy of
Political and Social Science 502 (March 1989) page 32.
®^DeLauer,

"The Good of It and Its Problems," page 132.
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businessmen,

scientists,

engineers,

educators,

and

other public and private citizens whose experience and
talents would not otherwise be available to DoD".

These

panels informi the DoD of new scientific discoveries
that might be applicable to weapons development,

help

find scientists and research organizations best able to
accomplish a specified research task,

and lobby in the

academic community for support of Pentagon policies.®^
During World War II,

many people in the military

and in academia hoped that the close relationship
between the military and academia would continue after
the war was over.

Edward Bowles,

Science Advisor to

Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote..."the opportunity
exists to encourage the training of brilliant minds and
to instill in them a consciousness of their
responsibility to the nation's security".
argues that the onset of the Cold War,

Abrams

it seemed,

assured that government leaders would stress the
obligation of higher education to service national
security needs,

and providing the large federal funding

needed for this scientific research would make great

®^Michael T.
1972), page 82.

Klare,

War Without End,

(New York: Alfred Knopf,

“Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program: A
History of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982), page 26.
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strides towards securing a receptive reaction from
university faculty.®^
However,

as the war ended and comprehension of the

destruction wreaked by the atomic blasts in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki settled into american social
consciousness,

many university scientists began to

publicly question whether their function as educators
was being corrupted by continuing to accept funding for
military research.

In response to these concerns,

many

universities took steps to protect their faculty from
the possibility of this corruption.

Most important

actions were taken in two major areas:

the opposition

to secrecy and the need for peer review for funded
research initiatives.
Conant,

In 1946,

Harvard President James

himself an important science advisor to the

government during the war,

established a policy

prohibiting university sponsorship of classified or
secret research.

Many other universities quickly

adopted this policy,

though MIT continued to permit

classified research and even classified doctoral
theses.
The debate raged.

Those in favor of allowing

classified research argued that the ban on such

®^Abrams,

"The U.S. Military and Higher Education," page 29.
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research would either endanger national security by the
failure to have such research done,

or top faculty

members would be wooed from the universities to conduct
research elsewhere by large grants and facilities.

It

was as much this second argument as the first that
persuaded most universities to continue their wartime
relationship with the military.
University acquiescence during the immediate post¬
war period cemented the relationship between scientific
research and the military.

The tremendous explosion of

new technology and the rise to preeminence of American
science in the world community occurred within the
relationship between academia and the military.

Much

of this new technology was discovered at universitymilitary research centers such as the Jet Propulsion
Lab,

the Lawrence Livermore Lab,

the Los Alamos

Laboratory and Lincoln Laboratory.
given in Department of Defense

(DoD)

The broad scope
grants for basic

research enabled the university researchers to minimize
the apparent military nature of their work.

The

guaranteed peer review of contract awards added
legitimacy to research sponsored by the military
establishment,

and those projects which required

secrecy were conducted at the off-campus research
facilities federally owned and financed but
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administered by universities.

By the 1960s,

there were

at least twenty centers known as Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers
the Atomic Energy Commission,

(FFRDC)

the DoD,

sponsored by

or NASA.®^

When President Kennedy took office in 1961 the
emphasis of military research and development shifted
from the development of nuclear weapons to efforts to
combat indigenous uprisings in the third world.
strategy was called counterinsurgency.

This

Klare argues

that the Kennedy administration felt that the military
had to be more oriented towards fighting guerilla wars,
as these were to be the battles of the future.

This

new emphasis focused specifically on the cooperation of
social scientists and foreign-area specialists to
acquire knowledge about the unfamiliar populations of
Africa,

Asia,

and Latin American so as to better

understand these peoples and be more equipped to wage
counterinsurgency wars on these continents.
Recognizing this,

in 1964 the Pentagon turned its

attention and resources toward developing this new
perspective on warfare and set out to enlist
anthropologists,
scientists,

®®Abrams,
23.

psychologists,

sociologists,

political

and economists in the world of military

"The U.S. Military and Higher Education," pages 22-
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sponsored research and development.^^

These efforts

on the surface appeared to be innocuous research tasks
discretely distributed to several universities and
think tanks. As the Vietnam War raged and american
forces became more bogged down in their
counterinsurgency efforts,

these studies became more

essential to the Pentagon's activities.
During this period the FFRDCs became even more
crucial.

The DoD established military research centers

at select universities and asked university
administrators to create independent research
organizations,

with the added bonus of financial

incentives to their universities should they
participate in this plan.

Where direct university

participation was not feasible,

the Pentagon created a

network of independent research organizations that were
to be known as

"think tanks".

Although these centers

were not directly related to universities,

they became

an extension of the university community as faculty
were attracted to spend time there contributing to the
purpose of the centers,

or were recruited away from the

universities all together and worked full-time at these
"think tanks".

®®Klare, War Without End,

pages 71-72.
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In an attempt to clearly define the role of
military research at universities in 1970 Congress
passed the Mansfield Amendment to the "Authorization
for Military Procurement,
Fiscal Year 1970,

Research and Development,

and Reserve Strength" which stated in

part:
None of the funds authorized by this act may be
used to carry out any research project or study
unless such a project or study has a direct and
apparent relationship to a specific military
function or operation.®”^
The purpose of this Amendment was to reduce the DoD's
role in the shaping of basic research,
argue that the exact opposite happened.

though many
Although

Congress later modified the Mansfield Amendment so that
research sponsored by the military had to have a
"potential relationship to a military function",
throughout the 1970s and 1980s DoD guidelines for grant
applications insisted on "the relevance of the proposed
research to the DoD mission," and also encouraged "pre¬
proposals"

so that university researchers could modify

projects when their initial ideas did not precisely
meet DoD interests.

Abrams writes that the DoD

®'^Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings
Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 91st
Congress, 2nd Session on S3376 and HR17123, 91st Congress, 2nd
Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970): page
159; quoted in Stanton A. Glantz and Norm V. Alberts, "Department
of Defense R & D in the University," Science, November 1974, page
76.
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explicitly rejected peer review of
substituting merit

review including

balanced geographic
awards

so

broader

that

Corps

the DoD could more

(ROTC)

this

time

programs

on

campus

a

Training

came under attack and a

against

At

closed the ROTC

about

the

same

time

a

classified military research on

such research on

adopted policies

their campuses,

which motivated Draper Laboratory to

itself
Jet

easily please

developed and many universities

prohibiting
MIT,

distribution of

the Reserve Officers'

their campuses.

strong movement

a

Congressmen and women.®®

significant number of universities
programs

such criteria as

and institutional

constituency of

During

research proposals,

from MIT and become an

including

separate

independent FFRDC.

The

Propulsion Laboratory also moved away from

classified military research and became primarily a
NASA support

center.

universities was
the

defense

The rift between

deepened by the

the military and

apparent neglect

of

technological base by the Nixon

Administration.

Between

1968

and 1974,

funding

for DoD

research and development dropped dramatically in all
areas:
FFRDCs,

government

and universities.

®®Abrams,

28.

laboratories,

"The U.S.

industrial

Presidents

contractors,

Johnson and Nixon

Military and Higher Education,"

pages 27-
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cut back on research and development funding to control
the defense budget while continuing to escalate the
war.

These decreases continued until 1975 and would

not increase significantly until the Reagan
Administration took power in 1981.

The Federal Grant Multiversity
The end of World War II also brought dramatic
enrollment increases for land-grant universities.
G.I.

The

Bill and a subsequent similar one for Korean

veterans pushed the state universities to the forefront
of absorbing and educating a booming population.
Combined with the increased research funding this
dramatic increase in higher education student aid gave
the federal government an unprecedented role in higher
education.

There followed an increase in the role and

visibility of higher education in the society at-large.
Many different sectors were now pulling at what had
become vast bureaucratic institutions from many
different directions.
government,

The federal government,

the private sector,

state

were now joined by a

rapidly expanding student body in laying claim to the
resources of the institution.
born.

A new university was
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Clark Kerr,

President Emeritus of the University

of California writes in his seminal work The Uses of
the University about this new university which he terms
the

"multiversity".

Kerr writes of the role of this

new university he calls the multiversity:
"The multiversity is an inconsistent
institution.
It is not one community but
several -- the community of the undergraduate
and the community of the graduate; the
community of the humanist, the community of
the social scientist, and the community of
the scientist; the communities of the
professional schools; the community of all
the nonacademic personnel; the community of
the administrators.
Its edges are fuzzy -it reaches out to alumni, legislators,
farmers, businessmen, who are all related to
one or more of these internal communities.
As an institution, it looks far into the past
and far into the future, and is often at odds
with the present.
It serves society almost
slavishly -- a society it also criticizes,
sometimes unmercifully.
Devoted to equality
of opportunity, it is itself a class society.
A community, like the medieval communities of
masters and students, should have common
interests; in the multiversity, they are
quite varied, even conflicting.
A community
should have a soul, a single animating
principle; the multiversity has several -some of them quite good, although there is
much debate on which souls really deserve
salvation.
The multiversity is expected to meet the very different
and sometimes competing needs of the different sectors
of society.

This means that there are more voices

®®Clark Kerr, The Uses of the University, 3rd ed.,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), pages 18-19.
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attempting to define what society's needs are in terms
of the allocation of university resources.

And who

controls the university's resources does much to define
these needs.

This is the reason why the external

relationships of the university play such a significant
role in shaping its character.
Kerr points out that among the casualties of these
competing forces is the internal harmony of the
university.

He points out that when trying to meet

these often conflicting needs an institution must
itself become internally diverse which puts at risk
unity and harmony that once was a trademark of United
States universities.

This,

necessarily a bad thing.

Kerr argues,

is not

By making internal harmony a

goal for the multiversity,

one is really asking the

university to serve only a single social interest,

not

the many that conflict with each other.
Robert Paul Wolff,

in his book The Ideal of the

University agrees with Kerr's analysis that the
university has a responsibility to serve the needs of
society.

He writes that it is not only traditional and

just for the university to address and serve society's
needs,

it is also very useful for it to do so.

’°Kerr,

Uses of the University,

page 11.

He
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argues that social justice requires the university to
serve the society in which it resides.
inherently,

he writes,

It is

parasitic upon the community,

consuming resources that are produced from the labor of
the working classes.
intellectually pure,

He argues that the more
and therefore removed from the day

to day life of society,
parasitic it becomes.

are its activities the more
Therefore,

he writes,

it is

reasonable that the recipients of these resources
(professors and students)
value to the society.

should return a part of its

He goes one step further to

argue that if tradition,

justice,

and social utility

are not sufficient to justify the multiversity,

then

the upward mobility and opportunity that it provides
for those who would otherwise be trapped at the lower
levels of the social structure is in and of itself
reason enough for its existence.However,
differs with Kerr on a crucial point.

Wolff

Wolff argues

that one must draw a distinction between the concepts
of effective or market demand and human or social need.
Human or social need,

he writes,

is a want or lack of

something material or social whose presence would
contribute to physical and emotional health,

^^Robert Paul Woolf, The Ideal of the University,
Beacon Press, 1969), page 32.

to the

(Boston:
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full development of human power such as food,
privacy,

self esteem or productive work.

Communities

have collective needs like social justice,
cultural and political community.

leisure,

peace,

Effective or market

demand is simply the existence in a market economy of
buyers who are in the market and are prepared to spend
for a particular commodity.

Many human needs cannot

get themselves expressed as market demands.

He cites

as an example the great need for cheap clothing and
housing in the United States.

He argues that it is

possible to make a profit on cheap clothing and so most
americans are attractively clothed.
well designed,
profit.

At the same time,

low cost housing returns little or no

Therefore,

Wolff argues,

the multiversity as

defined by Kerr does not necessarily meet social needs.
What it does meet is the market place demands through
federal research grants,

scholarships etc.

does not necessarily need more engineers.

The nation
There is a

demand for engineers because of the planned economic
policies of the government in support of such programs
as the space program or the enhancement of the
military-industrial complex.

’'^Woolf,

The Ideal of the University,

pages 36-40.

70
Wolff also argues that serving the needs of
society as defined by effective or market demands,
especially as defined or created by the federal
government,

neutralizes one of the major purposes that

he sees higher education serving society:
social critic.

its role as a

If the multiversity is an instrument of

the federal government then it can no longer be a
critic of the federal government.

In our society,

where the federal government is so strong and all
encompassing,

there are very few institutions strong

enough to challenge and critique it.
Wolff argues,
places.

Historically,

universities have been one of those

But when the university is so tied to federal

money and has developed what he calls a symbiotic
relationship with the federal government it becomes
extremely difficult to be a place for critique.
is adamant that there is no middle ground.

Wolff

A

multiversity cannot accept the government's money and
be admitted to the inner circle,

yet remain free to

dissent.

is there a greater

He poses the question:

social need for full-scale integration of the resources
and activities of the university into existing domestic
and foreign programs,

or for the university to maintain

its role of providing resources and activities that can
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serve as a critic of those program from an independent
position of authority and influence?"^^
In his book,

Beyond the Ivory Tower:

Responsibilities of the Modern University,

Social
Derek Bok,

President Emeritus of Harvard University also explores
this question of the role of the multiversity in
responding to society's needs and the relationship the
university holds with different forces in society.
Bok writes that it is the university's unique
combination of education and research that is its chief
contribution to society.

In order to facilitate

education and research a university must first be able
to recruit the most able and creative people that it
can and second,

be able to provide an environment of

freedom in which these people can do their best work.
It is here that the concept of academic freedom becomes
so important.

Bok views academic freedom not merely as

a reflection of society's commitment to free speech;
but also as a safeguard essential to the university's
ability to accomplish the goals society sets for it.
Any attempts to compromise the ability to recruit or
the environment to speak,
university.

’^Woolf,

he argues,

compromises the

Bok is quick to point out that there are

The Ideal of the University,

pages 41-42.
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very distinct,

if subtle forces at work that constantly

threaten academic freedom at universities.

Most

specifically this threat comes from the increasingly
closer contacts that have developed between university
faculty and the outside world and the subsequent
dependence on outside funding for research activities,
consulting activities,

and summer stipends from

business and government.
Through these outside connections faculty have
increased their income,

enlarged their research and

added variety to their lives,

but in return,

their

research focus or personal expertise becomes
significantly influenced by the opportunities available
to obtain necessary resources or compensation for such
activities.

The agenda of faculty can quickly become

that of the government and the private sector.

This

could compromise the independence of the faculty and,
in subtle forms,

academic freedom.

Bok argues that there is no reason for
universities to feel uncomfortable in taking into
account society's needs;

in fact,

a clear obligation to do so.

Beyond the Ivory Tower,

they have

The challenge is deciding

74Derek Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower,
University Press, 1982), pages 20-21.
■^^Bok,

he agrees,

(Carnbridge: Harvard

pages 67-68.
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what kind of response is appropriate.

He argues

strongly that the proper response is through the normal
academic functions,

such as teaching,

technical service.

For instance,

research or

he suggests that

racial inequality be dealt with by making a special
effort to enroll minority students;

that economic

progress be helped by translating discoveries into
products,

that specialized knowledge be made available

to assist the development of poorer nations.
initiatives,

he argues,

These

are all consistent with the

proper activities of an academic institution.”^®
The university's social obligations are as an
educational institution practicing teaching and
research.

Society has the right to ask the university

to respond to its needs in exchange for public
resources.

Society paid for,

and expects in return,

educational programs and research.

Bok argues that

universities have social responsibilities as a result
of being allocated scarce and valuable public
resources.He argues strongly that in order for the
university to exercise this responsibility it must
adhere to a principle of institutional neutrality.

Beyond the Ivory Tower, pages 301-302.
“^^Bok,

Beyond the Ivory Tower,

page 88.
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And,

he states,

that this principle of institutional

neutrality does not prevent the university from
addressing moral and ethical issues.

To the contrary,

he argues that institutional neutrality is essential in
order for the university to do so.
institutional neutrality,

Only by

Bok argues,

can the

university protect faculty when exercising their
academic freedom and taking controversial public
positions.

Bok argues that by fudging institutional

neutrality the university invites retaliation from the
outside world.

And that retaliation often takes the

form of efforts to inhibit the academic freedom of the
institution.
Sam Bowles and Herbert Gintes,

in their seminal

work Schooling in Capitalist America;

Educational

Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life,
much more critical look at Kerr's multiversity.

take a
Bowles

and Gintes point out that between 1967 and 1973 the
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education,

chaired by

Clark Kerr researched and articulated the strategy for
restructuring higher education to meet the needs of
society. According to Bowles and Gintes,
aspects of this strategy emerged:

"^^Bok,

Beyond the Ivo2rv Tower,

three major

first a concerted

pages 300-305.
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attempt to fragment the culture of the university
community;

second the support of community colleges to

stratify higher education;

and third an effort to

restrict the growth of the higher educational system so
as to keep the size of the

"reserve army"

of white-

collar workers to a politically acceptable level.
Bowles and Gintes argue that this strategy was in
response to dramatic structural economic change going
on in the United States.

This change manifested itself

in the expansion of the corporate and state sectors of
the economy which led to an increasingly peripheral
role of the self-employed and the birth of a new class
of technical,

lower supervisory and white-collar

services workers that were to play a central role in
production.

These changes,

they argue,

were

manifesting themselves in higher education:
expanded demand for technical,

the vastly

clerical and other white

collar skills by employers in the corporate and state
sectors in the post - World War II period and the
development of the wage labor white-collar class.

"^^Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintes, Schooling in Capitalist
America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic
Life

(New York:
®°Bowles

204.

Basic

Books,

and Gintes,

1976),

Schooling

page

206.

in Capitalist America,

page

76
Bowles and Gintes point out that

this

manifestation of economic change within the higher
education system is a logical

extension of the

fundamental contradiction that has always dominated the
relationship between industry and higher education:
to train both leaders and followers.

how

The educational

processes best suited to train the leaders of society
are not necessarily ideal

for fostering the

acquiescence needed from the
contradiction,

they argue,

followers.

is

behind Kerr's articulation of

one of the major goals
the multiversity.®^

Bowles and Gintes argue that
college enrollments have been,

Resolving this

the overexpansion of

in part,

the industrial needs generated by this

a response to
changing

economic structure of the work place and that one of
the major motivations of the G.I.
these needs of industry.

Bill was

to meet

They explain that this

increasing fragmentation of the work force has brought
about a corresponding fragmentation of curriculum and
research in higher education.

Students and faculty are

discouraged from examining the problem as a whole just
as a worker is
the work place.

forbidden to produce a whole product in
This compartmentalization is

®^Bowles and Gintes,

207.

ideal

Schooling in Capitalist America,

page

for
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industry because it allows

the development of advanced

technology or achievement while simultaneously
discouraging the understanding and application of
moral,

political or social

individuals'

implications of

the

the

work.®^

Ernest Boyer,

in his

seminal

Undergraduate Experience,

documents

effects of the development of
undergraduate education.

study College:

The

the concrete

the multiversity upon

According to Boyer,

the study

found that serious deficiencies have developed that
need to be addressed.

These are the following:

difficulty of the transition from high school

the

to

college for an undergraduate is mostly ignored by the
institution;

the goals and curriculum of

have become clouded as different
struggle over its purpose;

forces

more important than teaching;

dollars has

increased;

become muddled as

of the

that research is

the quality of campus

the concern for research

the governing of

the college has

too many people claim leadership

roles and no one seems
there is

in society

the priorities

faculty has become skewed to the point

life has been forgotten as

the education

to be able to coordinate them;

little effort to assess

®^Bowles and Gintes,
208-213.

the outcome of the

Schooling in Capitalist America,

pages
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undergraduate education and what an undergraduate ends
up with when he or she graduates;

and,

while the

connection between the campus and industry and the
federal government thrives

there seems

little

connection between undergraduate education and any
aspect of the world outside the college.
effects,

he argues,

threatens

undergraduate education.

These

the very nature of

He stresses

that unless

undergraduate education is restored to an equal

footing

with research operations then an entire generation of
youth will be ill-equipped for adulthood.®^
During the years after World War II another
important aspect developed in the relationship between
the

federal government and the public research

university that would have a profound effect on higher
education:

government regulation.

In Beyond the Ivory

Tower Bok explains the scope and consequence of this
federal regulation.

He writes

that

the involvement of

the federal government has taken the

form of either

commands

on how things are

to do something,

to be done,

subsidies

procedures

to entice action or by

strengthening market forces,

thus

increasing

competition as a way to achieve the government's

®^Ernest Boyer, College: The Undergraduate Experience in
America (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), pages 1-8.
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desired end.

Bok cites as examples of these

regulations as discrimination laws concerning
admissions;

quotas on medical schools to secure the

entry of Americans studying abroad;
requirements in faculty hiring;

affirmative action

requirements that

dental school students train for six weeks in under
served areas; prohibitions against certain types of
fetal experiments;

restrictions on investigations

involving human subjects and regulations concerning DNA
research.

Bok points out that much of this regulation

does not take the form of conventional laws,

but

instead are attached as conditions to the receipt of
federal funds.
don't pay.

In other words,

do it our way or we

He does not argue that the federal

government has no role in determining rules and
regulations for higher education,
is drawn.

only where the line

He argues that it is a fine line between

assuring that society's needs are met and stifling the
creativity and autonomy that he feels is such an
integral part of the university's existence.®^
And though Bok argues that it is impossible,
in some cases unwise,

to remove the scrutiny and

regulation from higher education he calls for the

®^Bok,

Beyond the Ivory Tower,

pages 38-40.

and
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federal government to play a more constructive role as
opposed to being a hinderance which,
often the case.

This can be done,

he argues,

he argues,

is

by the

government respecting what he considers the four
essential freedoms of the university:

to determine for

itself on academic grounds who may teach,
taught,

how it should be taught,

admitted to study.

what may be

and who may be

Bok explains how universities have

worked for generations to establish this autonomy over
its academic affairs,

thus keeping out interference by

political and private forces in the outside world.
Despite the best efforts of universities,

however,

all

four of these freedoms have become the subject of
considerable federal scrutiny and regulation.®^
In their article,
Challenge"
Action,

"A New Era of Technological

in the inaugural edition of Thought and

Paul Tsongas,

then Senator from Massachusetts,

and his legislative assistant Mitchell Tyson argue
passionately that the future standard of living in the
United States depends on an increased relationship
between industry and higher education and that it is
the responsibility of the federal government to
facilitate this relationship.

®^Bok,

Beyond the Ivory Tower,

They argue that without

pages 40-42.

81
a more deliberate and extensive federal program that
enhances United States competitiveness with Japan and
Europe then the United States'
fall dramatically.

standard of living will

They further argue that this

program should focus on improving the process by which
scientific knowledge is transformed into marketable
technology.

They point out that new inventions have

not been translated quickly enough into new products
and processes so that even technological discoveries
made in America were being developed and commercialized
by "competitors" overseas.

Tsongas and Mitchell write

that the nation that develops the new technologies,
builds new industries around them and incorporates them
into existing industry the fastest will have the edge
in global competition.

Tsongas and Tyson offer a

scathing critique of the United States federal policies
during the late 1970s and early 1980s towards the
industry-government-university relationship.

They

argue that in the early 1980s over 60% of federal R & D
expenditures were allocated for military activities and
that the transfer of technology from military to
civilian sectors was very limited.

They call for the

creation of new technology transfer processes to
improve these efforts.

They argue that the role of

education in the development of a skilled and highly
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trained work force is essential and they argue that
there are too few engineers and many who do become
engineers lack first-rate training.

This lack of a

trained work force even extends to managers who,
argue,

they

have established a mode of operation that

underutilizes workers who feel isolated and alienated,
the result being the inadequate utilization of
resources,

high turnover and unsuccessful

production.
They argue that new R & D companies are often weak
in managerial and business skills.

They write that a

support system involving universities,

government and

the private sector is needed to provide the necessary
financial,

technological and managerial assistance to

help these companies thrive.

They argue that the U.S.

has been at a serious disadvantage relative to Europe
and Japan in advanced production technologies.
they point out,

This,

is because of the neglect of university

programs in industrial engineering and that there is no
coordinated federal program to stimulate technological
innovation.

Tsongas and Tyson argue that the United

States should do all that it can to enhance the

®®Paul E. Tsongas and Mitchell G. Tyson,
Technological Challenge," Thought & Action 1
95-98.

"A New Era of
(Fall 1984): pages
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competitiveness of American industry and that higher
education plays an integral role in that mission.

They

propose that a growing supply of basic and applied
research be assured and that a technologically
sophisticated work force should be provided while all
barriers that inhibit innovation and technology
transfer be removed.®”^
They point out that unless the capacity of our
educational systems to provide technologically trained
students is increased it will be impossible to remain
competitive.

Therefore,

Technology Morrill Act,

they call for a "High
based on the original Morrill

Act which would provide federal matching funds for
joint initiatives by industry,

educational institutions

and government to strengthen science,
technical education.

engineering and

This would include a multi¬

billion dollar commitment to upgrade faculty,
equipment,
education.

facilities and curricula in higher
They also propose that a mechanism be

established to bring together industry,

academia and

government laboratories to identify economically
strategic technologies,

assess the targeted efforts of

foreign competitors and plan cooperative technology

®’'Tsongas and Tyson,

"Technological Challenge", page 160.
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developmerit programs to meet the competition.

They

further propose that Technology Extension Services
modeled after the Agricultural Extension Services,

be

established at state universities to help assure the
effective transfer and utilization of new technology.
These centers would function as clearinghouses for new
technology and serve as the primary means for
transferring federally supported R & D to the private
sector,

utilizing demonstrations,

courses and field agents.

conferences,

training

They state clearly that

cooperation between industry and our educational and
scientific institutions is essential to our well¬
being.®®
Robert Reich in his recent book The Work of
Nations provides an in-depth analysis of the role of
higher education in relation to the economy in the 21st
century.

Reich focuses his attention on the role of

educating who he terms the

"symbolic-analyst".

He

defines the symbolic analyst as those members of
society who do the "problem-solving,

problem-

identifying and strategic-brokering" activities such as
the research scientists,

engineers,

bankers,

lawyers,

real estate developers and the field of consultants

®®Tsongas and Tyson,

101.

"Technological Challenge",

pages 100-
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including management,
agricultural,

financial,

armaments,

tax,

energy,

architectural,

etc.®®

These

professions represent to Reich the management or upperclass of the 21st century economy.
Reich writes that educating these people is a
different task than educating the managers and upperclass of previous eras.

He explains that providing the

necessary education will be key to the success of the
american economy in the global economy.

He argues that

although the american economy has changed dramatically
in the last decade the american educational system has
not.®°

Still,

he writes,

the american education

system has always been very well equipped to educate
the elite of our country.

He writes that:

...no other society prepares its most
fortunate young people as well for lifetimes
of creative problem-solving, -identifying,
and brokering.
America's best four-year
colleges and universities are the best in the
world (as evidenced by the number of foreign
students who flock to them): the collegetrack programs of the secondary schools that
prepare students for them are equally
exceptional.
Reich explains that the formal education of a future
symbolic analyst entails four basic skill:

®®Reich,

The Work of Nations,

pages 177-178.

®°Reich,

The Work of Nations,

page 226.

®^Reich,

The Work of Nations,

page 228.

abstraction.
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system thinking,

experimentation and collarboration.

For most children in the United States,

he argues,

formal education entails just the opposite kind of
learning.

Instead of being given the skills to

construct meanings,

meanings are constructed for them.

Information is prepackaged and the good student must
only commit it to memory.

But america's elite students

mostly escape this kind of education in the best
primary,

secondary and universities where the

curriculum is

"fluid and interactive".^^

This abilty

of the american elite to receive the education and
training necessary to compete in the global economy
will allow the american economy to survive amidst the
international competition but will further accentuate
the class differences within the United States itself.
The role of higher education in the 21st century
also involves a critical role in the development and
production of new technology.

He explains about the

crucial role of universities in what he calls the
"symbolic-analytic zones".

The symbolic-analytic zones

are geographic pockets where symbolic analysts
live,

"work,

and learn with other symbolic analysts devoted to

a common kind of problem-solving,

®‘Reich,

The Work of Nations,

-identifying,

page 230.

and

87
brokering".These zones function as a kind of
large,

informal organization where members'

skills are

combined in certain ways for particular projects and
then recombined in different ways for others.

Higher

education and particularly universities play an
important role in these zones.

They offer state-of-

the-art research facilities and a steady supply of
well-educated students who are willing to work for low
inital wages in order to gain the experience and
contacts necessary to provide them a door into the
world of symbolic analysts.

And,

he argues,

as the

global economy continues to break down national
economic boundaries the importance of the resources
that universities provide to this form of 21st century
economic development,

research facilities and training

grounds for symbolic analysts,

will continue to

increase.

®^Reich,

The Work of Nations,

page 234.

CHAPTER 3
DESIGN

As stated previously,

this dissertation addresses

the specific relationship of federal economic policies
of the Reagan administration to public higher
education.

Its purpose is to answer the following

primary question;
How has state government financing of public
higher education been affected by Reaganomics?
Upon answering this,

the following question is

addressed:
Has there been any impact on the accessibility of
public higher education as a result of these
policies?
In order to answer these questions this dissertation
studies the federal economic policies of the Reagan
administration known as Reaganomics and their impact on
state financing of public higher education during the
period 1981-1992.

In conducting this study three

questions are asked:
What were the economic policies of the Reagan
administration?
What was the impact on state finances of these
policies?
What was the effect on access to public higher
education of this impact on state finances?
First the study analyzes the economic policies of
the Reagan administration known as

"Reaganomics" by
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asking

the questions:

What was

its political

and economic

components

of

the

results?

The roots

review of
States

Reaganomics?

roots?

What were

economic program?
are

the changing economic

Republican Party during

"supply-side

review includes
Conscience of
Revolution,
Paul

economics"

a Conservative,

Jude Wanniski,

Niskanen,

The

Reaganomics,

What were

ideology of
the

the

the United

Post-World War
on

school

the writings

Craig Roberts,

the

examined through an historical

period with a particular emphasis
the

What were

the

of

development

thought.

This

by Barry Goldwater,
Martin Anderson,

Supply-Side Revolution,
and Jack Kemp,
Then

economic program are outlined as

the

William

An American
specifics

for Economic Recovery and as

Michael

Boskin

results
studies,

Services,

Politics.

The

explained by

review of

concluded with an examination of

the program primarily through

one conducted by Lawrence

Experiment

for

the National

two

the

extensive

Lindsey The Growth

and one prepared by Fiscal
Inc.

A

in Reagan and the Economy and David

in Triumph of

of

the

described by the

Program

is

Idea,

of

Reagan administration in America's New Beginning:

Reaganomics

of

The Wav the World Works,

and An American Renaissance.

Stockman

II

Planning

Office of

the American
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Federation of State,

Community and Municipal Employees,
\

The Republican Record.
Second the impact of the economic program on state
finances

is examined.

This examination begins with an

historical overview of the relationship between federal
and state government concerning the funding of social
programs.

Historical research is

articles by John Joseph Wallis,
Wright,

and Lawrence D.

Perry Clark,

Timothy Conlan,

and William Anderson.

"New Federalism"

plan is

writings about the program are surveyed.
Scott Matheson's writings
Governor Bruce E.

Deli S.

Brown^^ and books by Jane

David Walker,

Then the Reagan

surveyed including

explained and
Governor

from Out of Balance^^ and

Babbit's,

"Federalism:

Reagan's

®^John Joseph Wallish, "New Deal Fiscal Federalism,,"
Economic Incruiry XXIX (July 1991): page 510-524; Timothy J.
Conlan, "The Politics of Federal Block Grants from Nixon to
Reagan", Political Science Quarterly 99, No. 2 (Summer 1984) 247257; Deii S. Wright, "Policy Shifts in the Politics and
Administration of Intergovernmental Relations, 1930s-1990s. " The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 509
(May 1990):60-72; and Lawrence D. Brown, "The Politics of
Devolution in Nixon's New Federalism." In The Changing Politics of
Federal Grants, pp. 54-107. Edited by Lawrence D. Brown, James W.
Fossett and Kenneth Palmer. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution): 54-107.
®^Jane Perry Clark, The Rise of a New Federalism:
Federal-State Cooperation in the United States (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1938); David B. Walker, Toward a Functioning
Federalism (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1981); and William
Anderson, The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners?
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955).
®®Scott Matheson,
Smith Books, 1986).

Out of Balance

(Salt Lake City:

Peregrine
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Trojan Horse,"

in Facing the Facts:

The Democratic

Governor ^ s View From the States^"^ are used to address
Reagan federalism from a state's perspective.
P.

Nathan,

Fred C.

and the States^^,
and the States:
and Timothy J.
New Federalism:

Doolittle,

George E.

Richard

and Associates'

Peterson's,

Reagan

"Federalism

An Experiment in Decentralization,"^^
Conlan and David B.
Design,

Walter,

"Reagan's

Debate and Discord,

are

used as primary sources on the components of the Reagan
federalism program,
responded.

the results and how states

Edward M.

Gramlich's article,

State and Local Fiscal Crisis,"

draws

"The 1991

the connection

between the Reagan program and the 1990's state and
local

fiscal crisis.

He argues

problems began in 1984,

that the state's

fiscal

a few years after the cuts

federal grants by the Reagan administration,

in

and

Federalism: Reagan's Trojan Horse," in Facing the Facts:
The Democratic Governor's View From the States (Washington, D.C.:
Democratic Governors' Association, 1984).
®®Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle, and Associates,
Reagan and the States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress , 1987) .
^^George E. Peterson, "Federalism and the States: An
Experiment in Decentralization," The Reagan Record, John L. Palmer
and Isabel V. Sawhill, eds. (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1984): pages 217-260.
“°Timothy J. Conlan and David B. Walter, "Reagan's New
Federalism: Design, Debate and Discord," American
Intergovernmental Relations Today: Perspectives and Controversies,
Robert Jay Dilger, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1986): pages 189-200.
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continued through the prolonged economic expansion.
A study of Medicaid by the United States Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

(ACIR)

is

used to explore both the role of health care in state
fiscal crises and to demonstrate how the Reagan
administration federalism program worked concerning a
specific policy area.

The report finds

states were

among other things,

forced to,

that many
cut other

spending to meet the increased costs of medicaid.
National

statistics

from the United States Census

Bureau are then utilized to document the changes

in

federal aid to state and local governments and in the
percentage of all state revenue that comes
aid during the period in question.

from federal

The AFSCME study is

utilized to document the specific funding reductions
from the

federal government to state governments and

studies cited earlier by Benton,

Stonecash and

Stotsky^°^ are used to document the response of state

^°^Edward M. Gramlich, "The 1991 State and Local Fiscal
Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1991): page 274.
^°^Advisory Coinmission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Medicaid: Intergovernmental Trends and Options (Washington,
GPO, 1992.

D.C.:

^°^Benton, J. Edwin. "The Effects of Changes in Federal Aid on
State and Local Government Spending." Publius: The Journal of
Federalism 22 (Winter 1992): pages 71-83; Stonecash, Jeffrey M.
"State Responses to Declining Federal Support: Behavior in the
Post-1978 Era." Policy Studies Journal 18 (Spring, 1990): pages
755- 767; and Stotsky, Janet G. "State Fiscal Responses to Federal
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governments

to these changes

National data is

in federal spending.

then used to illustrate the resulting

financial problems of states across
major states:

Massachusetts,

are reviewed briefly to
direct

the country.

Three

California and New York

illustrate the relationship of

federal aid and state

finances.

State-wide data

is used as gathered by state economic offices and
independent research institutes.
Finally,

how the Reagan program's

financing affected access
studied.

impact on state

to public higher education is

Historical research on state financing of

public higher education is
Alice M.

Rivlin and M.M.

Roger E.

Bolton,

Larry L.

Leslie,

Government Grants."
17-31.

Selma J.

surveyed including books by

Chambers,
Mushkin,

articles by
Elchanan Cole and

and a study conducted by the Tax

Growth and Change

22

(Summer,

1991):

pages

^°^Alice M. Rivlin, The Role of the Federal Government in
Financing Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1961) and M.M. Chambers, Higher Education: Who Pays?
Who Gains? (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers &
Publishers, Inc., 1968).
^°^Roger E. Bolton, "The Economics and Public Financing of
Higher Education: An Overview," in Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, The Economics of Financing of Higher Education in the
United States: A Compendium of Papers, 91st Congress., 1st session
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969); Selma J.
Mushkin, "A Note on State and Local Financing of Higher
Education," in Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Economics
of Financing of Higher Education in the United States: A
Compendium of Papers, 91st Congress., 1st session (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969); and Elchanan Cohn and
Larry L. Leslie, "The Development and Finance of Higher Education
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Foundation Inc.

Then more recent studies including

articles by Arthur M.

Hauptman,

and Michael McPherson et

Richard D.

Anderson,

and a study by

Hauptman^°® are used to explore the impact of state
financing on access

to public higher education.

national data is used to
attendance of changes
the study's

Then

identify the effect on cost of

in state appropriations during

time period.

After analyzing this national

data the impact on state appropriations

for higher

education and the cost of attendance in the three
states previously mentioned:
and California is

Massachusetts,

New York,

examined in order to demonstrate the

relationship on a state and institutional level.

in Perspective," in Subsidies to Higher Education, Howard P.
Tuckman and Edward Whalen eds. (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1980)
^°®Tax Foundation Inc, Public Financing of Higher Education
(New York: Tax Foundation Inc., 1966).
^“’'Arthur M. Hauptman, "Trends in the Federal and State
Financial Commitment to Higher Education," in The Uneasy Public
Policy Triangle in Higher Education: Quality, Efficiency and
Budgetary Efficiency, David H. Finifter, Roger G. Baldwin, and
John R. Thelin eds. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1991): pages 113-128; Richard E. Anderson, "The Economy and Higher
Education," in Financing Higher Education in a Global Economy,
Richard E, Anderson and Joel W. Meyerson eds. (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1990): pages 13-40; and Michael S. McPherson,
Morton Owen Schapiro, and Gordon C. Winston, "Recent Trends in
U.S. Higher Education Costs and Prices: The Role of Government
Funding," AEA Papers and Proceedings 79 (May 1989): pages 253-257.
^°®Arthur M. Hauptman, The College Tuition Spiral
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990).

(New York:
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In summary,

conclusions are drawn as

to what the

results of this study say about the relationship of
Reaganomics

to state financing of public higher

education and the accessibility of these institutions.
Observations are then made about the implications of
these findings

for the future.

relevance of these findings
potential

In particular,

the

to understanding the

impact of the Clinton administration's new

economic program on state financing of public higher
education and the accessibility of these institutions
is discussed.

CHAPTER 4
REAGANOMICS

Introduction
This chapter analyzes

the economic policies of the

Reagan administration known as

"Reaganomics".

It

begins with an examination of the political and
economic roots of Reaganomics.

This

includes tracing

the development of the theory of supply-side economics
in the Republican Party during the post World War II
era and contrasts
ideology of

it to the traditional conservative

"minimalist"

economics.

Then it details

the actual components of Reaganomics as outlined in
Reagan's

economic message to Congress delivered in the

first month of his presidency focusing primarily on the
proposed individual and business

income tax reductions

and the reordering of domestic spending priorities.
The chapter then describes

the actual economic program

passed by Congress and how it differed from the Reagan
administration proposal.

Finally,

the chapter

concludes with an evaluation of the program in relation
to the stated goals espoused by the Reagan
administration and its

impact on the United States

economy and the lives of

its population.
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The Roots of Reaganomics
The roots of Reaganomics

lie in two distinct

economic philosophies.

These different philosophies

are called

economics and

"minimalist"

"supply-side"

economics and have shaped the economic debate within
the United States Republican Party throughout the PostWorld War II period.

Both of these economic

philosophies are based upon a similar foundation
concerning the fundamental question of the role of the
federal government in the economic sphere.

This

foundation was clearly articulated by one of the most
prominent spokespersons
perspective,

for the

"minimalist"

former United States

Senator and

Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater.
book Conscience of a Conservative,

In his

1960

Goldwater explored

the role of the federal government in economics and
presented the conclusions upon which the foundation of
both the

"minimalist"

and

philosophies are based.

"supply-side"
He argues

economic

fervently that the

role of government in the economic sphere should be
extremely limited and rests primarily in preserving and
maximizing freedom.

He wrote:

The legitimate functions of government are
actually conducive to freedom.
Maintaining
internal order, keeping foreign foes at bay,
administering justice, removing obstacles to
the free interchange of goods - the exercise
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of these powers makes it possible for men to
follow their chosen pursuits with maximum
freedom.
However,

he wrote,

this has not been the reality:

Throughout history, government has proved to
be the chief instrument for thwarting man's
liberty. Government represents power in the
hands of some men to control and regulate the
lives of other men.^^°
He notes

that it is vital

that government have the

power of taxation in order to pursue these goals,
especially that of a national defense,
power gives

but that this

the government a tremendous ability to

control people's

lives.

Therefore,

he writes,

the

powers of the government to tax members of society must
be strictly limited:
Government does not have an unlimited claim
on the earnings of individuals.
One of the
foremost precepts of the natural law is man's
right to the possession and the use of his
property.
And a man's earnings are his
property as much as his land and the house in
which he lives.
Indeed, in the industrial
age, earnings are probably the most prevalent
form of property...This attack on property
rights is actually an attack on freedom.
It
is another instance of the modern failure to
take into account the whole man.
How can a
man be truly free if he is denied the means
to exercise freedom?
How can he be free if
the fruits of his labor are not his to
dispose of, but are treated, instead, as part
of a common pool of public wealth?
Property

^°®Barry Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative,
Macfadden Books, 1960), pages 16-17.
^^°Goldwater,

Conscience of a Conservative,

(New York:

page 17.
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and freedom are inseparable: to the extent
government takes the one in the form of
taxes, it intrudes on the other...But having
said that each man has an inalienable right
to his property, it also must be said that
every citizen has an obligation to contribute
his fair share to the legitimate functions of
government.
Government, in other words, has
some claim on our wealth, and the problem is
to define that claim in a way that gives due
consideration to the property rights of the
individual... The size of the government's
rightful claim -- that is, the total amount
it may take in taxes -- will be determined by
how we define the "legitimate functions of
government."
With regard to the federal
government, the Constitution is the proper
standard of legitimacy: its "legitimate"
powers, as we have seen are those the
Constitution has delegated to it.
Therefore,
if we adhere to the Constitution, the federal
government's total tax bill will be the cost
of exercising such of its delegated powers as
our representatives deem necessary in the
national interest.
But conversely, when the
federal government enacts programs that are
not authorized by its delegated powers, the
taxes needed to pay for such programs exceed
the government's rightful claim on our
wealth.
Another

important

aspect

of

this

perspective

is

the role of

versus

of

state government.

that

the

"minimalist"

federal

The question of

relationship has been debated since
union,

the

little doubt

should be

on the

^^^Goldwater,

as

aspect
to where

of

issue

Reaganomics.

the

formed

Goldwater

the Republican Party

issue:

Conscience of a Conservative,

this

founding of

and the Goldwater position on this

a primary ideological
left

government

pages 61 65.
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The Constitution...draws a sharp and clear
line between federal jurisdiction and state
jurisdiction.
The federal government's
failure to recognize that line has been a
crushing blow to the principle of limited
government... There is a reason for its (the
Constitution) reservation of States' Rights.
Not only does it prevent the accumulation of
power in a central government that is remote
from the people and relatively immune from
popular restraints; it also recognizes the
principle that essentially local problems are
best dealt with by the people most directly
concerned.
It was these positions on the roles and relationships
of government which provided the parameters for the
debate that followed within the Republican party during
the next 20 years.
The "minimalist" wing of the party reached its
most powerful moment during Goldwater's 1964 campaign
for president.

Goldwater argued that in order to

reduce the role of the federal government dramatic
spending cuts would have to be made.
realized,

This,

would cause pain and suffering,

he

but was a

necessary step to achieve the goal of reducing the
involvement of the federal government in the economy.
In a crucial point that was to be a major point of
disagreement among Republicans,

he argued that it was

only after these spending cuts were made that there
could be tax cuts.

^^^Goldwater,

He wrote:

Conscience of a Conservative,

page 30.
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While there is something to be said for the
proposition that spending will never be
reduced so long as there is money in the
federal treasury, I believe that as a
practical matter spending cuts must come
before tax cuts.
If we reduce taxes before
firm, principled decisions are made about
expenditures, we will court deficit spending
and the inflationary effects that invariably
follow.

Even though Goldwater was defeated in the 1964
presidential election by Lyndon Johnson in one of the
biggest landslides in United States Presidential
electoral history,

his mind set of first suffering

through spending cuts and later receiving the bonus of
tax cuts continued to be the dominant economic
philosophy of the Republican party until well into the
1970s.
During the mid 1970s a different economic
philosophy,

"supply-side"

the Republican Party.
actually quite simple.
rates

economics,

Supply-side economics was
It

on economic activity,

rates affected people's
produce goods,

began to emerge in

focused on the effect of tax
particularly how these tax

incentives

invest and save.^^^

to work,

earn money,

Martin Anderson,

a

key economic advisor to Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan

^“Goldwater,

Conscience of a Conservative,

^^^Martin Anderson, Revolution, (New York:
Jovanovich, Publishers, 1988), page 141.

page 65.
Harcourt Brace
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and a fellow at the Hoover Institute at Stanford
University,

describes it this way:

As a government raises tax rates, the amount
of earnings that taxpayers get to keep for
themselves declines.
If the government
raises tax rates high enough, people respond
by not working as hard, and they hide more of
their earnings from the government.
The
result is that there is less money available
for the government to tax.
At some point
increases in the tax rate become
counterproductive as far as tax revenue is
concerned.
Higher tax rates simply produce
less tax revenue.
When that point is reached
tax revenues can be increased, paradoxically,
by cutting tax rates.
This argument was explained through what was to be
named the
Laffer,

"Laffer Curve",

after Professor Arthur

a prominent economist and supply-side

proponent.

The curve is explained as follows: when the

tax rate is 100 percent,

all economic activity will

cease because people will not work if everything they
earn is taken by the government.
0 percent,

When the tax rate is

there is a state of anarchy because the

government cannot work if it has collected no revenue.
In between these extremes lies the laffer curve,

and

the goal is to find the spot on the curve in which the
electorate

"desires to be taxed."

When the point is

reached where higher taxes discourages economic
activity,

then tax revenue actually decreases with

^^^Anderson, Revolution, page 141.
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further tax increases.
the curve where,

Conversely,

there is a point on

if government decreases taxes,

then

revenue will actually increase because of the increase
in economic activity

(in the money economy as opposed

to the barter economy).

This point on the curve always

changes depending on the political and economic
conditions,

i.e.

in wartime people are willing to be

taxed at a higher level but as soon as the war is over
people will expect taxes to be lowered in order that
they may participate in the economy.
This philosophy contrasted to the traditional
perspective known as

"Keynesian economics" so named

after economist John Maynard Keynes,

which held that

government could most effectively manage the economy by
managing the demand for goods and services.

In times

of economic contraction the government would spend more
thus directly increasing demand and/or would lower
taxes,

thus raising the income of consumers and

increasing demand indirectly.

Keynesian economics

stated that this increase in demand would stimulate new
economic activity and the economy would grow.

In cases

where the economy was growing too fast and becoming
inflationary the government would reduce spending

^^®Jude Wanniski, The Wav the World Works,
and Schuster, 1978), pages 7-8.

(New York:

Simon
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and/or raise taxes to slow the economy,

thus reducing

inflation.
Supply-side proponents were quick to point out
that supply-side economics was not a new idea in the
1970s.^^®

In fact it has a long history in economic

thought dating back to Adam Smith who wrote:
"High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the
consumption of the taxed commodities, and
sometimes by encouraging smuggling,
frequently afford a smaller revenue to
government than what might be drawn from more
moderate taxes.
When the diminution of
revenue is the effect of the diminution of
consumption, there can be but one remedy, and
that is the lowering of the tax."^^^
This concept of reducing the tax rate in order to
increase tax revenue was first implemented in United
States economic policy during the 1920s when President
Calvin Coolidge,

at the urging of his Secretary of the

Treasury Andrew Mellon,
many supply-siders,

reduced taxes which,

spurred economic growth.

argued
Mellon

argued:
It seems difficult for some to understand
that high rates of taxation do not

^^^Lawrence Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax
Policy is Transforming the U.S. Economy, (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1990), page 6.
^^®Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics,
Schuster, 1984), page 241.

(New York:

Simon and

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, (London: Grant Richards, 1904), Volume II,
pages 544-545.
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necessarily mean large revenues to the
Government and more revenue may often be
obtained by lower rates.
Coolidge's proposal reduced the top tax rate from 73
percent to 25 percent

(to begin at a taxable income of

$100,000) with dramatic cuts from other brackets.

The

lowest tax rate was cut from 4 percent to 1.5 percent.
Though the total tax package did lose revenue at first,
the final results seem to support the supply-side
analysis.

After an initial drop of revenue from $861

million in 1922 to $734 million in 1925,

strong total

revenue growth continued for the next several
years.Even Keynes noted the possibilities of
generating more tax revenue through tax reductions.

In

1933 he wrote:
Nor should the argument seem strange that
taxation may be so high as to defeat its
object, and that, given sufficient time to
gather the fruits, a reduction of taxation
will run a better chance, than an increase,
of balancing the budget.

^^°Robert E. Keleher and William Orzechowski, "Supply-Side_
Fiscal Policy: An Historical Analysis of a Rejuvenated Idea," in
Richard H. Fink, ed., Supply-Side Economics: A Critical Appraisal,
(Aletheia Books, University Publications of America, 1982), page
147.
^^^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 24.
^^^John Maynard Keynes, The Means of Prosperity,
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1933), page 5.

(New York:
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In 1963 President Kennedy proposed the most dramatic
tax cuts since the Coolidge-Mellon tax cuts.

The top

tax rates dropped from 91 percent to 70 percent and the
bottom rate fell from 20 percent to 14 percent.
cuts were viewed as very successful:
11.1% from 1963 to 1965,

These

real GNP grew

the unemployment rate fell

from 5.7% to 4.5% during the same period and,
though tax rates were cut,

even

tax receipts rose by 2.5%

during the two year period while the federal deficit
declined from $4.8 billion in 1963 to $1.4 billion in
1965.^23

In the late 1960s supply-side economist Robert
Mundell from Columbia University teamed up with Laffer
and together they became two of the leading
spokespeople for the idea of a significant tax cut to
spur economic growth.For many years they labored
looking for converts.

Finally,

they joined with Jude

Wanniski who at that time was an editor with the Wall
Street Journal.

On December 11,

1974,

Wanniski

produced the first of what were to be many major pieces
on the Journal op-ed page,
spur economic growth.

calling for a tax cut to

The article,

in response to a

^^^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 32.
^^^Anderson,

Revolution,

page 146.
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proposal

floating within the Republican party to cut

taxes up to $30 billion,
Taxes".

was

entitled

"Its Time to Cut

In it he wrote:

A tax cut not only increases demand, but
increases the incentive to produce...with
lower taxes it is more attractive to invest
and more attractive to work; demand is
increased but so is supply...The $30 billion
tax cut is needed immediately.
Wanniski's piece reached thousands of people and
brought the idea of a massive tax cut into the public
realm of debate.

One person who was very intrigued

with the idea was Republican New York Congressman Jack
Kemp.

Kemp was a foimier professional

football

quarterback who espoused traditional conservative
values.

In the summer of 1975 he held a series of

meetings

in his Washington office with an array of

supply-side economists'^®,
on supply-side economics.

and soon became an expert
He lobbied other Republican

congressman and finally on February 23,

1977

the

Republican side of the House of Representatives offered
an amendment to the Democratic Budget Resolution

^“Jude Wanniski,
Journal, December 11,

"Its Time to Cut Taxes",
1974.

Wall Street

^^®Paul Craig Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution;
Insider's Account of Policymaking in Washington, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984), page 1.

108
proposing a major tax

The amendment failed but

it was a preview of what was
the debut of the proposal

to come.

Shortly after

for a tax cut,

Kemp teamed

with Senator William Roth to propose a three year,
federal

income tax cut

(10% per year).

30%

This became the

economic position of the Republican Party and on which
Kemp became a national spokesperson for the party.

He

began an extensive national campaign in support of
supply-side economics.

He presented it very simply:

The idea is a simple one and an old one.
When you tax something, you get less of that
thing.
When you tax production, capital,
work savings and entrepreneurial activity,
you get less of all of these.
Kemp undertook this new mantle of conservatism with a
vengeance.

He espoused that government was

the source

of many of the country's problems and the country
needed to rethink its

idea of government.

He argued

that the government should get out of the everyday
lives

of people and business:
Opportunity, the chance to make it and to
improve your life, that's what the American
Dream was and is all about.
What poisons
that dream is when government stands in the
way, throwing up roadblocks that are really
unnecessary.
More and more people sense

^^^Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution:
of Policymaking in Washington, page 7.

An Insider's Account

^^®Jack Kemp, An American Idea; Ending Limits to Growth,
(Washington, D.C.: The American Studies Center, 1984), page 13.
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along the way that they're not going to
fulfill their potential, not because of a
deficiency in their ambition or ability, but
because of a deficiency in the political
structure.
Their honest ambitions are
frustrated.
They believe, often rightly,
that somehow the flaws of government have
held them back or cut them down,
Kemp further articulated the need to remove the
boundaries

that he perceived politicians often placed

on the economic horizon.

He became fond of castigating

what he called the attitude of
explained his

thinking as

"zero-sum".

He

follows:

[Limits to economic growth] to my way of
thinking, represents the greatest obstacle to
opportunity and advancement we face as a
nation: static thinking, the idea that life
is a "zero-sum" game.
According to this
view, there are only so many jobs to go
around.
Only so much energy to go around.
A
fixed amount of prosperity, and a fixed
amount of poverty.
And so it is government's
job to divide up these fixed amounts until,
say, the sum of prosperity (a plus) and
poverty (a negative) comes to
zero... throughout the ages, people have been
afflicted with political rulers who have
treated society as if it were zero-sum.
Individuals can only benefit at the expense
of others.
Nations can only advance at the
expense of their competitors.
Politics
becomes the art of pitting class against
class...What I'm really driving at is that
there are only two ways to approach public
governance: statically and dynamically.
And
in every nation, among every people, whatever
the system of government, there are powerful
tendencies toward static thinking that must
be overcome by dynamic thinkers.

^^®Kemp, An American Renaissance: A Stratecrv for the 1980s,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pages 19-21.
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His

thinking rested on his conviction the country

could achieve anything it strived for as
didn't limit its
himself as a

long as

it

thinking.Kemp referred to

"humane"

conservative and though he agreed

with Goldwater about the basic role of the federal
government in the economic sphere and in the sanctity
and utmost priority of
that

individual

freedom,

he argued

the federal government had an important positive

role of providing assistance to the needy and less
fortunate.

Added to Goldwater's position of the

federal government's role of protecting society from
internal and external threats and securing what he
calls natural human rights,
a

Kemp presented a picture of

"conservative with a heart".
Keeping in line with the traditional perspective

of

the role of government in protecting society from

threats,

Kemp and the Republican party were also

strongly arguing for an increase in military spending.
Relying on the argument that national defense was one
of

the primary functions

of

the federal government,

therefore its power of taxation,

and

Kemp and the party

argued that military spending should take precedence.

“°Kemp,
page 82.
^^^Kemp,

An American Renaissance:

An American Idea:

A Stratecp/ for the 1980s,

Ending Limits to Growth,

page xxv.

Ill
citing studies

that the United States had fallen far

behind the Soviet Union in military strength,

the

Republicans pressed the Democratic administration of
Jimmy Carter to increase military spending.
Therefore,

with the approach of the 1980s,

the two

differing philosophies were slowly starting to reveal
some common ground:
government,
and less
All

limited role of the federal

tax cuts,

fortunate,

providing assistance to the needy

and increased military spending.

that was missing was someone to pull

it all

together.
The Emergence of Reagan
It is curious

that Ronald Reagan became the person

that would synthesize these competing perspectives.
Reagan was well known as a believer in the
philosophy,

"minimalist"

having worked as a spokesperson for

Goldwater during the 1976 presidential campaign^^^,
and as Governor of California as

the leading advocate

of a proposed amendment to the California state
constitution that would limit the taxing power of state

should be noted here that many other studies strongly
disagreed with the assertion that the United States had fallen
behind the Soviet Union in military strength and that though this
assertion became "fact" there is much dispute concerning it.
^^^William Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the
Policies and the People, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988) , page 14.
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government.

When he made his

first move for the

White House in the 1976 presidential campaign,
still very much the

"minimalist"

republican.

he was
But in

that campaign he made some strong statements about
cutting social programs
became obvious

that backfired on him and it

to him and others

party that this

"minimalist"

in the Republican

perspective made him

unelectable.The American people didn't want to be
told they had to suffer and by 1978 Reagan had learned
his

lesson and was changing course.

Most importantly,

he learned that the American electorate wanted an
optimistic President,

someone who would tell

things were going to work out,
hope,

them that

and who could give them

even if he and his advisors didn't necessarily

believe

in the workability of supply-side

economics.
Reagan managed to reject the baggage of
"minimalist"

politics without really rejecting its

objectives.

He accomplished this by embracing the

following propositions:

that inflation could be brought

under control without an increase in unemployment;

“^Niskanen,
and the People,

Reaganomics:

that

An Insider's Account of the Policies

page 14.

“^Stein,

Presidential Economics,

page 255.

“®Stein,

Presidential Economics,

page 257.
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tax cuts could be made that would help balance the
budget by increasing revenue;

and that he could reduce

government expenditures without injuring anyone or
reducing services because every social program was
of waste,

fraud and inef f iciencies .

With this

argument Reagan was able to merge the
"supply-side"
as

full

"minimalist"

and

wings of the party and avoid the debate

to whether to give out

the economy had thrived,

tax cuts as a reward after
or to give out tax cuts as a

way to spur the economy.He would make both tax
cuts and spending cuts without hurting anyone.

He also

managed to do it in a way that enabled both sides of
the debate to claim victory.
such as Herbert Stein,
Richard Nixon,
tax cut was

Minimalist economists

former economic advisor to

claimed that the real reason behind the

to force the spending cuts by putting

restrictive pressure on the budget.Meanwhile
supply-siders

^^'^Stein,

like Paul Craig Roberts claimed that

Presidential Economics,

page 236.

“^Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution:
of Policymaking in Washington, page 4.

An Insider's Account

^^®Arthur B. Laffer and Jan P. Seymour, The Economics of the
Tax Revolt: A Reader, (New York; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979),
page 53.
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Reagan was
charge

of

now a

setting economic policy.

Still,
House

two

supply-sider and they were now in

during

groups

"minimalist"
greatly as

and

to

of

the Reagan

transition

advisors

representing

"supply-side"

the development

"minimalist"

group,

Republicans,

wanted a

as

These

traditional

of

in

Republican administrations

Republicans

in

that

the

the

reduction

Senate.
in

spending because as
less

need

the

the

election,

and make

never get

the

the House

problem Kemp
Congressman

slowing of

officials

the

felt

economic

federal

economy grew there would be
safety net.

capital

first

through.

supported this

They also

felt

they would use

they had gained from the

so many enemies

tax cut

in taxes.

and senior

needed for

spending cuts

up whatever political

in

the

for a government

that by making

spending

The new supply-siders

taxes was

growth that would permit

federal

included most

in previous

The

traditional

any reduction

republicans

differed

economic policy.

lower growth
to

the White

the

perspectives

represented by more

a necessary complement

to

view.

that

Younger republicans
To deal with this

joined David Stockman,
from Michigan and soon

they would

then a young
to be Director of

““Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution:
of Policymaking in Washington, page 1.

An Insider's Account
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Office of Management and Budget,
that described an

in a long memorandum

"economic Dunkirk"

Republicans unless

for the

the proposed tax cuts

(Kemp-Roth)

were matched by a large reduction in spending for
discretionary domestic programs.

This was a powerful

presentation because Stockman was known as a strong
advocate for the spending reductions and Kemp as the
author of the tax cut proposal;

their collaboration

served as the integration of the two philosophies

in

the policy development process of the new
government.

The Components of Reaganomics
The Reagan Administration presented its Program
for Economic Recovery to the American public and the
Congress on February 18,

1981.

In the presentation of

the plan the Reagan government made clear the
underlying philosophy to reduce the scope of the
federal government:
The most important cause of our economic
problems has been the government itself.
The
Federal Government, through tax, spending,
regulatory, and monetary policies, has
sacrificed long-term growth and price
stability for ephemeral short-term goals.
In
particular, excessive government spending and
overly accommodative monetary policies have

^^^Niskanen,
and the People,

Reaganomics;
page 4.

An Insider's Account of the Policies
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combined to give us a climate of continuing
inflation.
That inflation itself has helped
to sap our prospects for growth.
In
addition, the growing weight of haphazard and
inefficient regulation has weakened our
productivity growth.
High marginal tax rates
on business and individuals discourage work,
innovation, and the investment necessary to
improve productivity and long-run growth.
Finally, the resulting stagnant growth
contributes further to inflation in a vicious
cycle that can only be broken with a plan
that attacks broadly on all fronts.
It stated further:
The budget that is being proposed will
restore the Federal Government to its proper
role in American society.
It will contribute
to the health of the economy, the strength of
our military, and the protection of the less
fortunate members of society who need the
compassion of the government for their
support.
Many special interests who had
found it easier to look to the Federal
Government for support than to the
competitive market will be disappointed by
this budget, but the average worker and
businessman, the backbone of our Nation, will
find that their interests are better
served.
The plan was a hybrid of the competing philosophies
the Republican Party.
budget cuts,

It called for

supply-side tax-cuts,

in

"minimalist"

a huge military

build-up and the protection of the social safety net
for those most in need.

This combination of different

^^^Ronald Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for
Economic Recovery, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February
18,

1981),

page 4.

^^^Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic
Recovery, page 13.
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philosophies

into one proposal was a political strategy

designed to offer something to everyone,
maintaining the fundamental

while

ideology of a

"minimalist"

government.
The proposal
specific parts:
cuts;

for economic recovery had four

to stimulate the economy through tax

to reorder federal

spending priorities by

reducing spending on social programs and increasing
military spending;

to slow monetary growth;

decrease federal regulations.

The plan included a

steady reduction in the Federal deficit,
$60 billion when Reagan took office,
balanced budget by 1984,

and to

which totalled

predicted a

and modest surpluses

thereafter.
Taxes
The Reagan Administration's proposal

to reduce

taxes was based on the Kemp-Roth proposal'to reduce the
marginal tax rates

for individuals across

10% per year for three years.
in stages
10

from a range of

14

This would reduce rates
to 70 percent to that of

to 50 percent by January 1,

proposal,

1984.^^^

In the

the administration argued the supply-side

perspective,

^^^Reagan,
Recovery,

the board by

page

asserting that,

as

America's New Beginning:
14.

taxpayers moved into

A Procrram for Economic
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higher brackets,

incentives

to work,

save,

and invest

were reduced since each addition to income yielded less
after taxes
marginal

than before.

The proposal

tax rate which is

the rate a taxpayer pays on

each additional dollar earned.
applied to all additional
it was

focused on the

It is

income.

this rate that is

Reagan argued that

the marginal rate that most directly affected

incentives

to work,

economic growth,
increased.

invest or save and in order to spur

these incentives needed to be

But the administration did not echo the

claim of the supply-side perspective that tax revenues
would actually increase because of the tax cut.
proposal

submitted to Congress

estimated that the reductions

In the

the administration
in Federal tax revenues,

compared with those which would have been obtained
under the existing law,

were $6.4 billion n FY 1981,

$44.2 billion in FY 1982,

and would rise to $162.4

billion in FY 1986.""^
The second half of

the tax cut proposal called for

tax relief for businesses.

This was described as

Accelerated Cost Recovery System

(ACRS),

which

substituted depreciation periods of three,
fifteen and eighteen years

^^^Reagan,
Recoveiy,

page

five,

ten,

for different classes of

America's New Beainnincr;
14.

the

A Program for Economic
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business

equipment and structures

complex Asset Depreciation Range,

for the much more
which had

depreciation periods of up to sixty years.
objective of the ACRS was

The

to reduce the effective tax

rates on the income from business
simplify the tax treatment of

this

investment and to
income.The

Reagan proposal estimated that ACRS would result in a
revenue loss of $2.5 billion in FY 1981,
in FY 1982,

and rising to $59.3

$9.7 billion

billion in FY 1986

(see

Table 4.1)
Table 4.1
Estimated Direct Revenue Effects of Proposed Tax
Reductions
(in billions of dollars)
(Fiscal Years)
1983
1984

1981

1982

Ind.

-6.4

-44.2

-81.4

Bus.

-2.5

- 9.7

TOTAL-8.8

-53.9

source:

the

1986

-118.1

-141.5

-162.4

-18.6

- 30.0

- 44.2

-

-100.0

-148.1

-185.7

-221.7

A Program for Economic Recovery,

^^®Niskanen,
and

1985

People,

^^’Reagan,
Recovery,

page

Reaganomics:
page

An

page 16.

Insider's Account

of

the

Policies

74.

America's New Beginning:
16.

59.3
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Spending
The second goal of the plan was

to reorder

spending priorities by cutting domestic spending and
increasing military spending.

Although the

Administration refered to this as a reduction in
spending,

the plan actually called only for a decrease

in the rate of growth of federal spending from the 16%
annual rate at the time of the Reagan inauguration to
approximately 7% by the end of the
Reagan Administration.

first

Nevertheless,

term of the

the plan

acknowledged that this reduction in the growth rate of
the Federal budget for the 1982

fiscal year was

the

largest ever proposed.
The plan listed three spending priorities:
increase military spending;
needy"

by maintaining a

to protect the

"social

"truly

safety net";

reduce all other domestic spending.

to

and to

Out of these

priorities came nine specific guidelines

that were

applied in developing the spending plan:
-

Preserve the social safety net;

- Revise entitlements

to eliminate unintended benefits;

- Reduce subsidies to middle-and upper-income groups;

“®Ronald Reagan, "Budget Reform Plan" in America's New
Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery, (The White House,
Washington, D.C. 1981), page 1,
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-

Impose fiscal restraint on other national

interest

programs;
- Recover costs
-

that can be clearly allocated to users;

Stretch-out and retarget public sector capital

investment programs;
- Reduce overhead and personnel costs of the Federal
Government;
- Apply sound economic criteria to subsidy programs;
- Consolidate categorical grant programs

into block

grants.
The spending proposal
in the social
the elderly

safety net:

listed the programs
social

included

insurance benefits

for

(traditional social security payments),

basic unemployment benefits,

cash benefits

chronically poor and veterans programs.

for the

These programs

in 1981 constituted approximately 37% of the total
federal budget.The administration's proposed a
defense share of federal spending to rise from 24%
1981 to 32% by 1984;

social

increase from 37% to 41%;

in

safety net spending to

and all other federal

^^®Reagan, America's New Beginning; A Program for Economic
Recovery, page 10.
^^°Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic
Recovery, page 11.
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programs

to decline from 29%

to

18%.^^^

The plan

called for additional defense spending of $7.2 billion
in 1982,

a 5%

increases
first

increase,

in 1983

with much larger yearly

and 1984

so that by the end of the

term of the Reagan Administration defense

spending would be nearly 60% higher than when Reagan
first

took off ice.

addition to a 62%

These increases were in
increase in defense spending

spending increase of approximately 5% annually)
the Carter Administration:

(real
during

1977-1981.^^^

Among the more prominent aspects of the proposed
reductions
it called

in non-social safety net programs were what
"the first comprehensive proposal in more

than a decade to overhaul the Nation's overgrown $350
billion entitlement system;"
fRood stamps,
assistance,
benefits,
total

including revisions of

extended unemployment benefits,

student loans,

trade

secondary social security

medicaid and other entitlement programs

savings of

billion by 1986.

for a

$9.4 billion in 1982 growing to $18.9
It also called for the substantial

^^^Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic
Recovery, pages 10-11.
^^^Reagan, "Budget Reform Plan" in America's New Beginning:
Program for Economic Recovery, page 10,

A

^^^Niskanen, Reaganomics; An Insider's Account of the Policies
and the People, page 28,
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cutback or elimination of what were called
"unessential,

or ineffective Federal programs"

including the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA),

Amtrak,

energy research and development,

Federal support for the Arts.

and

In an attempt to

transfer responsibility for many federal programs to
the state and local level,

the spending plan also

called for the consolidation of nearly 100 categorical
grant programs into a few flexible block grants for
state and local support of education,
social services,

and health and

with a 20% reduction in the overall

allocation resulting in savings of over $4 billion by
their full implementation in 1983.

Monetary Policy
The third component of the Reagan plan for
economic recovery was for a slowing of monetary growth.
Monetary policy is the responsibility of the autonomous
Federal Reserve System so the Reagan program in this
regard was basically a request of the Federal Reserve
to follow a slow growth policy.

Reagan argued that,

order to achieve the goals of his program,

in

the rate of

money and credit growth would need to be brought down.
This,

he argued,

would help control inflation.

If

monetary policy became too expansive inflation would
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continue to accelerate,

and the Administration's

economic program would be undermined.Reagan
supported the Federal Reserve efforts to control
inflation but,

in reality,

his influence was limited to

publicly and privately pushing the Federal Reserve to
adopt policies that were in line with the goals and
objectives of the plan for economic recovery.
Deregulation
The fourth aspect of the program for economic
recovery was the decrease in federal regulation.
Reagan argued that the rapid growth in federal
regulation had impeded economic growth and contributed
to inflation.

He acknowledged the legitimate role of

government in protecting the environment,
health and safety,

promoting

safeguarding workers and consumers,

and guaranteeing equal opportunity,

but argued that

these regulations had become excessive and were a very
significant factor in the difficult economic situation
facing the country in 1981.^^^

In his plan,

Reagan

explained that there were several ways in which
regulation placed additional costs on the economy:

the

^^^Reagan, Americans New Beginning: A Program for Economic
Recovery, page 22.
^^^Reagan, America's New Beginnincr: A Program for Economic
Recovery, page 18.

125
expenditures for the Federal bureaucracy which
administered and enforced the regulations;

the costs to

businesses and state and local government in complying
with regulations;

and the longer run and indirect

effects of regulation on economic growth and
productivity.
In order to accomplish the goal of reducing
Federal regulation Reagan proposed the establishment of
the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief,
chaired by Vice-President Bush.

The charge of the Task

Force was to review major regulatory proposals,
regulations already in place,

assess

and oversee the

development of legislative proposals designed to
coordinate the roles of different federal regulatory
agencies.

Reagan also abolished federal efforts to

control wage and price increases and issued an
Executive order to strengthen Presidential oversight of
the regulatory process.

In addition Reagan attributed

over $500 million in spending cuts to the decrease in
regulations.
In order to assess the economic impact of
Reaganomics

this study focuses primarily on an

evaluation of the tax and spending initiatives.

This

is not to say that the monetary and regulatory
proposals did not play a major role.

To the contrary.
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the ability of the Federal Reserve,

whether through its

own initiative or due to pressure from the
administration,

to curtail inflation had a tremendous

impact on the economy and the success of the Reagan
plan.

And the deregulatory actions of the

administration also had a tremendous impact on the
economy,

especially in terms of the savings and loan

industry where deregulation arguably led to the need
for the multibillion dollar bailout which has
contributed heavily to the federal budget deficit.
However,

for the purpose of the examination of the

results of the attempted implementation of the "supplyside" perspective that lay at the core of Reaganomics,
it is useful to focus primarily on the tax and spending
proposals and their results,

keeping in mind their

implementation was done in a context that depended on
many other variables of which‘ monetary and regulatory
policies were major ones.

Outcomes
Taxes
The tax bill that was eventually passed by
Congress was called the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981

(ERTA).

The business aspect of Reagan's proposal

passed through Congress mostly intact but the personal
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income tax legislation contained significant changes.
Because of concern about the potential deficits,

the

first year tax cut was changed from 10% to 5% and
postponed by four months.Two important aspects
left out of the Reagan proposal for fear of negative
political fallout were included by Congress.

The first

was the immediate reduction in the top rate on
investment income from 70 percent to 50 percent and
second.

Congress inserted tax bracket "indexing"

inflation to take effect in 1985.

to

Indexing of the tax

code for inflation was passed to end the phenomena
known as bracket creep.

Bracket creep was when a

taxpayer would be pushed into a higher tax bracket by
inflation even though their actual income had not
increased after being adjusted for inflation.

And

since tax brackets usually rose most steeply at the
bottom of the scale i.e.

a few thousand dollar increase

in salary pushed people into a new bracket while in the
top brackets it took much more to do so and those in
the highest tax brackets could not go any higher,
bracket creep affected those near the bottom or middle
of the scale most severely.

Indexing not only

compensated individuals for inflation,

it also removed

^^®Niskanen, Reaganomics; An Insider's Account of the Policies
and the People, page 75.
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any revenue incentive for the government to "inflate"
its way into a balanced budget or more spending.
However,

to the dismay of the Reagan administration,

Congress also loaded up ERTA with an array of other tax
cuts and incentives.

It extended tax incentives for

charitable contributions,
child care,

increased tax subsidies for

provided for adoption expenses,

increased

tax-free profits a retired couple could obtain from the
sale of their home,

and made dozens of other

adjustments to the tax code.

These additions were so

extensive and costly that the Congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation estimated that by 1986 half of
the revenue loss from the bill would come from
provisions other than the personal tax rate
reduction.In all ERTA was projected to reduce
revenues by $787 billion over the period between 82-89.
More than $500 billion of this total was a reduction in
individual income taxes,
income taxes,

$200 billion in corporate

and $40 billion in other taxes.

Shortly after the tax-bill was signed serious
questions were raised about the potential increase in

^^'^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 47.
^^®Michael Boskin, Reagan and the Economy, (San Francisco,
California: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1987), page 150.
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the deficit.

The stock market fell 11% between mid-

August and mid-September and long-term interest rates
rose substantially.

Industrial production fell and

unemployment rose starting in July signalling the
beginning of what was to be one of the most severe
recessions since the Great Depression.

By December the

problem had become even more serious as economic
conditions deteriorated.
quarter was 8.3%

Unemployment in the fourth

(compared to 7.7% predicted)

and

projected deficits were about $100 billion a year.^^^
The

1981-82 recession was in full force.

In September,

1982 in response to the recession and the growing
budget

deficit projections,

Equity and Fiscal
designed to

Responsibility Act

raise an additional

cumulatively through
enforcement

the

the

corporate

it

repealed

scheduled

individual

indexing

of

It

for

(TEFRA)

increased tax
loopholes but

income

the projected revenue

left

tax cuts passed in

1985 and many of the provisions

tax policy enacted in ERTA.

1985-86.

which was

$99 billion

further acceleration of

for

^®®Stein,

1985.

and eliminated some

undisturbed the

1981,

Congress passed the Tax

depreciation

TEFRA took back about
loss

for ERTA.

Presidential Economics,

However,

The net

pages 273-274.

25% of
impact by
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FY 88 was still to be a $215 billion tax reduction,^®®
though overall the total cumulative loss of revenue
between 1982-89 was reduced from the original
projection of $787 billion to $543 billion,

a reduction

of $244 billion - $72 billion less in individual
reductions,

$131 billion less in corporate reductions,

and $41 billion less in other taxes.
TEFRA was one of the largest tax increases

in

history in terms of projected revenue gains but did
leave alone the individual
which was

income tax aspect of ERTA

the heart of the Reagan plan.

withholding on interest and dividends,
corporate income tax payments,

TEFRA included
acceleration of

modification of the

completed contract method of tax accounting,
the taxation of life insurance companies,
airport and airways excise taxes,
social security hospital
employees,

increase in

extension of the

insurance taxes

strengthening the

changes

to federal

individual minimum tax,

increasing the floor for casualty and medical expense
deductions,

increasing the cigarette and telephone

excise taxes and increasing the rate and base of the
unemployment tax.

However,

even though TEFRA left

^®°Boskin,

Reagan and the Economy,

page 66.

^®^Boskin,

Reagan and the Economy,

page 157.

in
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intact income tax aspects of ERTA it caused tremendous
division within the Reagan Administration.
core supply-siders

Some hard¬

like Norman Ture and Craig Roberts

left the administration in anticipation of what Roberts
called the

"unraveling of Reaganomics".

But TEFRA also

gave Reagan more credibility in Congress as

it showed

many that he was about more than just cutting taxes no
matter what.
In 1983

He was

looking at the bigger picture.

Reagan and the Congress

supported the

recommendations of a bipartisan commission on social
security to significantly increase payroll taxes

to

protect the solvency of the social security system.
These increases were projected to raise approximately
$9 billion annually.

In 1986 Reagan proposed a

substantial simplification of the tax process by
proposing the elimination of many exemptions
those on Individual Retirement Accounts
wealthy,

state and local sales

tax,

for the

medical expenses

above a certain limit and other items
dues,

including

such as union

consumer interest payments and business meals.

This proposal was adopted to be

"revenue neutral"

and

was not perceived to have a significant effect on the
distribution or level of taxes.

Its primary goal was

^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies
and the People, pages 78-79.
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to simplify the system and eliminate many deductions
that served as

loopholes

for different sectors of

society.
Spending
One of the major challenges

facing the Reagan

administration's plan to reduce the growth of
spending was
spending.

the political obstacles

federal

to reducing social

During the presidential campaign Reagan

talked about being able to reduce spending merely by
restraining the growth of old programs,
programs and eliminating waste,
and abuse.

fraud,

avoiding new
extravagance,

He didn't talk about the pain and hardship

that these yet unspecified cuts would inevitably cause.
Niskanen claims that Reagan's advisors knew that in
order to achieve the proposed spending reductions

that

services would be affected and pain and hardship would
be caused^®^ but to say so would jeopardize the
campaign.
waste,

Since Reagan talked only about reducing

fraud,

extravagance,

that substantial reductions

and abuse and made it seem
in the growth of federal

spending could be achieved without any reduction in
services,

the American public was not prepared,

they given their approval

nor had

for such reductions.

^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies
and the People, page 13.
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In his proposal Reagan made great efforts to
portray his efforts to reduce the growth of spending as
sparing the "social safety net".

Some of the advisors

to the Reagan White House argued later whether this was
because of his true desire to protect these programs or
because of the political costs of being portrayed as
attacking the poor.

Martin Anderson,

Reagan's first

chief domestic policy advisor stated that:
providing a safety net for those who cannot
or are not expected to work was not really a
social policy objective.
The term safety net
was used...to describe the set of social
welfare programs that would not be closely
examined on the first round of budget changes
because of the fierce political pressures
that made it impossible to even discuss these
programs without involving a torrent of
passionate, often irrational, criticism...the
term safety net was political shorthand that
only made sense for a limited period of

time.^®^
However,
Democrat,

Reagan who in the 1940s and 1950s was a

was a strong supporter of the New Deal so it

was no coincidence that the programs labeled part of
the safety net were those programs that were part of
the New Deal.

Those that he labelled as

"other" and

therefore not protected from the budget ax were those

^®^Martin Anderson, "The Objectives of the Reagan
Administration's Social Welfare Policy," in D. Lee Bawden, ed.,
The Social Contract Revisited: Aims and Outcomes of President
Reagan's Social Welfare Policy, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban
Institute Press, 1984), page 113.
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developed primarily during the 1960s and 1970s as part
of the

"Great Society" program of Lyndon Johnson whose

1964 candidacy Reagan worked against as a spokesperson
for the Barry Goldwater campaign.
of the reasons,

However,

regardless

the White House was clear that

traditional social security payments to the elderly,
basic unemployment benefits,
elderly and chronically poor,

cash payments to the
and government

obligations to veterans were off limits to the budget
cuts.

This presented quite a difficult problem for the

members of the Reagan budget cutting team.

These

programs accounted for 36% of the total federal outlays
and when combined with the 24% that made up defense and
the 10% for interest payments nearly 70% of the budget
was termed off-limits for reductions.

This left only

30% of the budget available for reductions.

This meant

that in order to achieve the proposed $41 billion in
cuts

(after a $7.2 billion increase in defense)

in 1982

and the proposed $105 billion by 1984 this 30% of the
budget was going to have to incur substantial
reductions.
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Analysis
Taxes
It is very difficult to measure the success of the
Reagan tax proposal in meeting the goals of supply-side
economists particularly because there is substantial
disagreement among the supply-siders themselves as to
the original goals and objectives. Anderson claims that
the supply-siders were falsely accused of arguing that
the tax cut would almost instantly produce large
increases in tax revenues that would wipe out that
revenue loss of the cut itself.

He argues that the

Reagan team conservatively estimated that only a little
over 17% of the tax cut would be recovered over the
five-year period covered in the initial campaign
proposal.Stockman,

on the other hand,

argues that

Laffer and Wanniski clearly stated that the tax cuts
would pay for themselves and although Stockman claims
he never agreed with the argument,

and often wondered

if Laffer and Wanniski themselves did,

it was the

position of the supply-siders.^®®
Whatever the original claims it is still essential
to analyze the impact of the tax cut,

^®^Anderson,

Revolution,

particularly on

page 132.

^®®David A. Stockman, Triumph of Politics; How the Reagan
Revolution Failed, (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), page 53.
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federal revenues.

The most exhaustive attempt to

evaluate the effects of the tax cut for individuals
isolated from other aspects of the Reagan economic
program and from other economic factors affecting it
was done by Professor Lawrence Lindsey of Harvard
University,

who was a member of the Council of Economic

Advisors during the development and implementation of
the tax cut proposal.
Experiment:
U.S.

In 1990 he published The Growth

How the New Tax Policy is Transforming the

Economy.

According to Lindsey the core of supply-

side economics - that tax rates affect the willingness
of taxpayers to work,

save,

and invest and thereby also

affect the health of the economy - was clearly proven
as true and is now accepted as a given among
economists.

However,

he also states that the most

controversial claim of the supply-siders - that
reductions in tax rates would bring in more revenue
that they lost - was proven to be untrue. Yet he says
this is only because of the reductions in the
relatively low rates on moderate and low-income
taxpayers.

He argues reductions on upper-income tax

rates clearly produced a net increase in tax revenue

^^^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 10.
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and the tax cuts for the upper-middle class came out
about even.
In order to fully measure the effects of the tax
cut on government revenues Lindsey attempts to measure
the loss of revenue after taking into consideration the
effects on the economy of the tax cut itself.

He does

this by starting with the direct effect of the tax cuts
- the difference between what the new law generated and
what the old law would have generated if nothing else
had changed.

He finds the direct effect of the tax cut

from 1981 through 1985 as very large:

rising from $44

billion in 1982 to $115 billion in 1985.^®^

This is

the loss of revenue from the tax cut assuming all else
is equal.

Then he proceeds to subtract the amount of

revenue generated by three indirect effects of the tax
cuts:

the demand-side effect,

supply-side effect,

and

pecuniary effect from these numbers to arrive at what
he calls the true cost of the tax cut.
The demand-side effect is based on the assumption
that a tax cut will increase consumer demand and thus
increase economic activity.

This is similar to the

^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is
Transforming the U.S. Economy, pages 10-11.
^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment; How the New Tax Policy is
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 65.

138
orthodox Keynesian approach to economics whereby
stimulating the overall demand in the economy is the
means by which to influence the economy.

Using a model

developed by a group of economists for the National
Bureau of Economic Research which is based on the
actual tax returns of more than 34,000 taxpayers in
each of six years,

Lindsey calculates the demand-side

effect - the revenue generated by the increased demand
as a result of the tax cut as $14.1 billion in 1982 and
$40.1 billion in 1985.

When he subtracts these numbers

from the direct effect the revenue loss is reduced to
$29.9 billion in 1982 and $74.9 billion in 1985.
Then Lindsey calculates the supply-side effect
which measures the revenue changes that resulted from a
change in the supply of capital and labor.

At lower

tax rates each taxpayer keeps more of each additional
dollar earned which makes him more willing to work
longer hours,

to work harder and to save or invest more

or take greater entrepreneurial risks thus generating
additional tax revenue.

Using the same model,

he

calculates the supply-side effect to be $12 billion in
1982 and $20.7 billion from 1985.

After subtracting

this supply-side effect from the direct effect less the
demand effect he is left with a revenue loss of $17.9
billion in 1992,

less than half the direct effect
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The tax cut did not pay for itself as some of the
supply-siders claimed it would since personal income
tax collections were lower than they would have been if
the tax rates had not been cut.

However,

the

behavioral responses as seen in the supply-side and
pecuniary effects were quite substantial and made up
approximately a third of the estimated direct cost of
the cut.^^°

What is more important,

he argues,

is

that everyone in the income spectrum benefited,

with

families above the median doing best early in the tax
cut era - benefiting directly from the decrease in
rates - while others gained later as the economic
recovery continued.
Niskanen agrees,

However,

he points out,

and

that the catching up of the lower

economic strata had more to do with overall economic
conditions than with the tax cut directly.
Spending
In examining the results of the Reagan spending
proposals it is clear that the Reagan administration
was successful at slowing the growth of federal
spending but not by as much as it had proposed.

In

^’'“Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is
TransformincT the U.S. Economy, page 76.
^^^Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 82 and Niskanen, Reaganomics;
An Insider's Account of the Policies and the People, page 273.
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order to fully understand the size and impact of the
budget reductions it is helpful to examine the results
in real terms to account for the impact of inflation,
and in "current services"

levels:

the amount of funding

that would have been necessary to maintain services at
the level they were when Reagan took office taking into
account inflation and demographic changes that would
especially affect entitlement outlays.

During Reagan's

first term real federal spending increased at a 3.7%
annual rate,

lower than the 5% annual rate during the

Carter administration but this still meant that by FY
1985 real federal spending was 15% higher than the
initial Reagan proposal.

And although the growth

of domestic spending slowed,

federal spending as a

share of GNP was higher at the end of the first term
than when Reagan took office

{an estimated 24.1% for FY

1985 versus 23.5% in FY 1981).
However,

the administration was relatively

successful in reordering federal budget priorities.
Real defense outlays increased by 7% a year since 1981
raising the share from 26% to 32% in 1985 and a
substantially larger portion of this enhanced defense
budget was being allocated to weapons relative to

^’^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies
and the People, page 26.
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current operations and maintenance.

Congress

agreed to most of the proposed domestic spending cuts
for 1982 but far less in the subsequent years so budget
savings were about half of what Reagan asked for.
However,

this still meant that between 1981 and 1988

$159 billion was cut from domestic programs beyond what
was needed to maintain "current services".

These cuts

were divided up by 123.6 billion in grant-in-aid to
state and local government

(a 16.5% reduction)

billion in payments direct to individuals

and $35

(a 2.3%

reduction).
The grant-in-aid programs that were hit the
hardest were job training programs,
program for welfare recipients,
training grants,

the work incentive

health planning and

special milk programs,

regional commission programs,
administration grants,

appalachian

economic development

energy conservation programs,

and the Urban development action grant which all
suffered at least a 50% cut in current service levels.
Juvenile justice assistance,

subsidized housing,

environmental protection agency wastewater treatment
grants,

and the general revenue sharing programs all

^■'^John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, The Reagan Record,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984),
page

8.

143
experienced cuts of at least 40% current services.
General Revenue sharing was completely eliminated at
the end of FY 1986.

Grant-in-aid programs for state

and local governments in FY 1988 were 20% below the
level that would have been needed to maintain the level
of services provided in FY 1981.

The deepest cuts in

programs directly aiding individuals came in student
benefits,

which was cut by 9.5% in current service

funding and food stamps which was cut by 7.2% in
current service levels.
Below is a synopsis of the budget changes in the
major federal budget categories:
Social Security
Social Security represented about 21% of total
federal outlays in FY 1981 and increased at a 2.9% real
annual rate during the first term.
of the Reagan administration,

From the beginning

the traditional social

security benefits to the elderly were considered off
limits to budget cuts.

The Reagan budget did,

make significant changes in "peripheral"
security programs:

however,

social

reducing the minimum benefit and

^’^AFSCME, The Republican Record: A 7-Year Analysis of State
Losses of Federal Funding (FY 1982 - FY 1988), (Washington. D.C.:
AFSCME, 1988), pages 1-3.
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disability benefits,

while eliminating student benefits

and death benefits where there was no survivor.
Health
Spending for health programs

(excluding those for

the military and veterans but including Medicare and
Medicaid)

was about 10% of total federal outlays in FY

1981 and increased at a 5.7% real annual rate during
the first term.

These programs were not considered

part of the core safety net but the initial Reagan
budget proposed only small changes in these programs.
The Reagan administration had two major health
policy objectives upon taking office:

reducing the

growth of federal health care spending and reforming
private as well as public health insurance to promote
efficiency through competition.
first goal,
success,

With respect to the

the administration had only limited

reducing expected FY 1985 spending by about 6%

from pre-Reagan policy levels.

Reductions in Medicare

accounted for 75% of the saving but the largest
proportionate cuts were in the much smaller health
services grants programs.

In promoting competition,

the administration made little progress.

The medicare

program which is federally financed health insurance

^"'^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies
and the People, page 36.
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for the elderly and disabled accounted for 75% of total
federal spending on health care and despite a 17%
annual growth between 1974 and 1981 the
administration's FY 1982 and 1983 budgets didn't
propose any major reforms in the program.
rate of Medicaid,

The growth

the state administered entitlement

health insurance program for low-income people jointly
financed by the federal and state governments slowed to
about half the average annual growth rate between 1979
- 1981 of 18%.

Health Service Grants were more

profoundly affected.

The creation of block grants with

greatly reduced federal funding was the Reagan
administration's main goal for health services grants.
Congress agreed with the administration's 1981 proposal
that consolidated grants into three blocks with more
state flexibility to spend about 20% fewer federal
dollars.

The states responded by concentrating these

more limited federal dollars on programs that they had
traditionally favored
money)

(supported heavily with state

so programs without solid state-level

constituency suffered substantially.

^^®Palmer and Sawhill,

The Reagan Record,

page 368.
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Low-Income Assistance
Spending for direct assistance of low-income
families and individuals

(exclusive of Medicaid)

was

about 6% of total federal outlays in FY 1981 and
increased at a
term.

.9% real annual rate during the first

This included cash transfers to dependent

families and the elderly poor,
credit,

the earned income tax

and transfer-in-kind of food,

energy assistance.

housing,

and

Only cash transfers to dependent

families and the elderly poor were considered to be
core social safety net programs.

The administration's

initial objectives for these other programs to assist
low-income and disadvantaged people were to reduce the
cash and food assistance to those with incomes above
the poverty line,

to simplify administration,

reduce the growth of subsidized housing.

and to

In this they

were largely successful.
Federal child nutrition programs included free and
reduced price lunches for lower-income children in
participating schools,

a general subsidy for all meals

served in those schools,

a program of special food

supplements for pregnant and lactating women,
and children

(WIC)

infants

and several smaller programs.

In FY

^’'"'Niskanen, Reacranomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies
and the People, page 41.
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1985 child nutrition outlays as a whole were 28% below
the pre-Reagan baseline for FY 1985 because of the
cutbacks.

Participation in the school lunch program

was reduced by about 3 million children,

including 1

million eligible for free or reduced-price meals.

But

Congress did raise WIC 4% above the baseline despite
administration opposition.
The cuts in subsidized housing were also
substantial.

The housing assistance programs are

designed to improve the quality of housing occupied by
low-income families,

reduce the share of income they

spend on housing to an acceptable level,
the overall supply of low-income housing.

and augment
Programs

have used rent supplements to help families occupy
good-quality housing of their choice,

as well as using

subsidies for the development and operation of new
projects to house families who are income eligible.
The number of newly assisted households fell from an
annual average of 300,000 for 1976-1980 period to
100,000 for 1981-1984 period.

As a result there were

about 1 million fewer households receiving assistance
and approximately 300,000 more families living in
substandard housing at the end of 1985 than there would

^"^^Palmer and Sawhill,

The Reagan Record, page 373.
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have been under a continuation of pre-Reagan policies.
Overall the administration clearly succeeded in
curtailing the growth of housing funding levels by
cutting budget authority appropriations from $27
billion in FY 1980 to $13 billion by 1984.^’^^.
Education,

Training,

Employment,

Spending for education,

and Social Services

training,

employment,

social services was 5% of the FY 1981 budget.

and

These

services were a primary target of the efforts to reduce
spending.

Many of the proposed changes in these

programs were approved and total real spending for
these programs declined at a 7.8% annual rate.

The

federal role in elementary and secondary education is
actually relatively small,

since federal spending is

less than 10% of total public expenditures for this
purpose though nearly $7 billion in federal money in
1984 was appropriated to K-12 education.
federal program,
billion,

The major

constituting nearly half of this $7

is Chapter I of the Education Consolidation

and Improvement Act of 1981.

In 1981 Reagan proposed

consolidating more than forty-five federal education
programs into two block grants — one to help states
and localities meet special needs and one to improve

^■'^Palmer and Sawhill,

The Reaaan Record,

pages 372-373.
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the resources and performance of schools -- with a 25%
reduction in overall funding.

Congress agreed to only

part of the changes.

education funding was

However,

still cut well below the pre-Reagan baseline levels.
Outlays in FY 1985 for Chapter 1 were almost 20% in
real terms below what they would have been under preReagan policies.

About 1 million

(20% fewer)

children

were served in FY 1984 than in FY 1980.^®°
When Reagan took office federal spending on
postsecondary education was primarily in the form of
student aid - Pell grants to help low-income students
attend college,

student loans and grants to colleges

for low-income students plus social security dependent
benefits and veteran payments.

Between FY 1978 and

1981 outlays in these programs increased by 114%.

By

FY 1981 federal spending on student aid was $6 billion
which constituted nearly 80% of all the tuition and fee
income of all colleges and universities in the U.S.
(compared with 39% in FY 1976).

The administration won

enactment of proposals to restore income restrictions
on the student loan program and to tighten income
limits on Pell grants.

Consequently FY 1985 spending

was about 23% below what would have been needed to

^®°Palmer and Sawhill,

The Reagan Record,

page 364.
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maintain current service levels.

However,

Reagan also

completely eliminated education benefits for social
security dependents and substantially reduced education
benefits for veterans.

If these payments were included

under postsecondary allocations,

FY 1985 would show

considerably lower levels of spending in real terms on
postsecondary education than at any time since the mid1970s.
The major change in training and employment
services was the replacement of the public service
employment program

(CETA)

assistance program

(JTPA).

with a private employment
CETA legislation expired in

1982 and was replaced by JTPA as a compromise between
the administration and Congress.

The administration

proposed eliminating income support
allowances)
all funding.

(training

and Congress limited such costs to 15% of
The administration proposed that

responsibility for the entire program be shifted to the
private sector and Congress specified that the private
sector and local government be

"equal partners".

The

administration proposed that funds for JTPA be in the
form of unrestricted block grants to states;

Congress

concurred in the block grant but placed restrictions on

^®^Palmer and Sawhill,

The Reagan Record,

pages 373-374.
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how states allocate funds to local jurisdictions.

The

administration proposed federal funds of under $3
billion and Congress funded the program at a level of
about 15% above that requested.
Defense
Defense was the only major federal program that
Reagan proposed to increase.

Niskanen points out that

the rapid increase in defense spending began in the
last two years of the Carter administration and
continued through FY 1985.

Real spending for defense

increased at a 4.8% annual rate during the Carter
administration and at a 6.9% annual rate during the
first term of the Reagan administration.

By FY 1985

annual real spending was about 30% higher than in FY
1981 and about 50% higher than in 1979.^®^

Real

spending for procurement increased at a 13.5% annual
rate and real spending for R&D

(including Department of

Energy spending on nuclear weapons)

increased 11%.

Real spending for military personnel increased at a
4.1% annual rate and real spending for operations and
maintenance increased at a 3.7% annual rate.
Niskanen argues,

Thus,

the defense buildup was focused on

^®^Palmer and Sawhill,

The Reagan Record,

page 366.

^®^Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies
and the People, page 28.
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weapons modernization rather than an increase in the
size or readiness of the military forces.
Other
Spending for the hundreds of other activities of
the federal government totalled about 14% of total
outlays in FY 1981.

Total real spending for these

programs declined at a 7.2% annual rate.
major changes were

Some of the

(in annual real spending):

Science and Space - increased 2.5%
Energy - reduced by 25%
Commerce and housing credits:

- reduced 19%

Community and regional development:

- reduced 12%^®^.

Conclusion
In economic terms clearly the most unequivocal
result of Reaganomics is the huge increase in the
federal debt and budget deficit.
office in January,

1981 the budget deficit was

approximately $72.7 billion.
January,
billion.

Between FY 1980-87 the national debt rose

People,

^®^Niskanen,
and

the

When he left office in

1989 the deficit was approximately $194
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$529 billion more than would have been the case had FY
1980 fiscal policies stayed in place.

This despite

the fact that following the severe recession of 19811982 the economy grew at a signfleant rate.
1982-1989 the Gross National Product

Between FY

(GNP)

grew at an

average annual rate of 4.1% in real dollars
4.1).^®’^

(see Figure

This strong growth is pointed at by

supporters of the supply-side plan as proof of the
success of Reaganomics.

But this strong growth should

have led to increased revenues and decreased demand for
expenditures.
fact,

However,

the deficit kept rising.

In

during this same period FY 1982-89 the deficit

grew by 178%,

increasing from $74 billion in the

beginning of FY 1982 to over $206 billion at the end of
FY 1989

(see Figure 4.2).^®®

Since the Reagan Program

for Economic Recovery planned for a balanced budget in
FY 1984 what caused this huge deficit?
There are different answers to this question
depending on whose perspective you adopt.
perspectives fall under three categories:

These
those who

^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is
TransformincT the U.S. Economy, page 97.
^^’’’United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts
of the United States 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO), page 563.
^®®United States Bureau of the Census,
of the United States 1991, page 563.

Statistical Abstracts
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argue that the economic forecasts used to make the
budget were at fault,
spent,

those who argue that too much was

and those who argue not enough was taken in.
Reagan Economic Forecasts

Stockman argues that the claim that the Reagan
administration could have a big tax cut,
buildup,

a big defense

and still have a balanced budget by 1984 was

based on economic forecasts that assumed that the
inflation rate would be gradually reduced and economic
growth would gradually increase.What occurred
instead was a dramatic decrease in inflation which
decreased revenues from income tax rates that were
still increasing with inflation and therefore bringing
in new money,

a severe recession which decreased

revenues due to the decrease of economic activity,

and

increased expenditures from the escalating demand for
social services as a result of the 1981-1982 recession.
By 1986 revenue generated by the gross national product
was $660 billion lower than that in the Reagan forecast
due to this weak economic growth and lower rate of

^®®Stockitian, Triumph of Politics;
Failed, page 397.

How the Reagan Revolution
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inf lation.
not

It is also clear that this result was

independent of the Reagan plan,

but a result of it.

The faulty revenue forecasts were adopted for one
of

two reasons:

either as a result of a genuine

miscalculation of the impact of the policies

to be

enacted and how quickly and dramatically inflation
would fall;

or as a result of a deliberate attempt to

paint a picture of how this plan to reduce taxes,
increase military spending and protect those in need
would produce a balanced budget in order to get the
most difficult aspects of the plan,
and the domestic program reductions,
It is

the tax increase
enacted.

likely that both of these are true.

There

were both true supply-side believers and minimalist
supporters
forecasts.

involved in the development of

the revenue

It is possible that some of the supply-

siders really believed that cutting taxes would
actually increase revenue.

And it is very likely as

Stockman and Stein point out that many of those
involved were going along with the projections as a way
of selling the plan and obtaining the tax cuts,
domestic spending reductions,

and increases

in military

spending while knowing that the budget would not

^^“Stockman,
Failed,

page

399.

Triumph of

Politics;

How the Reagan Revolution
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balance.

However,

it does

seem hard to believe that

these economists and politicians could be off by $660
billion in five years.

Regardless,

these faulty

forecasts played a large role in the resulting budget
deficit whether they were developed out of incompetence
or deliberate lying in order to manipulate the
political process.
Spending
Another perspective on the deficit focuses on the
level of spending.

Niskanen argues

that most of the

increase in the deficit was due to the rapid growth of
federal

spending.

Between FY 1981-1985,

though

spending growth was reduced by about 10%,

or $56

billion compared to what it would have been under preReagan policies,

this was only half of what Reagan

proposed.Niskanen argues

further that this

difference between the actual and forecast real
spending was almost identical to the increase in the
real deficit and therefore the deficit could be
attributed almost entirely to the failure to control
the growth of spending.

He also points out that the

deficit was not only a result of the growth in spending
but also a cause of
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and the
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substantial increase in spending every year just to pay
the interest on the debt.^^^

From FY 1981-85 federal

interest payments increased about $15 billion a year
despite a sharp decline in interest rates.
Lindsey agrees that the major cause of the deficit
was increased spending but points specifically at the
increase in defense spending,
the major cause of this.

not domestic spending as

Between FY 1980-87 real

defense spending increased by an average of 6.3% per
year or 55% total.

By FY 1987 the cumulative increase

amounted to $275 billion of the $417 billion added to
the national debt by higher spending,

or 66% of the

total increase in the debt.^^^
Niskanen's point is an important one.

Regardless

of the social consequences of the proposed Reagan
reductions in domestic spending growth,

the reductions

did not come close to those proposed by Reagan in the
original Program for Economic Recovery.

It is clear

that if Reagan had obtained from Congress the cutbacks
in the rate of growth in federal spending that he

^®^Niskanen,
and the

People,

^^^Niskanen,
and

the

People,

^^^Lindsey,
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proposed the deficit would be much smaller.

However,

what is not clear is the unanticipated consequences of
such reductions for the economy.

What impact would

such cuts have had on economic growth?

How far could

the cuts go before the populations affected by them
would create social upheaval further imperiling the
economy,

especially in the urban areas?

What would

have been the impact on the confidence and
psychological state of the population of these
reductions?
Niskanen

These are questions not even broached by

(or Reagan).

To ignore the economic

repercussions of the withdrawl of another 10% of funds
needed to maintain service levels while arguing that
such a withdrawl would balance the budget is again
either incompetence or deliberate manipulation.
Lindsey's argument that the increase in military
spending was the sole cause of the deficit is not
acceptable.

The increase in military spending was

basically budgeted as such in the original proposal.
Though it is true that if the increase did not occur
there would likely be a smaller deficit his argument
that the increase caused the deficit is false.

Not

only was the increase approximately the same as
projected by the original plan
lower)

(in fact it was slightly

but Lindsey does not take into account the role
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of

th.G military spanding

in

th.G

Gconomic

growth of FY

1983-1989 and the impact on federal revenues if this
significant

influx of money into

the

economy did not

occur.

Taxes
Robert McIntyre of the Citizens for Tax Justice
argues the perspective that the Reagan tax cut played
the primary role in causing the deficit because the
domestic spending cuts were almost exactly offset by
military spending increases.

He writes:

Reagan came into office promising to increase
military spending but to reduce Federal
outlays. Social Security excepted.
He
succeeded.
The cost of non-social security,
nondefense programs has dropped from 10.3% of
the gross national product in FY 1980 to only
7.8% of the GNP in FY 1988.
That's $120
billion less this year than if it had stayed
at the 1980 share of the GNP.
Those domestic
spending cuts were more than enough to pay
for the big increase in military spending,
which grew from 5% of the GNP in 1980 to a
high of 6.5% in 86, and is at 6.1% in 1988.
To oversimplify only slightly, the Pentagon
military buildup has been paid for,
effectively, by cuts in social spending, (his
emphasis. )
Boskin agrees that the tax cut played a prominent
role in causing the deficit but argues that the
President is only partially to blame.

He attributes

most of the responsibility to Congress who not only

^^^AFSCME,

The Republican Record,

page 17.
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refused to cut spending the necessary amounts to meet
the projections but who also added substantially to the
Reagan tax cut proposal.

Congress added about $175

billion of additional tax cuts to those originally
proposed by the Administration,

about a quarter of the

total tax cuts enacted.
Lindsey,

however,

takes issue with the argument

that the tax cut played anything but a small role in
the increased deficit.

He argues that the direct

effect of the tax cut was between $30 billion and $60
?

billion per year while the size of the federal deficit
during the same time period ran between $150-200
billion per year.

Therefore,

even without taking into

account the additional revenue the cuts generated
(through demand,

supply and pecuniary aspects as

explained earlier)

the role of the tax cut was minimal

in terms of the deficit.

Even though the FY 1983

deficit hit a peacetime record of 5.2% of GNP,

nearly

$100 billion above the level it would have been if FY
1980 fiscal policies had stayed in place,
this increase was due to the tax cut.

only 30% of

Therefore 70%

^®®Boskin,

Reagan and the Economy,

page 3.

^^"^Boskin,

Reagan and the Economy,

page 122.

^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment; How the New Tax Policy is
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 94.
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was due to higher spending.

By FY 1987,

he argues,

the

entire cause of the increase in the budget deficit
since FY 1980 was added spending,

not lower taxes.

Between FY 1980-87 only 21% of the increase in the
national debt was due to the tax reduction.

The

remaining 79% was due to spending increases.
McIntyre's argument that the domestic spending
reductions essentially paid for the military spending
increases is an interesting one and,

when added to

Boskin's analysis that the tax cut played a prominent
role in the budget deficit,
convincing.

the argument becomes quite

Boskin's point concerning the added tax

cuts put on the original tax cut proposal by Congress
is also an important one because it is crucial that
Congress not escape some responsibility for the budget
deficit.

Congress's additional 25% tax cut to the

original tax bill in the form of loopholes and
targetted exemptions did serve to throw the budget
further out of balance.

However,

Lindsey's

calculations concerning the direct impact of the tax
cut on the deficit

(21%),

even without the positive

impact on economic activity of the cut,

demonstrate

that the tax reductions cannot be solely,

or even

^®®Lindsey, The Growth Experiment: How the New Tax Policy is
Transforming the U.S. Economy, page 97.
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primarily,

to blame for the deficit.

reductions played a role,

The tax

but were not the main

culprit.
In conclusion,

it seems that the explanation for

the tremendous increase in the budget deficit during
the Reagan administration lies primarily in the
original economic forecast from which all the other
proposals flowed.

The economic forecasts used to

explain how tax cuts,

military spending increases and

the protection of the needy would result in a balanced
budget were inherently false.

A $660 billion gap

between projected revenues and actual revenues is quite
significant,

implying that the incompetence or

manipulation was on a very large scale.

This

combination of manipulation and incompetence has
tremendous consequences for the legitimacy of the
American political process.

However,

it does not

impact greatly on the examination of the economic
results of Reaganomics or its impact on state-financing
of public higher education so this study does not
attempt to answer this important question here.
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relationship where the central governmental authority
could not be primary with a unitary model where the
central government was viewed as the ultimate
authority.The framers of the constitution
carefully limited the powers of the central authority
through specific articles in the constitution.

Yet the

Supremacy Clause in Article VI clearly indicates that
the central authority's laws...
...shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and
the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
As a result of this constitutional ambiguity two
different interpretations of American federalism
emerged:
theory.

the states'
States'

rights theory and the nationalist

rights advocates argue that the

Constitution is an intergovernmental compact among
states and that it cannot interfere with the powers
reserved by the states in the Tenth Amendment i.e.
everything that isn't specifically listed as powers of
the federal government.

The nationalist view is that

^°°Robert Jay Dilger, "The Expansion and Centralization of
American Governmental functions," in American Intergovernmental
Relations Today, ed. Robert Jay Dilger (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1986), page 7.
2oiThe Constitution of the United States as quoted in Dilger,
American Governmental Functions, page 6-7
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the Constitution rejects

the idea of an interstate

compact and the central government receives
authority from the people,
the central authority is
necessary to carry out

not the state.

its
Therefore

empowered to do whatever is

its policy^°^.

During the first 140 years of the union from 17891929 American intergovernmental relations
primarily under a states'

functioned

rights perspective.

Governmental powers and responsibilities were divided
between the central authority,
federal government,

hereafter called the

and the states.

Each had their

areas of authority and didn't meddle in the
other's.^°^

The states were primarily responsible for

the domestic needs of public goods and services.

The

federal government focused its activities primarily on
the internal and external defense of the union,
westward expansion and promoting interstate
commerce.But the division was not absolute and
near the end of the 19th century intergovernmental
exchange of resources began to creep into the economy.

^°^Dilger,

American Governmental Functions,

page 7.

203Diiger,

American Governmental Functions,

page 8.

2°^John Shannon, "The Deregulation of the American Federal
System: 1789-1989," in The Changing Face of Fiscal Federalism,
eds. Thomas R. Swartz and John E. Peck (Armonk, New York: M.E.
Sharpe,

1990),

page 18.
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Originally federal grants to states took the form of
land grants of national land.

The federal government

gave over 3 million acres to the states to help pay for
wagon roads,

4.5 million acres for canal construction,

2.25 million acres for river navigation,

and 64 million

acres for flood control.
The most famous land grant during this period was
authorized by the Morrill Act which in 1862 provided
every existing and future state with 60,000 acres of
federal land plus an additional 30,000 acres for each
of the state's congressional representatives to be sold
so as to raise money to build colleges that focused
primarily on agriculture and the mechanical arts.

The

Morrill Act is also viewed as the beginning of federal
regulations being attached to intergovernmental
resource allocations.

The Act delineated how the

states were to pay for the construction of the colleges
and required the states to report all expenditures
involving these colleges to Congress on an annual
basis.Although financial grants from the federal
government to state governments actually began in 1808

^°^Morton Grodzins, "The Federal System," in American
Government, 5th ed., ed. Peter Woll (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975),
page 144, as quoted in Dilger, American Governmental Functions,
page 10.
^°®Dilger,

American Governmental Functions,

pages 10-11.
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with aid for the support of

the National Guard they

dramatically expanded after the Morrill Act to include
payments

to states

to establish agricultural experiment

stations authorized by the Hatch Act of 1887,
$25,000
1888,

grants of

for the care of disabled Civil War veterans

in

funding to assist the teaching mission of the

land grant colleges

in 1890,

and in 1894 national

funds

were provided to subsidize state initiated irrigation
projects
The stock market crash of
events

1929

set into motion

that would forever change the face of the

American federal

system.

The tremendous

social

upheaval caused by the depression generated
unprecedented demands
population on the

from state government and the

federal government to help.^°®

In

1930 about 50% of government services were being
provided by local government,
government and 30%
1940

from the

20% by the state

federal government.

By

this pattern had reversed with about 50% being

supplied by the federal government,
government,
important

20% by the state

and 30% by local government.

fiscal cause of this

shift was

The most
the

^°^Grodzins, pages 34-37, as quoted in Dilger,
Governmental Functions, page 11.
^°®Shannon,

"American Federal System,"

page 19.

American
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implementation of national relief programs
to combat the depression.

These programs

Federal Emergency Relief Administration
Works Progress Administration
Security Act.^°^
1936

(WPA)

implemented
included the

(FERA),

the

and the Social

Just between the years of 1932

and

the federal government intergovernmental and

individual grants-in-aid expenditures rose from $229
million to $2.3 billion.

The

$2 billion increase was

almost entirely for public welfare programs.The
states were asked to administer many of these New Deal
programs and were able to do so independently.

The

implementation of open-ended matching grant programs
allowed states

to control

the amount spent in each

program.
Federal grants-in-aid expenditures
1940

shortly before the U.S.

leveled off in

entered World War II.

During World War II national expenditures skyrocketed
but they mostly took the

ss^siaasam

policy expenditures.
off so much of

form of defense and foreign

In fact,

the war effort drained

the federal governments resources

that

the total national grants-in-aid expenditures dropped

2°^John Joseph Wallis,
Incruiry XXIXX (July 1991):
^^°Shannon,
^^^Wallis,

"New Deal Fiscal Federalism,"
page 510.

"American Federal System,"

page 15.

"New Deal Fiscal Federalism,"

page 510.

Economic
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during the war from a peak of $2.4 billion in 1940
$1 billion in 1944.

to

This drop was primarily due to the

termination of all six emergency relief programs
enacted during the 1930s so the dramatic reduction in
federal grants-in-aid was almost entirely in grants
individuals.

Federal grants

to

to state and local

governments remained relatively constant from 1936

to

.

1944 2^2
The period between 1953

and 1978 was

the era of

tremendous growth in federal grants-in-aid for
individuals and state and local governments.

During

this period the number of federal aid programs rose
from 38

in 1954

to almost 500 by 1978.

This expansion

occurred under both Democratic and Republican
administrations.

After the Korean War national

expenditures on domestic needs began to rise
dramatically.

Between 1952

and 1960

aid to state and local governments

federal grants-in-

tripled.

The most

significant intergovernmental program of this time was
the interstate highways program.

The federal

government provided states with 90% of the cost of

^^^Dilger,
^^^Shannon,

American Governmental Functions,
"American Federal System,"

pages 14-15.

page 23.
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building the highway system.Still,

despite this

tripling of grants to state and local governments,

in

1960 the United States Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations

(ACIR)

still found

intergovernmental relations were relatively few,

with a

narrow focus and not very intrusive.
However,

during the Johnson administration from

1963-1968 national expenditures and the number of
national grants-in-aid exploded.

The number of

categorical grants increased from 132 in 1960 to 385 in
1968 and expenditures on federal grants to state and
local governments also increased dramatically from $7
billion in 1960 to over $18 billion in 1968.

Just in

the years 1966-67 expenditures for education training
and employment and social services quadrupled from $1
billion to $4 billion.This increase primarily
reflected the liberal agenda of the Johnson
administration and the Democratic Congress that was
elected with him in 1964.

The programs begun during

this period were aimed at combatting poverty,

disease,

^^^Dilger,

American Governmental Functions,

page 17.

^^^Dilger,

American Governmental Functions,

page 19.

^^®John C. Weicher, "The Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts:
Proposals, Outcomes, and Effects", in Essays in Contemporary
Economic Problems, 1986; The Impact of the Reagan Program, ed.
Phillip Cagan (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1986),

page 24.
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illiteracy,
housing,

racial injustice,

crime,

and urban decay.These included the

Economic Opportunity Act of

1964 which contained a

number of new categorical programs
and the Neighborhood Youth Corp,
Medicaid,

substandard

like the Job Corps

the creation of

the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,

the Housing and Urban Development Act in 1965 and the
expansion of existing school

food programs

in 1966 and

1968.
A significant proportion of
federal grants-in-aid was

these increases

in

in grants directly to local

governments and entirely bypassed the states.

This was

because during the 1950s and 1960s many states

lost

credibility with a changing political electorate and
the

federal government.

The birth of the civil rights

movement and the increased consciousness among the
white population concerning civil rights and poverty
issues

led to new expectations of state government.

Many states retreated from these newly identified
problems and refused to meet the needs of minorities
and the poor.

^^’Dilger,

Local governments

in particular felt the

American Governmental Functions,

page 20.

2^®Kenneth T. Palmer, "The Evolution of Grant Policies", in
The Changing Politics of Federal Grants, eds. Lawrence D. Brown,
James W. Fossett, and Kenneth T. Palmer (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1984), pages 9-11.
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void left by unresponsive state governments so they
appealed directly to congress for help.

During this

time states were also under attack from the judicial
branch through desegregation,

reapportionment and

voting rights cases.
When President Richard Nixon took office in 1969
he expressed concern that the role of state and local
elected officials was becoming too weak in the
federalist system.

He criticized the new programs of

the 1960s as ineffective and of having dispersed too
much responsibility and authority in too many
directions.

In his

"New Federalism"

initiative he

proposed more clearly defining governmental
responsibilities for major programs.

Under his urging

Congress adopted three blocks grants which consolidated
26 categorical grants.

In 1972 Nixon won approval from

Congress for the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act
which created the general revenue sharing program where
federal funds were allocated among states and
localities by a predetermined formula with no
conditions.

But instead of replacing categorical

grants with the revenue sharing program as Nixon had
hoped.

Congress added the revenue sharing program to

^^^Scott M. Matheson and James Edwin Kee, Out of Balance
Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1986), page 19.

(Salt
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existing intergovernmental expenditures.

Thus during

the Nixon presidency intergovernmental expenditures
rose from $18.6 billion to $43.3 billion.
There were no major changes in the
intergovernmental system during the Ford or Carter
administrations except for the massive growth in the
public-employment programs which were developed to
counter downturns in national employment levels.
However,

the level of intergovernmental expenditures

peaked in 1978 when more than 25% of state and local
government expenditures were provided by the federal
government.

The number of intergovernmental programs

also increased from 448 in 1975 to a peak of 498 in
1978.

Swartz and Peck argue that in some ways the

success of these programs is what did them in.^^^

By

the late 1970s the general population didn't seem to
feel the same urgency of the 1960s in providing federal
aid to

"level the playing field".So it turned out

to be Carter who actually began the reductions in
federal aid to states and local governments.

In 1978

Carter eliminated the 25% of general revenue sharing

22°Dilger,

American Governmental Functions,

page 23.

^^^Thomas Swartz and John E. Peck, The Changing Face of Fiscal
Federalism, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), pages 6-9.
^^^Weicher,

"Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts,"

pages

6-9.
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that was designated for states.Still,

though many

people in hindsight now see Carter's 1978-79 budget as
the beginning
spending,

of the slowdown of federal grant

at the time it seemed that these dips were

nothing more than the dismantling of temporary job and
public work programs put in place to deal with the 1977
recession.""
administration

During these last years of the Carter
(1978-1981)

spending grew in nominal

terms but the rapid inflation of the period converted
nominal increases into a real decline of about

Reagan's

"New Federalism"

In his inaugural address Reagan outlined eight
basic principles of his federalism initiative.
1. Substitute state and local governments for
the federal governments in dealing with
private institutions that receive federal
aid.
2.

Cap open-ended federal matching programs.

3. Use block grants to combine and move
categorical federal programs to state and local
level.

^^^George E. Peterson, "Federalism and the States," in The
Reagan Record, eds. John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984),
pages 222-223.
224peterson,

"Federalism and the States," page 211.

^“Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle and Associates, Reagan
and the States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), page

50.
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4. Utilize planning, audit and review
functions at the state and local level.
5. Move federal regulatory power,
state and local government.
6.

to the

Remove federally imposed mandates.

7. Replace federal funding with the movement
of revenue sources from federal to state and
local governments.
8. Substitute state government for federal
government in dealing with local
government.
Reagan was not only challenging the workings of the
intergovernmental relationships but also the prevailing
ideological foundation of federalism in the United
States.

His vision focused on enhancing the

delineation between the role of the federal government
and state governments and implementing a devolution of
responsibilities to the governments closer to the
people.
Reagan had two strategies:

first to enlist state

and local governments as partners in the effort to
restrict public spending;
policy authority.
side.

second to devolute domestic

He also had public opinion on his

In 1980 public opinion polls showed that the

level of support for governmental activities was

226Matheson,
227

Peterson,

Out

of

Balance,

"Federalism and

page
the

23.
States,"

page

222.
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shifting from the federal to the state and local
levels.
The heart of Reagan's initiative lay in his
proposal to allocate state and local grants in blocks.
Under Reagan's proposals block grants would group
together 90 categorical grants into seven lump-sum
allocations.

Reagan's purpose was threefold:

to

simplify the grants making their administration more
efficient;

to increase state and local flexibility,

to make State and local officials more directly
accountable to their taxpayers.
During the summer of his first year in office
Reagan addressed the National Conference of State
Legislatures at their annual convention in Atlanta,
Georgia.

Here he flushed out his block grant

proposals:
Our economic package, which consists of tax
cuts, spending cuts, block grants, and
regulatory relief, is a first phase in our
effort to revitalize federalism.
For too
long, the Federal Government has preempted
the States' tax base, regulatory authority,
and spending flexibility.
It has tried to
reduce the States to mere administrative
districts of a government centralized in
Washington.
With our economic proposals,
we're staging a quiet federalism revolution.

^^®Matheson,
^^^President,
(November

1981),

Out

of

Balance,

Report,
page

3.

page

23.

Federalism;

The

First

Ten Months

and
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It's a revolution that promises to be one of
the most exciting and noteworthy in our
generation...Block grants are designed to
eliminate burdensome reporting requirements
and regulations, unnecessary administrative
costs, and program duplication.
Block grants
are not a mere strategy in our budget as some
have suggested; they stand on their own as a
federalist tool for transferring power back
to the State and to the local level...The
ultimate objective is to use block grants,
however, as only a bridge, leading to the day
when you'll have not only the responsibility
for the programs that properly belong at the
State level, but you will have the tax
sources now usurped by Washington returned to
you, ending that round trip of the peoples'
money to Washington, where a carrying charge
is deducted, and then back to you.^^°
According to the then Governor of Utah,
Matheson,

Scott M.

Reagan took advantage of the states'

growing

disillusionment with the federal government to push his
block grant proposals.

Governors had supported the

concept of block grants in a 1980 resolution and
indicated their willingness to accept a 10% cut in
total federal aid in return for greater flexibility and
control over the use of the funds.

But the Reagan

proposals called for a 20% spending reduction and when
Congress finally passed legislation consolidating 57
categorical grants into nine new,

or modified,

block

grants at a budget authority of approximately $7.5
billion it represented a cut of approximately 25% or

^^°as
(November

quoted in President,
1981),

pages

31-36.

Federalism;

The

First Ten Months
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almost 33% in real dollars,

from the previous year's

authorization.Between 1980 and 1982 the state and
local share of the federal budget shrunk from
approximately $105 billion to $78 billion.
Reagan was thus more successful at reducing grant
expenditures than in cutting the rest of the federal
domestic budget.

In the first year total federal

grants to state and local government were cut by 13.1%
from baseline levels or more than double the rate of
the overall reduction in the domestic budget.

This was

because direct grants to state and local growth as
opposed to income support and medicaid payments to
4

individuals,
block grants,

bore the greatest reductions.

The nine

seven of which were blocks for health and

social services,

one for some educational grants,

one for community development programs,

and

did reduce

paperwork and helped shift decision making away from
the federal government.

They gave states wide

discretion in selecting their own priorities,

removed

most of the regulatory rules limiting states's choices
about how to implement them,

and bundled together many

small programs which had been sustained primarily by

^^^Matheson,

Out

of

Balance,

^^^Matheson,

Out

of Balance,

pages
page

22-24.
37.
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federal dollars giving states

the option of withdrawing

altogether from these program areas

if

they chose.

And since domestic programs were destined to be
targeted for reduction regardless,

the enactment of the

block grant plan at least provided states and local
officials

some ability to allocate smaller resources

to

areas where they were needed most.^^^
Unlike Nixon who had also advocated greater
flexibility for state governments
federal aid,
states

and offered financial

to win their support,

in the spending of
incentives

to the

the Reagan administration

proposed to greatly reduce the amount of this grant
aid,

which it believed had mistakenly stimulated local

spending because of the matching requirements contained
in many programs.The block grant initiative
encouraged greater spending restraint in the large
entitlement programs,
Dependent Children
insurance,

such as Aid to Families with

(AFDC),

Medicaid,

and unemployment

in which expenditures vary with the number

of people seeking assistance and financing is shared by

233peterson,

"Federalism and the

^^^Matheson,

Out

of Balance,

page

States,"

page

229.

27.

^^^John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, The Reagan Record,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984),
pages

13-16.
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different

levels of government.

The reduction in the

number of separate grant programs
259

from 361

in 1981

to

in 1983 by eliminating some and consolidating

others

into block grants^^® helped the administration

reverse the trend of growing financial dependence on
the federal government and put in place a less
restrictive grant structure that provides
encouragement to local

spending.

less

This action helped

Reagan challenge the assumption that there should be
uniform national standards
fully engaged the states,

for public services and more
willingly or not,

as partners

in the effort to contain domestic program spending.
The reductions
in the block grants
poor.
jobs,

Cuts

in funding for the programs grouped
fell disproportionately on the

in entitlement programs,

community service programs,

public service

aid to large cities,

aid to schools serving low-income student in large
cities,

and housing assistance affected the poor more

than any other economic group.Half of the
reduction for 1982 was

in the education,

training and

^^®Palmer and Sawhill,

The Reagan Record,

pages

^^'^Palmer and Sawhill,

The Reagan Record,

page

^^®Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 65.

16-17.
18.
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employment and social services category.Overall
funding for federal aid to state and local governments
dropped sharply in the first Reagan budget

($6.6

r

billion in nominal dollars or $9 billion or 12% in real
dollars)

the first annual drop in nominal terms in more

than 25 years.
The 1981 block grants and accompanying funding
reductions would turn out to be the last major
accomplishment of the Reagan federalism agenda.

In

1982 he offered an ambitious plan that would have
turned over to the states the two basic income support
programs,

AFDC and Food stamps,

while the federal

government would assume full responsibility for
Medicaid.

In addition he proposed that 61 smaller

government programs would be returned to the states for
their sole financing and administration,

and in return

the federal government would surrender a comparable
amount of tax revenues.

If passed intact,

this plan

would have lowered the federal grant-in-aid share of
state and local budgets to 3-4% by 1991 the lowest
since the first year of the New Deal.^^°

Reagan

proposed establishing a special trust fund to be

”®Weicher,
^^°Peterson,

"Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts," pages 25-27.
"Federalism and the States," pages 219-220.
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created to handle the transition but this 1982
initiative never got anywhere.

Congress had become too

occupied with the rising federal deficit and much of
Reagan's ability to push his agenda through the
Democratic congress had disappeared.But as far as
the states were concerned the major changes had already
occurred and it was up to them to adjust to new
responsibilities for developing,

financing and

administering social programs.

State Government Responses
Three major studies have been conducted concerning
the response of state governments to these reductions
in federal aid.

The most extensive was done by Nathan,

Doolittle and Associates who conducted field surveys of
a cross section of 14 states between 1981-1986.

The

Urban Institute conducted a similar study under the
direction of George E.

Peterson which looked at the

national picture and considered aggregate data for
particular grant areas and by state.

The third study

was conducted by John C. Weicher on behalf of the
American Enterprise Institute.

All three of these

studies came to a similar conclusion that there was a

24ipeterson,

"Federalism and the States," page 231.
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large degree of replacement of federal funds with state
funds by state governments.

They also all found that

the goal of Reagan to aid his retrenchment goals
through the devolution of management authority from the
federal to state level did not come true.

Nathan et al

found this especially surprising:.
Evidence is that Reagan's federalism reforms
have stimulated and are continuing to
stimulate state governments to increase their
efforts to meet domestic needs in the
functional areas in which the national
government either was cutting grants-in-aid
or threatening to do so.^^^
Peterson argues the same point slightly differently.
He says that explicit devolution never really happened
because it was given a fair public test and was
rejected.

But Peterson points out that Reagan was

still able to accomplish more of intergovernmental
reform than most previous administrations.
All three studies found that state and local
governments chose to replace some of the federal grant
reductions despite the severe 1981-82 recession.

In

some cases the states moved to replace the grants.
example,

state governments increased their grants to

local governments to operate mass transit systems as

^^^Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

^^^Peterson,

page 8.

"Federalism and the States," page 217.

For
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federal operating subsidies were decreased.

States

also took advantage of new flexibility in federal
grants to shift funds away from energy assistance
(which Congress did not cut)
Congress did cut)

to social services

(which

and have also provided money from

their own revenues for social services.

The net effect

was to significantly compensate for the federal grant
reductions.

As stated earlier,

the most severe cuts

came in grants for job training and employment.

In

these cases state governments developed their own
substitute programs,

but spent much less than the

federal government used to.
other hand,

Community services,

on the

were hit the hardest because states did not

replace these funds.

However in many cases the

community service agencies found new private sources of
revenue.
What kind of effect did these cuts have on state
priorities?

The studies found that individual states

differed quite a bit in their overall responses to cuts
in federal aid.

It became clear that when the states

became reliant on their own funds,

they would select

very different budget priorities from those chosen in
the past with federal aid as an incentive.

^^^Weicher,

These

"Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts," pages 7-8.

187
responses depended primarily on the political and
economic climate of the particular state.
supportive political environments
and supportive economic culture

In

(pro-social programs)

(where the state's

economy and finances were strong enough to permit
replacement efforts)

more federal aid was replaced.

Nathan et al found that the way that state governments
responded for a particular program depended on three
things:

the incidence of the benefits or services

provided;

the strength of the grant's constituency and

the level of general public support and visibility;

and

the identification in the mind of state and local
officials of the programs

"federal,

state or local

natureNathan et al also found that the stronger
the redistributive purpose of a given program the less
likely it would be protected.The more a program
was targeted for the poor the more likely it was to be
cut by the federal government and the less likely it
was that these cuts would be replaced by state and
local governments.^^®

^^^Peterson,

This was most evident in the

"Federalism and the States," page 238.

^^®Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 96.

^^'^Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 112.

^^®Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

pages 7-8.
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entitlement programs.

With the exception of Medicaid,

the general tendency was for the state governments to
ratify

{not replace)

these cuts and to pass them along

to the recipients in programs such as AFDC,
stamps,

food

and the school lunch program.The

replacement of cuts within block grants was greatest in
programs that historically were areas of greatest state
and local activity and where organized and politically
active local constituencies cared about the activities.
Examples of these are disease-focused public health
services,

social services for the elderly,

and day-care.

child abuse

More amorphous programs like community

services programs didn't get replacement funds.In
some cases actions by states made it so that there were
little or no policy or service changes at all.^^^
The additional expenditures by states to replace
much of the federal aid cut by the Reagan program
coincided with a sharp decline in the growth of state
tax revenues as a result of the 1981-1982 recession.
Between FY 1979-1981 state tax revenues grew by 3.9% in
real dollars.

Between FY 1981-1982 state tax revenues

^^^Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 78.

^®°Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 86.

^^^Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 11.
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actually declined slightly in real dollars
^1)^ 252

(see Figure

This combination of increased spending

5

responsibilities and decreased tax revenues put a
severe strain on state budgets.
the 50

states

billion.

In January 1983,

faced revenue shortfalls

As a result,

two-thirds of

totalling $8

the states were

forced to reduce spending in mid-year to less
originally appropriated levels
year.

To compensate,

41 of

for the 1982

in FY 1982 and 1983,

than the

fiscal
44

states

raised taxes and revenue raising measures were again
implemented by many states
result,

in fiscal

between FY 1982-1983

1984.^^^

As a

state tax revenues

increased 3.5% in real dollars.When the economic
recovery began to take hold in 1983

these new taxes

brought in substantial new revenues.The Gross
National
1984,

Product increased 3.6%

3.4%

in FY 1983,

6.8%

in FY

in FY 1985 and 2.7% in FY 1986^^® so

^^^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO,).
^“Scott M. Matheson, "The Federal budget Deficit: Impact on
the States," in Facing the Facts: The Democratic Governors' View^
From the States, ed. Bernard Aronson (Washington, D.C.: Democratic
Governors' Association, 1984), page 93.
^^^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
^^^Weicher,

"Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts," page 34.

^^®U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the
United States: 1991, (Washington, D.C.: GPO), page 563.
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combined with the new state taxes,
between FY 1983-1984

increased 6.5%

increase in FY 1985 and 6.9%
makes
that

state tax revenues
followed by a 6.3%

in FY 1986.^^’^

What

these tax increases even more significant was
they were passed in the midst of a strong tax-

limitation movement that was
the country.

thriving in states across

What started in California with

Proposition 13

and Massachusetts with Proposition 2

1/2

had spread throughout the country and in almost every
state there was a strong movement to oppose new taxes.
It took significant political capital
governments

to pass

for state

these tax increases.

This combination of tax increases and economic
recovery put state finances on what seemed to be sound
footing and enabled them to absorb the new
responsibilities placed on them by the Reagan program.
Since it

took awhile for some of the federal cuts

to

make their way through the system by the time they did

Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
2^^For more on tax-limitation efforts see John J. Kirlin, The
Political Economy of Fiscal Limits, (Lexington, Massachusetts:
Lexington Books, 1982); Clarence Y.H. Lo, Small Property versus
Big Government: Social Origins of the Property Tax Revolt,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Jerome G. Rose,
ed. , Tax and Expenditure Limitations: How to Implement and Live
Within Them, (Piscataway, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy
Research, 1982); and David O. Sears and Jack Citrin, Tax Revolt:
Something for Nothing in California, (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1985).
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many states were in a position to make up the
difference with new funds.
spurred by the signals

And they were further

from the federal government that

the importance of the role of the state government in
domestic programs would continue to increase^^^ and
that the mounting federal deficit would inhibit any
spending for new programs.^®®

The 1991 State Fiscal Crisis
By the end of the Reagan administration grant-inaid cuts

to state and local governments

billion from baseline levels
37%

(16.5%),

totalled $123.6

a reduction of

in real dollars.This reduction also

represented a decrease in the share of state revenues
from federal aid from 22%
(see Figure 5.2).^^^
chapter,

in 1979

to 18.8% in FY 1990

As mentioned in the previous

the grant-in-aid programs

hardest were job training programs,
program for welfare recipients,

that were hit the
the work incentive

health planning and

^^^Nathan,

Reagan and the States, page 14.

^®°Nathan,

Reagan and the States, page 13.

^®^American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, The Republican Record: A 7-Year Analysis of State
Losses of Federal Funding (FY 1982 - FY 1988) (Washington, D.C.:
AFSCME), page 1.
^®^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(Various Years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
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training grants,

special milk programs,

regional commission programs,
administration grants,

Appalachian

economic development

energy conservation programs,

and the Urban development action grant which all
suffered at least 50% cut

from baseline levels.

Juvenile justice assistance,

subsidized housing,

environmental protection agency wastewater treatment
grants,

and the general revenue sharing programs all

experienced cuts of at least 40%
General Revenue sharing was

from baseline levels.

finally terminated at the

end of FY 1986.
In addition to the $123.6 billion cut in federal
aid state and local government also suffered from
localized economic dislocations arising from the
administration's agriculture,
policies,

and energy

interstate competition to keep taxes as

as possible in the belief
jobs,

trade,

low

that this would attract new

new demands arising from changing demographics

and social

trends e.g.

age children,

a new wave of

American and Asia,
sentences,

the Baby-boom

AIDS,

for tougher prison

an increase in the number of

elderly needing long-term care,

^®^AFSCME,

of school-

immigration from Latin

demands

crack epidemic,

"echo"

The Republican Record,

and more need for child

page 2.
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care because of the growing proportion of two-earner
families.
Throughout the 1980s another factor was at work
that deeply affected state finances:
costs.

rising health care

In contrast to the stated goals of the

devolution of policy making responsibility from the
federal government

to state governments during the

Reagan Administration Medicaid policy making shifted
disproportionately

the federal government which then

passed on new mandates

to the states

increasing state expenditures.

thus substantially

Medicaid was designed

originally as a partnership between the states and the
federal government.
unilateral changes
became more

However,

in federal Medicaid requirements

frequent.

These changes often

significantly increased costs
implement.

during the 1980s major

Sometimes

for the states

to

the states had to start entirely

new programs or make a series of changes

in a program

even while new requirements were enacted in final
regulations.

New federal requirements also involved

costly changes
staff

in computer programs and additional

training.

^®^AFSCME,

The Republican Record,

pages 12-13.

194
The U.S.

General Accounting Office

(GAO)

in a

study found that these new conditions and requirements
exacerbated the states'

fiscal problems

already in place as a result of

the changes

aid policies and the recession of
found it extremely difficult to

that were

1981-82.

in federal
Many states

finance the new

conditions and requirements without raising taxes,
shifting Medicaid resources by eliminating optional
services or closing public clinics,

or reducing other

state spending

Medicaid

(emphasis

added)

expenditures accounted for 14.8% of state general
expenditures
5.3).

in 1990,

up from 11.3% in 1979

As of 1990 Medicaid was

category of spending.^®®

These

(see Figure

the second largest
increased health care

costs contributed significantly to the financial
difficulties of states

in FY 1991-92.^®^

The distribution of

tax responsibility also

changed with spending responsibilities.
local

taxes rose in the 1980s

compared to

Both state and
federal

^®^Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Medicaid: Intergovernmental Trends and Options (Washington,
GPO, 1992), page 1.

D.C.:

2®®Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Medicaid, page 2.
^®’'Edward M. Gramlich, "The 1991 State and Local Fiscal
Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol\ime 2 (1991):
page 247.

195
taxes.

In 1987

states accounted for 26.1% of'total

revenue raised by all
trust

funds

levels of government not counting

like Social Security up from 23.9%

and 2 0.6% in 1970.^®®
tax burden was

tax

Much of this

in 1980

increase in state

in the form of personal

income tax which

rose from 19.1% of state tax revenue in 1970

to 30.8%

of state tax revenue in 1987.^®®
Still,

the economic expansion of

enabled state governments

to

the mid 1980s

temporarily absorb these

increased responsibilities.

Between FY 1983-89

tax revenues rose a total of 34.1%

state

in real dollars,

average of 5.7% per year in real dollars.

an

This

compared to 7.6% increase in real dollars between 1979
and 1983,

an average of 1.9%

in real dollars.This

increased revenue served to gloss over the significant
transformation in the relationship between federal and
state government and the increased responsibilities
taken on by the states.

However when the economic

expansion ended in 1990 and recession took hold the
structural changes

in the federal-state relationship

^®®Steven Gold, "State Finances in the New Era of Fiscal
Federalism," in The Changinq Face of Fiscal Federalism, eds.
Thomas R. Swartz and John E. Peck (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
1990),

page

2®®Gold,
^’'°U.S.

92.
"State Finances,"
Bureau of

(Various Years),

page

the Census,

(Washington,

93.

State Government

D.C.:

GPO).

Finances
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crystallized and state governments were suddenly in
deep financial difficulties.

Between FY 1989-1990

state tax revenues rose 3.5%

in real dollars but in

1990-1991 they rose only 1.1%

in real dollars.

At the

same time state expenditures between FY 1989-1990 rose
4.8%

in real dollars and between FY 1990-1991 rose 6.3%

in real dollars

(see Figure 5.4).^”^^

increase in state spending was

This

significant

largely attributable to

rising health care costs.
By the middle of FY 1991 at

least 30

states were

facing serious budget shortfalls^”^^ with the number
rising to at least 37

states

in FY 1992.^”^^

though 26 states did manage to raise taxes
in anticipation of these difficulties,

And
for FY 1991

half of the

extra revenue was accounted for by three states
Jersey,

Massachusetts,

- New

and New York.^’^^

Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(Various Years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
^’^Gramlich,

"The 1991 State and Local Fiscal Crisis," page

247.
^’^Larry Tye, "Downturn Forces Deficits in 30 States," Boston
Globe, 23 November, 1990, page 1.
^^^Chronicle of Higher Education.

9 January 1991, page A20.

^^^Robert Pear, "Governors Facing a Fiscal Squeeze and Tough
Choices,"
New York Times. 11 November 1990, page 1.
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Conclusion
The Reagan era represented a significant change in
the relationship between the federal government and
(

state governments.

Reagan clearly articulated an

ideology of state government being the primary vehicle
for the providing of most social services and set out
to transfer federal
responsibilities
government.
this

financial and administrative

for social services

to state

Though he was only partially successful

in

effort what he did accomplish had a considerable

effect on state governments.
The most successful aspect of this

effort was

the

development of block grants which grouped together
previously separate line item allocations
social programs

for specific

into lump-sum allocations.

administration had three goals

for the block grant

proposals:

first to entice Governors

reductions

in federal aid allocations

contained within the block grants
increased state authority;

The

to agree to
for the programs

in exchange

for the

second to shift

responsibility and any subsequent political
repercussions

for cutting individual programs

federal government to state governments;
enlist

the states

(federal,

from the

third to

in Reagan's goal of reducing total

state and local)

spending on social programs.
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The first two goals were largely met.
year of the administration,

During the first

federal budget allocations

for programs contained in the block grants declined 33%
in real dollars and Reagan managed to avoid any
significant political responsibility for the resulting
strains on state government and the impacted social
services.

However,

contrary to the hopes of the Reagan

administration state governments replaced a large
amount of the withdrawn federal funds with state funds
despite the severe impact on state tax revenues of the
1981-1982 recession.
In order to accomplish this replacement effort
most states were forced to raise taxes during a time of
substantial anti-tax sentiment throughout the country.
And by spending large amounts of political capital to
raise taxes and meet these new responsibilities state
governments unwittingly laid the groundwork for the
difficulty they were to face in the early 1990s.
Though further efforts by the Reagan
administration to radically change this federal-state
relationship were largely unsuccessful,

the

administration did shift more responsibility for
Medicaid to state governments.

This shift,

combined

with the explosion of health care costs also placed
substantial new burdens on state governments and has
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contributed to the problems now facing state
governments.

The national economic recovery and growth

era of FY 1983-89 served to mask the difficult
situation state governments were in.

They had accepted

new financial responsibilities and raised taxes to meet
them.

Now economic recovery filled state coffers with

additional revenues which were used to further increase
state spending.

However,

when the economic growth era

ended and stagnation and recession hit in the early
1990s state governments were unable to meet the
spending obligations they had absorbed.
the large tax increases in 1982,

1983,

And because of
and 1984 states

were politically unable to adequately raise taxes to
meet these obligations.

This situation led to the

state budget difficulties in FY 1991-93 and the
spending reductions implemented to address these
difficulties.
Therefore,

the financial crisis facing state

governments in the early 1990s can be attributed to
three causes all linked to Reaganomics:

the increased

responsibility to fund many social programs and the
state tax increases to meet them;

increased state

responsibility for Medicaid and subsequent skyrocketing
health care costs;

and the declining tax revenues as a

result of the FY 1990-91 recession and inability of
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states to adequately raise taxes to meet them due to
the huge state tax increases of 1982-84.
combination of events,

This

all linked to the economic

policies of the Reagan Administration,

put state

governments in an extremely difficult position where
rising costs and decreasing revenues have led to
significant state budget deficits that,
political climate,

given the

could only be eliminated by

substantial spending reductions.
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Figure 5.1 Total U.S. state revenues for fiscal years 1979-1991 in
1987 dollars.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
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Figure 5,2
1979-1990,

Percentage federal aid of state revenue for fiscal years
Source; u,S, liureau of the Census,
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percentage

fiscal year
Figure 5.3 Percentage medicaid of state expenditures for fiscal
years 1979-1990.
Source: U.S, Bureau of the Census,
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Figure 5,4 Total state expenditures for fiscal years 1979-1991 in
1987 dollars.
Source: U.S, Bureau of the Census.

CHAPTER 6
THE IMPACT ON STATE FINANCING AND ACCESS OF PUBLIC
HIGHER EDUCATION

Introduction
This chapter analyzes the impact of the
difficulties in state finances as explained in Chapter
5 on state financing of public higher education and
access to these institutions.

First the chapter

presents a brief historical survey on the growth of
public higher education between 1862-1980.

Then

national data is used to measure the changes in state
funding for public higher education,

the cost of

attending institutions of public higher education,

and

total available student financial aid during the Reagan
Administration.

In order to do this the Reagan

administration is divided into three periods:
implementation
1988);

(1981-84);

and the aftermath

the

the growth period (1984(1988-1993).

relationship between Reaganomics,

Then the

state financing of

public higher education and access to public higher
education institutions in California,
and New York is analyzed.

Massachusetts,

Finally conclusions are

drawn concerning this relationship and are compared to
research on this issue.
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Historical Overview
During the period between the passage of The
Morrill Act of 1862 and World War II public higher
education grew steadily in the number and size of
institutions.

However,

World War II brought a

revolutionary change to the financing of public higher
education.

Before the war,

student financing was

primarily the responsibility of the student and family.
Tuition was generally very low so there were relatively
few scholarships or loan programs.

But after World War

II the passage of the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of
1944

(GI Bill)

1951,

dramatically increased enrollments.

By

2.35 million former servicemen were in some sort

of institution of higher education.The total
enrollment in public higher education jumped from
approximately 800,000 in 1939 to 2,181,000 in 1959,
increase of over 250%.

an

During this period the

percentage of students seeking degrees in college that
were attending public institutions rose from 53% to
60%.^^^

Also during this period state appropriations

^■^^Elchanan Cohn and Larry L. Leslie, "The Development and
Finance of Higher Education in Perspective", in Subsidies to
Higher Education, Howard P. Tuckman and Edward Whalen eds., (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) page 18.
Department of Education, Digest of Education
Statistics 1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), page 12.
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increased dramatically.

From 1939 to 1959 state

expenditures on higher education

(all types)

from $151 million to $1.3 billion,

increased

an increase of 860%,

yet this represented an increase of only 3% in the
proportion of spending on higher education provided by
state government.This indicates that other
revenue sources were also expanding at a similar rate
including tuition and fees and the federal government
funding.

Nevertheless the role of state government,

though not necessarily increasing in relation to other
higher education revenue sources,

was still increasing

dramatically.
During the period from 1960-1980 public higher
education continued to grow.

Enrollments in

institutions of public higher education went from
2,181,000 in 1959 to 9,457,000 in 1980,

an increase of

434%.
The years of the Carter administration continued
the steady growth of public higher education.

During

the period FY 1977-1981 public higher education in the
United States received an average of 6% real growth per

Department of Education,
Statistics 1991, page 309.

Digest of Educational
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year in state support^”^® while the average cost of
attendance decreased slightly in real dollars^®® and
total financial aid increased at an average rate of
2.3% per year in real dollars.^®^

However,

when

Reagan took office the situation changed significantly.
To facilitate study of the Reagan era it is divided
into three periods;
implementation
(1984-1988);

the initial three year period of

(1981-84);

the four years of growth

and the aftermath

(1988-1993).

The National Impact of Reaganomics On State Financing
of Public Higher Education and Cost of Attendance
1981-1984:

Implementation

During the implementation of the initial 1981
Reagan program of income tax cuts,

block grants and the

transfer of responsibility for social services to state
government,

state funding for public higher education

suffered significantly.

During these three years state

appropriations for public higher education increased
less than 1% per year in real dollars,

down from the 6%

^■'^Center for the Study of Higher Education State
Appropriations for Public Higher Education: 1976-1993
Illinois:

Unpublished Data).

^®°U.S.
Statistics

(Normal,

Department
1991,

pages

of

Education,

Digest

of

Education

296-7,

^®^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1980
(Washington, D.C.: College Board Publications, 1989),

to 1989
page 13.
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per year real growth of the Carter era
1)^ 282

(see Figure

This decline in the growth of state support

for public higher education reflected the decline in
total

state expenditures

in real dollars^®^ which was

caused primarily by the cutbacks

in federal aid to

state governments and by the negative impact on state
revenues of the national recession.
consequences of this decline

One of the major

in the rate of growth of

state support to public higher education was

the

significant increase in the cost of attendance that was
used to offset the declines
support.

in the rate of state

This replacement of state dollars with

student dollars had a negative impact on access
public higher education institutions.
period of less

to

During this

than 1% per year real growth in state

support the average cost of attendance of public higher
education rose an average of
dollars

(13%

in nominal)

5.4% per year in real

a steep rate of

especially during one of the most serious
since the Great Depression

^®^Center

for

the

increase
recessions

(see Figure 6.2).

Study of Higher Education,

And a

State

Appropriations.
^®^U.S.

Bureau of

(various years)
^®^U.S.
Statistics

(Washington,

Department
1991,

the Census,

page

of
296.

D.C.:

State Government

Finances

GPO)

Education,

Digest

of

Education
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significant decline in student

financial aid compounded

the negative impact on access of the decline in the
rate of state support and the increased cost of
attendance.

During the three year period 1981-1984

total

federal and institutional

state,

financial aid

declined at a rate of 3.5% per year in real dollars
(see Figure 6.3).

This decline in total

was entirely attributable to declines
financial aid.

financial aid

in federal

During the three year period federal

financial aid declined at a rate of 5.4% per year in
real dollars.

Though states and institutions

increased

slightly their financial aid in an attempt to
compensate for the federal reductions,
share of total
efforts

the 80%

federal

financial aid made these compensation

ineffective

percentage of total

(see Figure 6.4).

In addition the

financial aid available in loans as

opposed to grants rose from 40.4%

in 1981

1984

the total amount of

indicating that not only was

to 47%

in

aid declining in real dollars but a significant
proportion of available aid was being reallocated from
grants

to loans.This combination of high

increases

in tuition and fees and significant decreases

in financial aid,

both happening during a severe

2®^The College Board,

Trends in Student Aid,

pages 7-9.
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-

recession,
of

put a tremendous

strain on the accessibility

the public higher education institutions.
1984-1988:

The Growth Era

During the growth period of the Reagan presidency
the plight of public higher education eased,
only slightly.

though

During this period state appropriations

for public higher education increased at an average
rate of 3.6% per year in real dollars.^®®
primarily because state expenditures

This was

increased at an

average rate of 5% per year in real dollars.As a
result of the increased state appropriations

for public

higher education the increase in the average cost of
attendance eased.

During the period 1984-1988

the

average cost of attendance at institutions of public
higher education increased by an average of 4.8% per
year in real dollars

(8% nominal)

More

importantly concerning access during this period the
level of total

financial aid increased an average of

4.6% per year in real dollars
per year in real dollars of

including a 3.5%

federal aid.

The

^®®The Center for the Study of Higher Education,
Appropriations.
^®’U.S. Bureau of the Census,
(various years).

increase

State

State Government Finances

2®®U.S. Department of Education,
Statistics 1991, page 296.

Digest of Education
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reallocation from grants to loans did continue,

though

at a slower pace so that by 1988 loans represented 52%
of the total aid.^®^
1988-1993:

The Aftermath

During the aftermath of the Reagan presidency the
situation began to deteriorate for public higher
education.

Between FY 1988-91 state support for public

higher education grew at an average rate of less than
1% per year in real dollars.This was despite the
fact that state expenditures continued to grow at an
average rate of 5% per year in real dollars during the
same period.During this same period the cost of
attendance rose an average of 1.8% per year in real
dollars^^^ but total financial aid declined slightly
in real dollars.Between 1991-1993 things have
gotten even worse.

During these past two years state

support for public higher education has declined an

2®^The College Board,

Trends in Student Aid,

page 9.

^®°The Center for the Study of Higher Education,
Appropriations.
^®^U.S. Bureau of the Census,
(various years).

State Government Finances

^^^U.S. Department of Education,
Statistics 1991, page 296.
^®^The College Board,

State

Digest of Education

Trends in Student Aid,

page 9.
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average of 3.75% per year in real dollars^^^ while the
cost of attendance has increased at an average rate of
8% per year in real dollars.And between FY 19911992

(FY 1993 data not yet available)

total financial

aid increased only 5% in real dollars.During the
entire period of FY 1988-1993 total state support for
public higher education declined 4.4% in real dollars
while the cost of attendance increased 22.4% in real
dollars and total available financial aid between FY
1988-1992 increased 10% in real dollars.
Overall during the period FY 1981-1993 total state
support for public higher education increased 12% in
real dollars or 1% per year in real dollars,

while the

cost of attendance increased 69% in real dollars or
5.7% per year in real dollars.

During the period FY

1981-1992 total available financial aid increased 12.8%
in real dollars or 1.2% per year in real dollars while
the percentage of total aid available in the forms of
loans increased from 40.4% to 49%.

Center

for

the

Study of Higher Education,

State

Appropriations.

year.
21

^^^Jean Evangelauf, "Tuition at Public Colleges is Up 10% This
College Board Study Finds," Chronicle of Higher Education,

October

1992,

page A36.

^^®The College Board, Trends in Student Aid; 1982-1992
(Washington, D.C.: College Board Publications, 1992), page

4.
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Case
In order

to

further

between Reaganomics,
education,
access

to

the cost
the

examined:

Studies

illustrate

state
of

relationship

financing of public higher

attendance,

institutions

California;,

this

three

financial

states

Massachusetts;

aid,

and

are briefly

and New York.

California
Setting
When Reagan proposed in
reductions

in

federal

California was
The huge
1978

already in

impact

passage of

of

used

13

replace

tax revenue
result,
the

a

state

as

serious

the

Proposition

immediate

a result

of

for

local

funding
the

governments

to

revenues

compensate.

of

60%

13

initiative
At

the

state had
During

these

decline

the

the

funds were

in property
As

a

in the responsibility of

services

shifted from local

state government without additional
And when

initiatives were passed:
4,

the

the referendum.

increase

(Proposition

finances

of nearly $5 billion.

substantial

to

financial difficulty.

Proposition 13

after

for

state governments

had already taken hold.

the passage of

three years
to

initial plan

a property tax limitation

accumulated a surplus
first

to

on California state

called Proposition
time

aid

1981 his

1979);

limits

three other

on expenditures

indexing of

the personal

income
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tax

(Proposition 1,

inheritance tax

1982);

and the abolishment of the

(Proposition 6,

1982)^^'^ even a bigger

burden was placed on the California state government.
Because of the impact of these initiatives on
California state government finances,
seemed minor in comparison.

the Reagan cuts

These initiatives

revenues available to California state,

reduced

county and

local governments by $14 billion in 1982-83,

more than

twice the amount of the nationwide reductions in
intergovernmental aid that occurred between 198182.^^®

By the Fall of 1982 the surplus was gone

and the state was faced with falling tax revenue as a
result of the initiatives and the onset of the national
recession.
Reagan Cuts and the California State Response
This decline in tax revenue was placing a
tremendous strain on state finances that was only
compounded by the reductions of federal aid that had
already begun to decline under Carter and now increased
dramatically under the first Reagan federal budget.
The projected deficit for the FY 1982 state budget was

^^’Richard Nathan et al, Reagan and the States, (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), page 332.
^®®Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 3 50.
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$2.8 billion.Overall,

state revenues came in

well below projected levels for three continuous years.
And the scale of the shortfalls dwarfed the size of the
federal reductions.

The California revenue shortfalls

in 1981-83 were ten times as large as their reductions
in federal aid indicating that the primary
responsibility for the financial problems facing the
state were the shifting of responsibility from local
governments to the state government as a result of
Proposition 13 and the national recession which caused
significant declines in state tax revenues.
In this context it is clear why the Reagan
reductions received little public attention in
California and why state officials ratified the cuts in
federal aid without much public response.

The state

austerity measures and tax increases implemented to
deal with this budget deficit and that projected for FY
1983 were so large that the Reagan reductions seemed
somewhat insignificant.

Over $1 billion in services

was cut and a revenue raising package of nearly $800
million was enacted for FY 1983.^°°

The FY 1983

budget represented the first time since 1943 that the

^®®Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 335.

^°°Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 350.
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total state spending would be less than the previous
year.
By the time planning for the FY 1984 budget
occurred the national economic recovery was underway
and the resulting increase in state revenues combined
with the increased revenues from the tax increase
brought the state finances back into balance and even
allowed limited spending to be restored.

The FY 1985-

89 budgets were all growth budgets so the increased
revenue as a result of the increased economic activity
enabled the state to meet spending levels with no
general tax increases.

However,

the reductions in the

level of federal funds needed to maintain current level
of services continued,

shifting more responsibility

from the federal government to the state government.
Overall,

during the period 1982-1987 California lost

over $13 billion in federal funding needed to maintain
pre Reagan service levels,

a drop of 16%.^°^

In January 1987 the first alarms were sounded
about shrinking state revenues.

A $1 billion reserve

fund accumulated during the growth years was drained

^°^New York Times,

5 March 1982,

page 1.

^“^American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, The Republican Record: A 7-Year Analysis of Stat^
Losses of Federal Funding (FY 1982 - FY 1988) (Washington, D.C.:
AFSCME), Tables.
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and the state was predicting a $500 million revenue
shortfall for FY 1987.^°^

In response the state

raised taxes approximately $1 billion for FY 1988.
by January,

But

1989 state economic growth had slowed and

revenues began to drop off again.

And in the spring of

1991 in the planning for the FY 1992 budget things got
much worse.

The gap between projected revenues and

expenditures had reached $12.6 billion,
total state budget.

or 23% of the

In response the states enacted a

tax increase that included raising the sales tax and
the income tax for taxpayers with incomes of more than
$200,000 which generated $7.3 billion in taxes.

At the

same time the legislature cut another $5 billion from
spending programs.

Still,

this wasn't enough.

The FY

1993 budget was projected to be another $10.7 billion
in the red and there seemed no political will to
further raise taxes.

Instead,

after tremendous

political upheaval in the state government draconian
spending cuts were made,

deeply affecting both social

services and education.
Impact on California Public Higher Education
State funding for public higher education in
California reflected this trend of initial decrease.

^°^New York Times,

18 January 1987,

page 23.
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significant increase,

and then dramatic decrease.

Between FY 1981-84 state funding for public higher
education declined a total of 16% in real dollars or an
average of slightly more than 5% per year in real
dollars.

During the period FY 1984-89 public higher

education in California received an increase of 40% in
the real dollars of their state appropriation,
average of 8% per year in real dollars.

or an

But from FY

1989 to FY 1993 state appropriations dropped 23% in
real dollars,

or an average of 5.75% per year in real

dollars and show no signs of levelling off.

Overall,

between FY 1981 and FY 1993 California state funding
for public higher education had declined a total of
9.4% in real dollars
decrease,

(see Figure 6.5).^°^

While this

increase and then decrease was going on in

appropriations,

the cost to attend California public

higher education institutions was following the same
pattern.

Using the "flagship" campus of the public

higher education system,
at Berkeley,

the University of California

as the gauge,

between FY 1981-1984 the

cost of attendance increased 44% in real dollars or an
average of 14.6% per year in real dollars.

Then during

the period FY 1984-1989 the cost of attendance actually

Center for the Study of Higher Education,
Appropriations.

State
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declined by 3.8% in real dollars.

But during the

period FY 1989-1993 the cost of attendance again
increased,

this time by 64% in real dollars or an

average of 16% per year in real dollars.

Overall,

from

FY 1981-93 the increase in cost was 126% in real
dollars

(see Figure 6.6).
Massachusetts

Setting
When Reagan took office in January,

1981 the

Massachusetts state economy was in relatively good
health and had been so during the late 1970s.

During

the recessions of 1969-70 and 1973-75 the state was hit
harder than most,

the first time because of Vietnam war

era defense cutbacks and the second time because of the
state's 80% dependence on foreign oil for its energy
needs.

But each time the state economy rebounded

strongly.

In the late 1970s Massachusetts joined

California as a leader in the national
In November,
Reagan,

1980,

"tax revolt."

along with the election of Ronald

a property tax-limitation referendum.

Proposition 2 1/2 won overwhelming approval.

This

referendum severely cutback property tax revenues thus
placing a tremendous strain on local governments who
turned to the state for increased local aid.

The state

government provided this help by making program cuts in
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other areas of the budget and using the saved revenue
to increase state aid to local governments.

This

increase in local aid came on top of an already
increasing state appropriation for such aid.

Total

direct state aid to local governments increased from
$871 million in FY 1978 to $1,288 billion in FY 1981.
After Proposition 2 1/2 the aid increased to $1,539
billion in FY 1983,

$1,696 billion in FY 1983 and

$1,827 billion in FY 1984.^°=
Reagan Cuts and the Massachusetts State Response
During the period FY 1982-1987 Massachusetts state
government lost more than $3.4 billion in federal
funding needed to maintain pre-Reagan service levels,
drop of 19.5%.^°^

a

More than most states,

Massachusetts chose to cushion the impact of Reagan's
federal grant reductions by replacing them with state
funds.

However,

this response varied significantly by

grant type.
The state ratified most of the cuts in entitlement
programs resulting from changes in federal eligibility
requirements.

This peimiitted the government to drop

^°®Nathan,

Reagan and the States, pages 139-141.

^°®AFSCME,

The Republican Record,

tables.

^“"'Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 138.
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individuals from AFDC,

Medicaid and food stamp programs

so between 1982-83 the AFDC caseload in Massachusetts
declined by 27%,
in one year.

resulting in a drop in spending of 16%

Though the state did increase the clothing

allowances given beneficiaries these allocations were
small relative to the cut in federal appropriation.

As

a result of the drop in AFDC cases the Medicaid
caseload also dropped 10% between 1981-1983 because a
substantial part of the Medicaid cost is for AFDC
recipients who are automatically eligible for
Medicaid.
Massachusetts funding for the new health,
service,

social

and employment and training block grants all

declined between 10% and 46%.

Given the opportunity of

more control inherent in the block grant format the
state government took over the authority for three of
the four health block grants,
block grant,

the community services

the elementary and secondary education

block grant and the new job training programs.
Massachusetts chose to replace a larger proportion of
these federal cuts than it did in the entitlement
programs,

but did not replace all the cuts.

The most

significant replacement effort was for social services

^°®Nathan,

Reagan and the States, page 142.
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programs.

In some cases funding for these programs was

actually increased on top of replacement of lost
federal funds.

In FY 1983 the state replaced more of

the federal cuts including appropriations for maternal
and child health programs.

But there was no

replacement effort in community services or employment
and training programs .
In Massachusetts subsidized housing programs were
the most seriously affected capital programs by the
Reagan budget cuts.

Subsidized housing funds to

Massachusetts shrank by 46% in FY 82 and in 1983 were
still 39% below the pre-Reagan levels.

The state did

attempt to replace and even augment some of the
subsidized housing funding but was not able to replace
all of the reduction in federal funds.
In FY 1984 the economy recovered and the state
budget regained its good health.

Things were going so

well that between FY 1985 and FY 1986 the state
legislature reduced the income tax from 5.375% to 5.0%.
This resulted in a loss of $400 million in revenue
which was made up by the growth in tax revenues due to

3”Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

pages 148-151.

^^°Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 155.
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the economic expansion underway.This expansion
continued until halfway through FY 1988
of the Presidential campaign)
drop.

(in the midst

when revenues began to

To help compensate in FY 1989 a $2 64 million tax

increase on tobacco and cigarettes was enacted.

But

this was only a fraction of what was needed because
soon state tax revenues were in a virtual freefall.
The FY 1990 budget was passed with an income tax hike
to cover the previous year's deficit but the budget was
soon out of balance and a series of mid-year spending
reductions were implemented.

In FY 1990 total state

revenues were nearly $1 billion less than the previous
year.

For FY 1991 a $1.2 billion tax increase was

passed but this still didn't stem the tide of declining
revenues so more spending cuts were made during the
early months of FY 1991.

However,

in Fall,

1990 the

Massachusetts population sent a mixed message when they
elected a new Governor who campaigned on a no new taxes
pledge but rejected a income tax rollback initiative by
a 60-40% margin.

But,

regardless,

a $1 billion budget

gap for FY 1992 was met entirely through spending

^^^Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, State Budget Trends;
1979-1988, (Boston: Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, 1987),
page 6-7.
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reductions putting tremendous strain on social services
and education.
Impact on Massachusetts Public Higher Education
State funding for public higher education in
Massachusetts maintained a steady growth throughout the
Reagan administration peaking in FY 1988.

Between FY

1981 and FY 1988 Massachusetts state funding for public
higher education doxibled in real dollars,
14% growth per year in real dollars

an average of

(see Figure

6.7).^^^ During this period the cost of attending the
"flagship" campus of the Massachusetts system,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst,

the

increased 33%

in real dollars or an average of 4.6% per year in real
dollars

(see Figure 6.8).^^^

However,

when the Massachusetts economic boom

peaked in FY 1988 funding for public higher education
began a long decline that left it near the real dollar
value of the appropriation at the beginning of the
Reagan term.

Between Fy 1988-1992 Massachusetts state

appropriations for public higher education declined 44%
in real dollars or an average of 11% per year in real

Center for the Study of Higher Education,
Appropriations

State

^^^University of Massachusetts, FACTBOOK (various years)
(Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts).

226
dollars.To accentuate this decline in state
support the cost of attendance during this same period
increased dramatically.

Between FY 1988-1992 the cost

of attendance of the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst increased 105% in real dollars or an increase
of 26% per year in real dollars.

In addition,

during

the period FY 1988-1992 state financial aid was
decreased 73% in real dollars or an average of 18% in
real dollars.
New York
Setting
New York has historically had a strong commitment
to high government spending,

high taxes,

mandated public services programs.

and state-

This comes from a

liberal political culture that values the role of the
public sector in aiding those in need.

Spending for

the needy is among the most generous in the nation,
multibillion dollar public higher education system
receives strong bipartisan support,

and most laws

concerning special education services,

preventive

mental health services protective and health care

Center for the Study of Higher Education,
Appropriations.

State

^^^The Center for the Study of Higher Education,
Appropriations.

State

the
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services for the children and elderly are much more
comprehensive than federal programs.

During the 1950s

New York's government expenditures and taxes per capita
were the highest in the nation.
state was also high;

But income in the

tax burden as measured by the

ratio of revenues to personal income was lower than in
many states,

exceeding the national average by only

16%.
However,

in the mid-1960s growth in spending,

especially to assist low-income people,
growth of the economy.

By 1975 not only were taxes per

capita the highest in the nation,
was also the highest,

exceeded the

but the tax burden

36% above the national average.

This caused the era of rising spending to come to an
end and during the 1975 New York City fiscal crisis
state finances grew suspect as well.

A new governor

argued that high taxes were driving business out of the
states and thereby contributed to the deterioration in
the tax base.

Therefore,

the fiscal crisis of 1975

essentially served the same function as the
constitutional and statutory tax and expenditure
limitations instituted in California and Massachusetts.
It encouraged lower income tax rates and cuts in the

^^®Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

pages 169 172.
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growth of spending.

Between 1975 and 1981 revenues

decreased in real dollars due to reductions in personal
and business taxes and the slow growth in the economy.
But expenditures,

though growing much less than before,

still remained relatively unchanged in real dollars.
This resulted in deficits and in 1981 the need to
borrow over $3 billion.

So,

when Reagan proposed his

reductions in federal aid in 1981 the New York state
budget was already extremely tight.
Reagan Cuts and New York State Response
In 1980-81,

just prior to the Reagan initiative,

federal grants to New York State amounted to $6.7
billion,

24% of state expenditures.

Federal grants

directly to New York local governments amounted to $1.8
billion,

or 5% of their expenditures.^^®

New York

lost $12.5 billion in federal grants-in-aid during the
Reagan Administration from the levels of funding needed
to maintain pre-Reagan service levels.®^®

When the

cuts were announced then Governor Carey reluctantly
proposed an increase in the sales tax and other
miscellaneous taxes.

But the option of raising any

^^^Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

pages 172-173.

^^®Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 174.

319AFSCME,

The Republican Record,

Tables.
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taxes,

including the sales tax,

legislature.^^®

However,

was rejected by the

the legislature,

while

rejecting the tax increases continued to add to
expenditures which made the 81-82 recession a further
strain on the budget.

When Governor Cuomo took office

in 1983 the deficit was estimated at $1.8 billion,
largest in state history.

the

Because of the scope of this

internal state finance problem the cuts in federal aid
proposed by Reagan,
budget,

although significant for the state

received little attention.

Even though little public attention was focused on
the impact of the Reagan cuts the state did move to
compensate for them.

Compensation tended to occur

mostly in programs that were structured to
automatically fill gaps in federal support as in the
case of AFDC and compensatory education aid.
Compensation also occurred in programs offering
mechanisms for replacing federal cuts without enacting
special legislation.

These mechanisms were crucial in

replacing cuts in the social services block grant,
where state mandates permitted the state and localities
to finance services after the block grants were

^^°Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 173.

^^^Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 174.
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exhausted.

This made the impact of the 1981 cuts

important not so much for any reordering of
intergovernmental relationships between New York and
Washington,

but rather for the reinforcing of those

characteristics of big state government and liberalism
that had long existed in the state.However,
the

face of the severe 1981-82

in

recession and budget

deficit already facing the state,these
compensatory actions placed additional strain on the
state budget so that taxes were raised $900 million to
balance for the FY 1984

state budget.

Economic recovery began in earnest in late 1983

so

the combination of this tax increase and spurred
economic growth led to significant increases
revenues

for FY 1984.

This

and a three-year tax cut,

in state

led to increased spending

with the FY 1987 budget still

ending with a substantial surplus.

This

situation

reflected the national economy's recovery that had
pulled out of recession in FY 1983
through FY 1987.

and continued

However in January,

1988

the state

growth slowed substantially and the state was

^^^Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

pages 206-207.

^^^Nathan,

Reagan and the States,

page 174.

^^^New York Times,

19 March 1983,

page 1.
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with a budget gap of nearly $2 billion.

By May,

1988

revenues had dropped even more and even before the ink
had dried on the FY 1989 budget it was

thought to be

out of balance,

resulting in large spending reductions.

But by January,

1990 revenues had fallen so much that

planning for the FY 1991 state budget entailed closing
a $4 billion gap.

To do so the state legislature

passed the FY 1991 budget with the largest tax increase
in New York state history;

$1.4 billion plus a deferral

of a planned $400 million income tax cut,
to making deep cuts

in social spending.

did not stem the erosion of revenues.
1991 deficit projections

for FY 1992

or 20% of the state budget.

in addition
But this

still

During late FY
reached $6 billion

And even after

unprecedented spending reductions and another $1.2
billion in tax increases
to

the state revenues continued

fall resulting in a new deficit for FY 1993.

Impact on New York Public Higher Education
State funding for public higher education in New
York,

like Massachusetts,

maintained a steady rate of

growth throughout the Reagan years.

Between FY 1981-89

New York state funding for public higher education
increased 29%

in real dollars or an average increase of
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3.5% per year in real dollars

(see Figure 6.9).^^^

During this period the average cost of attendance at
the State University of New York at Albany increased a
total of 2% in real dollars
However,

like Massachusetts,

(see Figure 6.10).^^®
when the economic growth

period ended in 1988 funding for public higher
education in New York dropped significantly.

Between

FY 1989-1993 state support declined 24% in real dollars
or an average of 6% per year in real dollars.
addition,

In

the cost of attending SUNY/Albany during this

period increased 67% in real dollars or an average of
16.8% per year in real dollars.

At the same time state

financial aid increased a total of 2.7% in real dollars
or an average of

.7% per year in real dollars.

Conclusion
The’ national data indicates that when state
governments were placed in serious financial
difficulties by changes in federal policies during the
years of the Reagan administration the burden on the

Center for the Study of Higher Education,
Appropriations.

State

^^®State University of New York at Albany Student Accounts
Office, unpublished data.
^^■'The Center for the Study of Higher Education,
Appropriations.

State
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states

to

fund public higher

difficult.

However,

the

there were differences
states

and

the

three case

in

response

education became very

of

the

studies

impact

on

show that

individual

their

governments.

As Arthur Hauptman

Spiral points

out:

in The College Tuition

...a state's ability to fund higher education
may be constrained by increased competition
between higher education and other state
priorities brought about by changing federal
priorities... that lead to more state
responsibility for functions previously
performed at the local level.
What

also becomes

that when

the

public higher
the

cost

of

rate

clear
of

from examining

growth

in state

this

support

education declined the rate

attendance

increased.

consistent with previous

data

These

is

for

of growth
findings

research conducted on

in

are

this

issue.
The

replacement

support with
Hauptman

of

lost

tuition and fee

in his

article

Commitment

Hauptman writes

that

impact

for higher
on

the

rate

dollars

"Trends

State Financial

funding

state higher

in

explored by

the Federal

and

to Higher Education".

the way

in which states provide

education has
of

is

education

increase

in

a

"large and inverse"
the cost

of

^^®Arthur M. Hauptman, The College Tuition Spiral
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), pages 14-15.

(New York:
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attendance that public institutions charge their
students.

This,

he argues,

is because the revenue from

tuition and mandatory fees at public higher education
institutions are generally used to fill the gap between
state appropriations and the size of institutional
budgets.

So when state funds increase rapidly,

the

cost of attendance tends to increase less since there
is a smaller gap to fill between state funding and
institutional spending levels.
state funds slows,

When the growth of

then the cost of attendance tends to

increase faster to make up for the larger difference
between institutional budgets and state funds.
Hauptman writes that since the extent of state funds
available to public higher education is tied in a
direct way to the state economy there is a "disturbing"
relationship between changes in economic conditions and
increases in cost of attendance.

When economic

conditions are bad a state cannot afford to increase or
even maintain institutional budgets so the cost of
attendance rises faster.

As the economy improves,

state funding increases so cost of attendance increases
slow down.

Hauptman finds that this is what happened

in the 1980s.

When the economy went into recession in

the early 1980s and state resources were scarce the
cost of attendance skyrocketed.

When the economy

235
recovered in the mid-1980s the cost of attendance
increases at public institutions eased.

Hauptman

argues that this runs counter to what the policy should
be.

He explains that students are asked to pay the

highest cost of attendance increases when times are
good and the least increase when they can least afford
them,

when economic conditions are bad.^^^

These

findings were confirmed by Mcpherson et al in an
empirical analysis found in their article "Recent
Trends in U.S.

Higher Education Costs and Prices:

The

Role of Government Funding
The relationship between decreases in state
financing of public higher education and increases in
the cost of attendance,

linked to the earlier

established relationship between federal economic
policies and state finances,

provides the basis for the

argument put forth in this dissertation.

^^^Arthur M. Hauptman, "Trends in the Federal and State
Financial Commitment to Higher Education," in The Uneasy Public
Policy Triangle in Higher Education: Quality, Efficiency and
Budgetary Efficiency, David H. Finifter, Roger G. Baldwin, and
John R. Thelin eds. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1991): pages 124-125.
^^°Michael S. McPherson, Morton Owen Schapiro, and Gordon C.
Winston, "Recent Trends in U.S. Higher Education Costs and Prices:
The Role of Government Funding," AEA Papers and Proceedings 79
(May 1989): pages 253-257.
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the
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During the years of the Reagan administration and
the term of George Bush that succeeded it the national
economy followed a pattern of
in 1981-1982,

first a severe recession

then sustained growth from 1983-89 and

then stagnation and recession between 1990-92.
However,

throughout the entire period of 1981-92

federal deficit kept growing.
result of the faulty economic

the

This was primarily a
forecasts

that ended up

over $660 billion off in projected revenues during the
period FY 1982-87.^^^
The Reagan administration was,
successful
tax levels;

however,

in three of its major goals:

somewhat

to cut income

to cut the growth in domestic spending;

to increase military spending.

and

During the first year

of the Reagan administration personal

income tax rates

were cut dramatically and though many other federal
taxes

increased during the Reagan and Bush

administrations,

these individual

income tax levels

remained below the levels when Reagan took office.
Spending growth throughout the FY 1982-87
Reagan administration was cut

term of the

10% and even though this

^^^David Stockman, Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan
Revolution Failed, (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), page 399.
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was

only half of what Reagan proposed,

it was

still

a significant curtailment of the growth in spending.
Military spending was also increased significantly
during the Reagan administration,

rising an average of

6.3% per year in real dollars before peaking in FY
1989.
The impact of these economic policies
government

on state

finances was significant in two major ways:

the substantial reduction in federal aid to state
governments during the initial phase of
implementation of Reaganomics;

the

and the transferring of

responsibility for certain social

services

federal government to state governments,

from the

particularly

in the Medicaid program.
Reagan was very successful at cutting federal aid
to state governments during the initial phase of his
administration.

As explained earlier,

in the first

budget of the Reagan administration total
grants

federal

to state and local government were cut by 13.1%

from baseline levels.

When Congress passed a modified

version of the Reagan proposed legislation that
consolidated 57

categorical grants

into nine new,

or

^^^William Niskanen, Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the
Policies and the People, (New York: Oxford University Press,

1988),

page 9.
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modified,

block grants at a budget authority of

approximately $7.5 billion,

it represented a cut of

approximately 25% or almost 33% in real terms,

from the

previous year's authorization.Overall funding for
federal aid to state and local governments dropped
sharply in the first Reagan budget,

$6.6 billion in

current dollars or $9 billion in real terms

(12%),

the

first annual drop in nominal terms in more than 25
years.
It is also important to note that the reductions
in funding for the programs grouped in the block grants
fell disproportionately on the poor.
entitlement programs,
service programs,

Cuts in

public service jobs,

aid to large cities,

community

aid to schools

serving low-income student in large cities,

and housing

assistance affected the poor more than any other
economic group.Half of the reduction for FY 1982
was in the education,

training and employment and

social services category.

^^^Scott Matheson, Out of Balance, (Salt Lake City,
Peregring Smith Books, 1986), pages 22-24.

Utah:

^^^Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle, and Associates,
Reagan and the States, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1987), page 65.
^^^John C. Weicher, "The Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts:
Proposals, Outcomes, and Effects," in Essays in Contemporary
Economic Problems, 1986: The Impact of the Reagan Program, pp.
7-44, edited by Phillip Cagan, (Washington, D.C.: American

250
By the end of the Reagan administration grant-inaid cuts

to state and local governments

billion from baseline levels

totalled $123.6

(16.5%).^^®

This

reduction also contributed to the decrease in the share
of

federal aid in state spending from 25%

1970s

to 17%

in FY 1991.

Though it was

in the late

the hope of

Reagan administration that these reductions

in federal

aid to state governments would enlist the states
Reagan's
board,
federal

efforts

the

in

to retrench social spending across

the

there was a large degree of replacement of
funds with state funds by state governments,

despite the severe 1981-1982 recession.

However,

it

was also clear that when the states became reliant on
their own funds,
budget priorities

they would select very different
from those chosen in the past with

federal aid as an incentive.

These state responses

to

federal aid cutbacks depended primarily on the
political and economic climate of the particular state.
In supportive political environments
programs)
state's

(pro-social

and supportive economic culture

(where the

economy and finances were strong enough to

Enterprise Institute,

1986), pages 25-27.

^^®Artierican Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, The Republican Record: A 7-Year Analysis of State
Losses of Federal Fundino (FY 1982 - FY 1988) (Washington, D.C.:
AFSCME), page 2.
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permit replacement efforts)
replaced.

more federal aid was

Another aspect of the replacement effort

also was clear:

the stronger the redistributive purpose

of a given program and the more a program was
for the poor the less

targeted

likely it would be protected,

even though these programs were more likely to be cut
by the
evident
of

federal government.

This became most

in the entitlement programs.

The replacement

federal cuts by state governments was

in programs

the greatest

that historically were areas of the most

state and local activity and where organized and
politically active local constituencies cared about
activities.

So,

the

even though states attempted to

replace federal aid reductions,

they aimed their

replacement efforts at those with the most political
clout.

This

served to affect the poor the most

severely.
The will of states

to replace federal aid

unfortunately coincided with a sharp decline in the
growth of state tax revenues as a result of the 19811982

recession.

1979-1981
terms.

As documented earlier,

between FY

state tax revenues grew by 3.9%

Between FY 1981-1982

^^■'Nathan et al,

in real

state tax revenues

Reagan and the States,

page 112.
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actually declined slightly in real
combination of

terms.This

increased spending responsibilities and

decreased tax revenues put a severe strain on state
budgets.

In January 1983,

revenue shortfalls
two-thirds

41 of

the 50

states

totalling $8 billion.

faced

As a result,

of the states were forced to reduce spending

in mid-year to less

than the originally appropriated

levels

fiscal year.

1982

for the 1982

and 1983,

44

To compensate,

in FY

states raised taxes and revenue

raising measures were again implemented by many states
in fiscal

1984.^^^

As a result,

state tax revenues

between FY 1982-1983

increased 3.5%

in real terms.

When the economic recovery began to take hold in 1983
these new taxes brought in substantial new
revenues.Tax revenues of states between FY 19831984

increased 6.5%

1985

and 6.9%

followed by a 6.3%

in FY 1986.^^^

increase in FY

What makes

these tax

Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
^^^Scott M. Matheson, "The Federal Budget Deficit: Impact on
the States," in Facing the Facts: The Democratic Governors' View^
From the States, ed. Bernard Aronson (Washington, D.C.: Democratic
Governors' Association, 1984), page 93.
^^°U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(various years)., (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
^^^Weicher,

"Reagan Domestic Budget Cuts," page 34.

^^^U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(various years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
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increases

even more significant was

that they were

passed in the midst of a strong tax-limitation movement
that was

thriving in states across

the country.

It is

likely that state governments used significant amounts
of political capital to pass these tax increases.
Throughout the 1980s another important factor was
at work that deeply affected state finances:
health care costs.

rising

In contrast to the stated goals of

the Reagan administration to devolute policy making
responsibility from the federal government to state
governments,

Medicaid policy making shifted

disproportionately

the federal government which then

passed on new mandates

to the states

thus

substantially

increasing state funding responsibilities.

Medicaid

was designed originally as a partnership between the
states and the federal government.
1980s major unilateral changes

implement.

Many states

during the

in federal Medicaid

requirements became more frequent.
contained significant costs

However,

These changes often

for the states

to

found it extremely difficult to

finance the new conditions and requirements without
raising taxes,

shifting Medicaid resources by

eliminating optional services or closing public
clinics,

or reducing other state spending

(emphasis
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added)

Medicaid expenditures accounted for 14.8%

of state general
1980 and 7.0%

expenditures

in 1970.^^'^

in 1990,

up from 11.6%

in

These increased health care

costs contributed significantly to the financial
difficulties of
Still,

states

in FY 1991-92.^^^

the economic expansion of the mid 1980s

enabled state governments

to

increased responsibilities.

temporarily absorb these
Between FY 1983-89 state

tax revenues rose a total of 34.1%

in real terms,

average of 5.7% per year in real terms.
to a 7.6%

an

This compared

increase in real terms between 1979 and 1983,

an annual average of 1.9%

in real terms.This

increased revenue served to gloss over the significant
transformation in the relationship between federal and
state government and the increased responsibilities
taken on by the states.

However,

when the economic

expansion ended in 1990 and recession took hold the
structural changes

in the federal-state relationship

^^^Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,

Medicaid: Intergovernmental Trends and Options
GPO, 1992), page 1.

(Washington,

D.C.:

^’‘‘Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,

Medicaid,

page 2.

^^^Edward M. Gramlich, "The 1991 State and Local Fiscal
Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Volume 2 (1991):
page 247.
Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(Various Years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
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crystallized and state governments were suddenly in
deep financial difficulties.

Between FY 1989-1990

state tax revenues slowed to an increase of 3.5% in
real terms and between FY 1990-1991 rose only 1.1% in
real te2nns.

At the same time state expenditures

between FY 1989-1990 rose 4.8% in real terms and
between FY 1990-1991 rose 6.3% in real terms.This
significant increase in state spending was largely
attributable to rising health care costs.By the
middle of FY 1991 at least 30 states were facing
serious budget shortfalls^^^ with the number rising to
at least 37 states in FY 1992.^^°
The distribution of tax responsibility also
changed with spending responsibilities.

Both state and

local taxes rose in the 1980s compared to federal
taxes.

In 1987 states accounted for 26.1% of total tax

revenue raised by all levels of government not counting
trust funds suck as Social Security,

up from 23.9% in

Bureau of the Census, State Government Finances
(Various Years), (Washington, D.C.: GPO).
^^®Gramlich,

"The 1991 State and Local Fiscal Crisis," page

247.
^^®Larry Tye, "Downturn Forces Deficits in 30 States," Boston
Globe, 23 November 1990, page 1.
^®°Chronicle of Higher Education.

9 January 1991, page A20.
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1980 and 20.6% in 1970.^^^

Much of this increase in

state tax burden was in the form of personal income
taxes which rose from 19.1% of state tax revenue in
1970 to 3 0.8% of state tax revenue in 1987.^^^

This

made it politically very difficult for states to raise
taxes again to offset the budget deficits in 1991 and
1992.
These changes in state finances during the period
FY 1982-1992 had a significant impact on state funding
of public higher education and access to these
institutions.

The implementation of federal reductions

in aid to state governments and the 1981-1982 recession
led to significant cutbacks in state financing of
public higher education.

Between FY 1981-84 state

appropriations for public higher education increased
less than 1% per year in real terms,

down from the 6%

per year real growth during the Carter administration.
One of the major consequences of this decline in the
rate of growth of state funding of public higher
education was the significant increase in the cost of
attendance that was used to offset the declines in the

^^^Steven Gold, "State Finances in the New Era of Fiscal
Federalism," in The Changing Face of Fiscal Federalism, eds.
Thomas R. Swartz and John E. Peck (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
1990), page 92.
^^^Gold,

"State Finances," page 93.
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rate of state support.

During this period of less than

1% per year real growth in state support the average
cost of attendance of public higher education rose an
average of 5.4% per year in real terms

(13%

nominala steep rate of increase especially during
one of the most serious recessions since the Great
Depression.

This replacement of state dollars with

student dollars had a negative impact on access to
public higher education institutions which was
exacerbated by the simultaneous decline in available
student financial aid.

During the three year period FY

1981-1984 total state,

federal and institutional

financial aid declined at a rate of 3.5% per year in
real dollars.
During the growth period,

the impact of the Reagan

program on public higher education was mitigated
somewhat because state expenditures increased at an
average rate of 5% per year in real dollars.
During this period state appropriations for public
higher education increased at an average rate of 3.6%

^^^U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education
Statistics 1991, (Washington, D.C.: GPO), page 296.
^^^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1980 to 1989,
(Washington, D.C.: College Board Publications, 1989), pages 7-9.
^®^U.S. Bureau of the Census,
(various years).

State Government Finances
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per year in real dollars.As a result of the
increased state appropriations for public higher
education the increase in the average cost of
attendance also eased,

though only slightly.

During

the period FY 1984-1988 the average cost of attendance
at institutions of public higher education increased by
an average of 4.8% per year in real dollars
nominal)

(8%

More importantly concerning access

during this period,

the level of total financial aid

increased an average of 4.6% per year in real dollars
including a 3.5% increase per year in real dollars of
federal aid.^^®
In the aftermath of the Reagan presidency the
situation deteriorated for public higher education.
Between FY 1988-91 state support for public higher
education grew at an average rate of less than 1% per
year in real dollars.This was despite the fact
that state expenditures grew at an average rate of 5%

^^®Center for the Study of Higher Education State
Appropriations for Public Higher Education; 1976-1993
Illinois: Unpublished Data).
^®’U.S. Department of Education,
Statistics 1991, page 296.
358The College Board,

(Normal,

Digest of Education

Trends in Student Aid,

page 9.

^^^The Center for the Study of Higher Education,
Appropriations.

State
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per year in real dollars during the same period.^®®
During this same period the cost of attendance rose an
average of 1.8% per year in real dollars^®^ while
total financial aid declined slightly in real
dollars.Between FY 1991-93 things became much
worse.

During these past two years state support for

public higher education has declined an average of
3.75% per year in real dollars^^^ while the cost of
attendance has increased at an average rate of 8% per
year in real terms.And between FY 1991-1992
1993 data not yet available)

(FY

total financial aid

increased only 5% in real terms.
Overall during the period FY 1981-1993 total state
support for public higher education increased 12% in
real dollars or 1% per year in real dollars,

while the

cost of attendance increased 69% in real dollars or

Bureau of

the Census,

State Government

Finances

(various years).
Department
Statistics

1991,

page

^®^The College
363The Center

of

Digest

of

Education

296,

Board,
for

Education,

the

Trends

in Student Aid,

Study of Higher

page

Education,

9.
State

Appropriations.

year.
21

^^‘‘Jean Evangelauf,
"Tuition at Public Colleges is Up 10% This
College Board Study Finds," Chronicle of Higher Education,

October

1992,

page A36,

^^^The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1982
(Washington, D.C.: College Board Publications, 1992),

to 1992,
page 1-9.
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5.7% per year in real dollars.

During the period FY

1981-1992 total available financial aid increased 12.8%
in real dollars or 1.2% per year in real dollars while
the percentage of total aid available in the forms of
loans increased from 40.4% to 49%.
This national data indicates that when state
governments were placed in serious financial
difficulties by changes in federal policies during the
early years of the Reagan administration the burden on
the states to fund public higher education became very
difficult.

State increases in real funding for public

higher education were limited to 1% per year while real
increases in cost of attendance grew to 5.4% per year.
When the economy recovered during the mid-1980s state
finances also rebounded and using increased tax
revenues from the recovery as well as from tax
increases implemented before the recovery,

states were

able to handle the increased responsibilities and fund
state public higher education at a reasonable rate of
real growth.

Real state funding grew by 3.6% per year

while real cost increases averaged 4.8% per year.

But

when the economy slowed during the years immediately
following the Reagan administration and state
expenditures continued to rise due to increased state
responsibilities,

especially for Medicaid costs,

public
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6d.uca.tion funding slowed to nean zeno gnowth in
real terms.

And when the recession hit in FY 1991

causing a slowdown in state revenues,

the bottom fell

out of state financing of public higher education.
Real state support declined by 3.75% per year while the
real cost of attendance increased 8% per year.
These findings are consistent with previous
research which found that a state's ability to fund
higher education may be constrained by increased
competition between higher education and other state
priorities that was brought about by changing federal
priorities.

Implications of These Findings for Future State
Financing and Accessibility of Public Higher Education
The findings of this study have significant
implications for the understanding of future state
financing and accessibility of public higher education
because they clearly establish the relationship between
federal economic policies,

state finances,

financing of public higher education,
public higher education.

state

and access to

Because of these

relationships it becomes clear that the future levels
of state financing of public higher education and

^®®Arthur M.
Macmillan

Hauptman,

The College Tuition Spiral

Publishing Company,

1990),

pages

14-15.

(New York:
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access

to these institutions will depend greatly on the

economic policies of the Clinton administration.
Obviously the general recovery of the national
economy,

whether brought about by Clinton's economic

policies or other economic variables,

will go far in

the restoration of real growth in state funding of
public higher education.

An economic recovery will

likely lead to increased economic activity on the state
level and,
it is

therefore,

increased tax revenues.

However,

important to note that an economic recovery will

likely not entirely solve state governments'
problems.
rising cost

financial

The findings of this

study show that the

to state government

for health care has

played a major role in state financial difficulties
between FY 1989-1993.

This

indicates

that in order to

solve state government

financial difficulties

significant health care reform must accompany any
economic recovery.

The fact that state expenditures

continued to rise at a significant rate during the Bush
Administration while state funding levels

for public

higher education lagged well behind indicates the
consuming nature of rising health care costs and their
direct impact on public higher education.
increases

the urgency of

This

finding

the effort by the Clinton

administration to reform health care.

Clinton spoke
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often during the presidential campaign of the
tremendous

strain of rising health care costs on state

government

finances.

And since becoming President he

has demonstrated his understanding of the importance of
health care reform in restoring financial health to
state governments.

However intent is different than

success and it remains

to be seen how successful his

health care reform efforts are

(if at all).

However,

there can be no doubt that lessening this health care
burden on state governments will go far in freeing
state funds

that could be used for public higher

education.
Still,

even if this money is

freed it remains

to

be seen whether states will actually respond by
increasing their funding of public higher education.
The fact that the growth of state funding for public
higher education has

lagged behind the growth in state

expenditures during the past few years
the growing movement towards
services.

likely reflects

"privatization"

The concept of privatization has

of public
taken root

in many corners of the country and has contributed to
the significant increases

in the cost of attendance of

public higher education.

Whether this rush to

privatization represents an ideological shift in state
government or a tactic

to deal with severe financial
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constraints
when

the

on

financial pressure

However,

the

the

of

rate

during
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fact
state

the mid

attendance

that
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the growth in
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students
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of

in
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education
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submit
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institutions.
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economic

body of public higher

needed direction

the

for

financial

information
This makes
it

seems

aid

to public

it difficult

reasonable

levels

of

financial
the

further

findings

of

to
in
aid

student

education institutions.

to higher

policy professionals,

students

economic background

composition of

question certainly deserves
Nevertheless,

those

of

combination of high increases

attendance and lagging

changed the

the cost

of public higher education.

obtain on

impact.

that

that must be

the growth in

only those applying

required to

hypothesize
cost

cost

economic background of

to

to gauge

increases

state politics
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able

higher
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other
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are

significant

eases.

thought.

The

of

state government

spending on public higher education

privatization has
otherwise

on

only be known

This

study.
this

study give much

education administrators,

union and student

advocates,

and
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state government officials involved with public higher
education.

When attempting to identify the causes of

the present financial crisis in public higher education
these people have tended to focus primarily on the
narrow question of state tax and expenditure policies.
The discussion concerning the decreases in state
revenue seems to focus on whether there should be tax
increases,

if so which one,

involved in the decision,
motivations.

who are the players

and what are their

The discussion about expenditures has

been about how to pay for various services,'what are
the choices that state government should make,
the most influence,
population.

who has

and who will suffer most in the

Although these are important questions

that need to be addressed in the discussion concerning
the present financial crisis in state funding of public
higher education,

the lack of attention paid to the

role of federal policies is striking.
The findings of this study clearly indicate that
in order to restore state finances to good health the
economic policies of the federal government will have
to play a major role.

The study also indicates that

the federal government has the capability of cushioning
the impact of national recessions on state governments
which could also ease the burden on public higher
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education.

Hopefully this understanding will encourage

those interested in the financial well-being of public
higher education to broaden the discussion to include
the responsibility of the federal government for the
present financial crisis and its alleviation.
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